NLRB Cases Archive 1960 - 1995, LABOR-RELATIONS 1993-94 CCH-NLRB ¶15,439, CARPENTRY CONTRACTORS, INC. and LOCAL UNION NO. 1234, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO., (Aug. 22, 1994), National Labor Relations Board, (Aug 22, 1994)

CARPENTRY CONTRACTORS, INC. and LOCAL UNION NO. 1234, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO.

314 NLRB No. 134.Case No. 7-CA-35375. August 22, 1994

Before Gould, Stephens and Browning.

Board Procedure--Answers--Partial Answer Responsive.--Although an employer’s answer in the form of a general denial to unfair labor practice charges was not in the appropriate form customarily accepted by the NLRB and failed to respond to each and every allegation of the complaint, the NLRB refused to grant summary judgment to the General Counsel on the pleadings. The employer’s letters to the Board were made without benefit of counsel and constituted a sufficiently clear and substantial denial of the charges required to call the allegations into question. Section 10(a).

Back reference: ¶5560.821.

From Text of Board’s Decision

The February 3 complaint alleges, inter alia, that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing and refusing, since about June 27, 1993, to pay bargaining unit employees the wages required by the Respondent’s collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, and to make contributions to the Union and to the Union’s Fringe Benefit Trust Funds on behalf of bargaining unit employees, as mandated by the collective-bargaining agreement. The Respondent did not file an answer to the complaint within the 14-day time period set forth in Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations. [1]

On March 2, the Board’s Regional Attorney notified the Respondent that an answer to the complaint had not been received, that the time for filing an answer was being extended to March 16, and that if no answer was filed by that deadline, the General Counsel would seek a default judgment from the Board against the Respondent, which, if granted, would result in all of the allegations in the complaint being deemed to be admitted to be true.

On March 15, the Respondent’s president and owner, Bryson Maddick, wrote to the Regional Director, stating in pertinent part:

It is my understanding that I may request a time extension on this hearing, to May 2, 1994. ... I will explain briefly my answer to each allegation as I explained in my affidavit to Eric Cockrell. [2]

Charge 1. Payed [sic] employees wages according [to] their job sites (wages are different)

2. Having payed [sic] some fringes, but am late on some.

On March 17, the Regional Director issued an order extending the time for the Respondent to file an answer to the complaint to April 4.

On April 3, Maddick again wrote to the Regional Director, stating in pertinent part:

In answer to the complaint filed against Carpentry Contractor Inc. by Carpenters Local 1234.

Complaint #1

Due to the various wage scales regarding type of construction (commercial, residential, multi-family [)] and apprentices and work in the Ann Arbor area.

Enclosed is a[n] affidavit from employees and wage scale. [3]

[typed]

[handwritten]

Complaint #2

We have contributed fringes for 1993 but are still behind.

On April 7, the Regional Attorney again wrote to Maddick, acknowledging receipt of what the Regional Attorney described as Maddick’s April 3 “Response to Complaint,” and advising him that “since your April 3 ... Response is intended to be an answer to the complaint herein, it is not sufficient for this purpose.” More specifically, the Regional Attorney told Maddick that his letter was deficient because it failed to respond to each complaint paragraph by admitting or denying the allegations, or by offering an explanation as to why an answer could not be provided. The Regional Attorney further advised Maddick that unless he complied with the Board’s Rules and Regulations in regard to filing an appropriate answer by April 11, a Motion for Default Judgment would be filed with the Board. The Respondent did not respond to the Regional Attorney’s letter.

In his motion, the General Counsel asserts that the Respondent’s March 15 and April 3 letters are not sufficient answers to the complaint because they do not comply with Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, supra. Thus, the General Counsel contends that no sufficient answer to the complaint has been filed, and that, in accordance with the provisions of Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, all allegations in the complaint should be deemed to be admitted to be true and should be so found by the Board, and that the Respondent should consequently be found to have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the complaint, as alleged.

2. Discussion

The Board, having considered the matter, finds that summary judgment is not appropriate here. The Respondent’s March 15 and April 3 pro se letters reasonably, albeit not artfully, appear to be denials of the complaint allegation that the Respondent has been failing and refusing to pay bargaining unit employees the wage rates required by the collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, although--as the General Counsel contends--the Respondent’s letters are not in a form that comports with Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the letters do respond effectively in the negative to the complaint allegations containing the operative facts of the alleged failure to pay contractually required wage rates. [4] And the letters do attempt to provide an explanation for the Respondent’s conduct in regard to wage rates paid. [5]

The Respondent’s letters do not, to be sure, respond to each and every allegation in the complaint. [6] Indeed, they do not address most of the facts alleged in the complaint. However, even if those unaddressed facts were deemed to be admitted to be true, the Respondent’s effective denials of the substance of the complaint allegation of failure to pay contractual wages has raised substantial and material issues of fact warranting a hearing before an administrative law judge. [7]

Under the circumstances, because the Respondent’s letters were filed without benefit of counsel, and also because they constitute a sufficiently clear denial of the allegation regarding failure to pay contractual wage rates, we will not preclude a determination on the merits simply because of the Respondent’s failure to comply with all of our procedural rules. [8]

Based on all of the above considerations, we conclude that the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.

[Partial Dissent]

Member Stephens, dissenting in part: In my view the Respondent’s letters answering the complaint substantially admit that the Respondent had failed to adhere to the contractual requirement of timely payments to fringe benefits trust funds. I would therefore grant the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to those allegations, finding a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) on that basis, and leaving to compliance the matter of what sums must be paid to remedy it. I agree with my colleagues that the Respondent has raised a factual issue as to the wage rate allegations and thus I join them in denying summary judgment as to that portion of the complaint.