Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, RETALIATION—S.D. Ohio: Ex-chief deputy's retaliation suit against Hamilton County sheriff fails, (Sep 28, 2026)

By Wendy Biddle, J.D.

The court granted summary judgment on the federal claims of a former chief deputy who was fired by a sheriff he had once recommended for termination.

A federal district court in Ohio granted summary judgment to Hamilton County and its sheriff on the federal discrimination claims of the office's former chief deputy. The newly elected sheriff dismissed the chief deputy after she took office. He had previously recommended her termination and testified against her in her own employment lawsuit. The court held that the chief deputy role was a policymaking position that tipped the Pickering balance toward the government and fell within Title VII's personal staff exemption, and that the chief deputy could not show causation for his later removal as a special deputy (Schoonover v. Hamilton County, No. 1:22-cv-767 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2026)).

The former chief deputy joined the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office in 1981 and worked in corrections and patrol. When a new sheriff was elected in 2012, he made the plaintiff his chief deputy, a post he held from January 2013 until January 2021. In that role, the chief deputy reported directly to the sheriff, ran the office's daily operations, supervised more than 900 employees, and oversaw the court services, enforcement, and corrections divisions. He also implemented the sheriff's policies and served as his confidential advisor.

Internal complaint. In January 2017, an internal complaint accused the then major of jail and court services of creating a hostile work environment. After an internal investigation, the chief deputy recommended her termination. The sheriff offered her another position, which she declined, and he fired her on June 1, 2017. The former major then sued. She alleged that she was terminated because of her gender or sexual orientation and that the chief deputy and other male employees retaliated against her for opposing unlawful employment practices and complaining about excessive force against inmates.

Deposition. The chief deputy was deposed in that case in 2019. He denied that he belittled the former major, scrutinized her because of her sexual orientation, or excluded her from command staff meetings. He also disputed her claims of repeated use-of-force violations and testified that her termination was appropriate.

New sheriff. Subsequently, the former major challenged the sheriff in the 2020 election and won. On December 26, 2020, she informed the chief deputy by letter that his employment would end on January 4, 2021, the day she took office.

On January 3, the outgoing sheriff appointed the chief deputy to special deputy, an unpaid volunteer position that allows the holder to earn compensation working private security details. The office's regular practice was to grant such appointments to departing deputies in good standing who requested them. After taking office, the sheriff required all special deputies to reapply. The former chief deputy submitted an application on February 8, 2021, which defendants characterized as unusually brief. The sheriff terminated his special deputy status on March 12, 2021.

The former chief deputy sued the county and the new sheriff for First Amendment retaliation, Title VII retaliation and sex discrimination, as well as state-law claims for retaliation, sex discrimination and wrongful discharge.

First Amendment retaliation. First, the court clarified the speech at issue. The defendants had framed it as the chief deputy's termination recommendation, but the chief deputy relied on his 2019 deposition testimony. The defendants conceded that the testimony addressed a matter of public concern and was given as a private citizen, which left only the Pickering balancing test.

For the chief deputy position, the court applied the Sixth Circuit's presumption that the Pickering balance favors the government when a policymaking or confidential employee is terminated for speech related to political or policy views. The court determined that the role was policymaking and placed the position in Categories Two (total discretionary authority that was delegated) and Three (confidential advisors) from the categories outlined in Ross v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2002). The chief deputy admitted that he and the new sheriff disagreed about the office's use-of-force policies. The court concluded that a sheriff may choose a second-in-command who shares her views. Because the presumption applied, the chief deputy claim failed at the protected speech element.

The special deputy position came out differently on this element. The defendants did not argue that the presumption applied to it, and the court found that the position fit none of the four categories. Because the briefing was silent on the Bennett factors, the court could not find that the balance favored defendants, and so the speech was protected as to that position.

The special deputy’s claim nonetheless failed on causation. Sixth Circuit precedent measures temporal proximity from the employer's first opportunity to retaliate. The sheriff removed the chief deputy roughly three months after that point, and the court found this timing insufficient standing alone. The chief deputy also pointed to the sheriff’s past treatment of subordinates, but the court held that this was character evidence barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and inadmissible evidence cannot be considered at summary judgment. The court therefore granted summary judgment to the county on the First Amendment retaliation claim.

Title VII claims. Next, the court held that Title VII's personal staff exemption, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), barred the claims tied to the chief deputy position. It applied the Sixth Circuit's non-exhaustive factors, including the official's plenary appointment power, the position's rank, and the intimacy of the working relationship. The court emphasized that the exemption rests on an elected official's need for loyalty from close staff. It rejected the chief deputy's argument that the case should be treated as a failure to hire, noting both that the exemption has been applied to similar transitions and that the complaint pleaded no failure-to-hire claim.

The defendants did not argue that the exemption covered the special deputy position, so the court reached the merits of those claims. On retaliation, where the protected activity was the chief deputy's participation in the county's defense, the three-month gap again failed to establish causation. The court also noted that the chief deputy offered no argument that the stated reason for his removal, his brief application, was pretextual.

On the sex discrimination claim, the chief deputy conceded that the sheriff was not a proper comparator. He argued instead that other evidence showed discriminatory animus. The court acknowledged that, after Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025), majority-group plaintiffs no longer carry a heightened prima facie burden. It held, however, that under Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court, 392 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 2004), a plaintiff without a comparator must show substantial evidence of animus, and the chief deputy offered nothing comparable to the hostility present in Birch.

Having granted judgment on every federal claim, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Ohio retaliation, discrimination, and wrongful-discharge claims, dismissed them without prejudice, and terminated the case.

The case is No. 1:22-cv-767.

Judge: McFarland, M.

Attorneys: David Gerard Torchia (Tobias & Torchia) for Mark Schoonover. Emily Therese Supinger (Strauss Troy) for Hamilton County and Charmaine McGuffey.

Companies: Hamilton County

Cases: Retaliation Discharge Discrimination SexDiscrimination IndividualRights PublicEmployees StateLawClaims OhioNews