NLRB Cases Archive 1960 - 1995, LABOR-RELATIONS 1993-94 CCH-NLRB ¶15,457, KIRKPATRICK ELECTRIC CO., INC. and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 136, AFL-CIO., (Sep. 09, 1994), National Labor Relations Board, (Sep 9, 1994)

KIRKPATRICK ELECTRIC CO., INC. and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 136, AFL-CIO.

314 NLRB No. 169.Case No. 10-CA-26166. September 9, 1994 Richard J. Linton, Administrative Law Judge..

Before Gould, Stephens and Devaney.

Edward A. Smith, for General Counsel. Eugene W. Fuquay, Birmingham, Alabama, for Respondent. Gary C. Reaves, Bus. Mgr. (IBEW 136), Homewood, Alabama, for Charging Party.

Activities Affecting Commerce--Board Discretion--Assent to Multiemployer Unit.--Although an employer denied the commerce allegations in an unfair labor practice complaint, NLRB jurisdiction was established respecting the employer because it had signed a Letter of Assent, which it never canceled, assigning its bargaining rights to a multiemployer association, thereby joining forces with a group in an activity that had an indisputable impact on commerce so far as the NLRA was concerned. Section 2(7).

Back reference: ¶1610.3491.

Refusal to Bargain--Appropriateness of Unit--One-Man Unit--Because a bargaining unit consisted of only one member, an employer’s repudiation of its collective bargaining agreement with a union was not an unlawful refusal to bargain. A second member of the unit was not a statutory employee, based on his close relationship to management. Although an administrative law judge stated that the employer’s bargaining duty would resume should the unit expand to two or more permanent statutory employees during the three-year term of the bargaining agreement, this was not the case. A relationship, once lawfully terminated, does not persist inchoate. It can only be reestablished through procedures recognized under Sec. 9(a) or 8(f). Section 8(a)(5).

Back reference: ¶3055.55.

Discharges--Antiunion Animus--Request for Contract Benefits.--Although an employer had no duty to apply a collective bargaining agreement--because the bargaining unit consisted of but a single statutory employee, it was not at liberty to terminate that statutory employee because he wanted the contract’s benefits applied. Had the employer merely informed the employee of why the bargaining agreement would no longer be applied, but that he was welcome to remain, a voluntary departure would have been neither a discharge nor a constructive discharge. Instead, the employer violated the NLRA by discharging the employee for union-related considerations. Section 8(a)(3) and (1)

Back reference: ¶4065.512.

From Text of Board’s Decision

The issues addressed here are whether the judge correctly found that (1) the Respondent is subject to the Board’s jurisdiction; (2) the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by repudiating its collective- bargaining agreement with the Union; and (3) the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Randall Mauldin. [1]

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, [2] and conclusions [3] and to adopt the recommended Order. [4]