NLRB Cases Archive 1960 - 1995, LABOR-RELATIONS 1993-94 CCH-NLRB ¶15,560, FORD MOTOR COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW), AFL-CIO., (Nov. 16, 1994), National Labor Relations Board, (Nov 16, 1994)

The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility resolutions. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. [19 LC ¶66,308] 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.

In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s no-distribution/no-solicitation rule was overly broad, we place no reliance on her citation to Soltech, Inc., [1991-92 CCH NLRB ¶17,095] 306 NLRB 269 (1992), which dealt with distribution of literature. Instead, we rely on Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794 (1987), in finding that the Respondent may not preclude the protected activity of union solicitation in working areas during nonworking time. We also stress that in addition to the factors the judge relied on, the Respondent’s unlawful no-distribution/no-solicitation rule constitutes a basis for setting aside the election in Case 7-RC-19940 because the rule impinged on the unit employees’ ability to communicate on matters relating to the organizing campaign.

We also adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent did not act unlawfully in converting some of its supplemental employees to fulltime status during the election campaign. This finding is supported by uncontroverted testimony by Ronald Bowersock, the Respondent’s engine laboratories manager, that the Respondent began the conversion process in June 1992, which was over a month before the organizing campaign started later that summer. Thus, we do not find that the Respondent initiated this change in employment conditions in order to dissipate support for the Union. We disregard, however, the judge’s finding that the filing of the representation petition on November 23, 1992, was the critical date for considering this issue. In the context of an unfair labor practice case, the Board examines whether the respondent’s conduct interfered with employees’ organizational rights without regard to whether the union had obtained the requisite showing of interest to file a representation petition.

Finally, in adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by verbally warning employee Robert Brace about taking a lengthy lunchbreak, we rely on Brace’s credited testimony that his immediate supervisor, Stan Harrison, told him after the incident that “it is only chicken shit and all this stuff will stop after the union stuff stops.” We note that, contrary to the judge’s findings, the Respondent gave two other employees similar warnings before bringing this matter to Brace’s attention and that the two supervisors who did so had direct authority over Brace at the time because they were substituting for Harrison. Nevertheless, we find that correction of the judge’s misstatements does not affect our ultimate finding of a violation here because Harrison’s statement effectively admits that the warning was attributable to the ongoing union activity.