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    • NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DIVISION OF JUDGES
    • Sprinklermatic Florida, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Aug. 20, 2026)
    • Microsoft Corporation, National Labor Relations Board, (Jul. 10, 2026)
    • Pinebrook Nursing Home, National Labor Relations Board, (Jun. 15, 2026)
    • Sutherland Global Services, Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (May 28, 2026)
    • Biotricity, Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (May 5, 2026)
    • Center for Economic and Policy Research, National Labor Relations Board, (Feb. 11, 2026)
    • Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1433 (First Transit Inc.), National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 7, 2026)
    • Netflix, Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 6, 2026)
    • Gary Merlino Construction, National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 18, 2025)
    • BAYADA Home Health Care, National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 18, 2025)
    • United Parcel Service, National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 17, 2025)
    • Swirlds Labs., National Labor Relations Board, (Nov. 18, 2025)
    • Floor and Decor., National Labor Relations Board, (Sept. 23, 2025)
    • Baltimore Sun., National Labor Relations Board, (Sept. 12, 2025)
    • General Teamsters State of Arizona, Local 104 (Alliance Beverage Distributing Co., LLC d/b/a Breakthru Beverage Arizona)., National Labor Relations Board, (Sept. 11, 2025)
    • Kroger Co. and Dillon Companies d/b/a King Soopers, Case 27-CA-336005 and Albertson Companies, Inc. and Safeway, Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (Jul. 16, 2025)
    • Universal Automation & Mechanical Services, National Labor Relations Board, (May 30, 2025)
    • Seeking Remedial Relief in Settlement Agreements and Formal Compliance Cases, National Labor Relations Board, (May 16, 2025)
    • Edward Waters University, National Labor Relations Board, (May 7, 2025)
    • FirstService Residential, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 24, 2025)
    • Starbucks Corp, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 11, 2025)
    • United States Postal Service, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 26, 2025)
    • Montgomery TV, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 14, 2025)
    • USPS, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 12, 2025)
    • Cardenas Market #7, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 3, 2025)
    • Insituform Technologies, LLC., National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 16, 2025)
    • Republic Services, National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 16, 2025)
    • STAR CRANE & HOIST, DIVISION OF LIFT SOLUTIONS, National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 27, 2024)
    • SEIU Local 32BJ (Westmoreland Protection Agency, Inc.), National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 19, 2024)
    • Green Standard Cultivation, National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 13, 2024)
    • FedEx Express, National Labor Relations Board, (Nov. 19, 2024)
    • Ascension St. Joseph Hospital - Joliet, National Labor Relations Board, (Oct. 30, 2024)
    • Teamsters Local 63 (Bellflower Dental Grp.), National Labor Relations Board, (Sept. 11, 2024)
    • Renal Advantage Inc./Fresenius Management Services, Inc. dba Fresenius Kidney Care Elk Grove Blvd., National Labor Relations Board, (May 16, 2024)
    • RUSH Construction, Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (May 1, 2024)
    • Teamsters Local Union No. 988, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 19, 2024)
    • CPC Parts Delivery, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 2, 2024)
    • Congruex, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 27, 2024)
    • United Federation LEOS (Inner Parish Security Corp.), National Labor Relations Board, (Feb. 28, 2024)
    • Vibe Consulting, National Labor Relations Board, (Feb. 7, 2024)
    • Promotional Concepts, National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 7, 2023)
    • Dental Health Associates of Madison Ltd., National Labor Relations Board, (Nov. 20, 2023)
    • VOS Electric Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (Nov. 6, 2023)
    • J. Arnhrogi Food Distribution, National Labor Relations Board, (Aug. 3, 2023)
    • Trustees of Grinnell College, National Labor Relations Board, (May 25, 2023)
    • American Electric Power, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 25, 2023)
    • Hershey Chocolate Co. of Virginia, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 21, 2023)
    • Direct Fairways, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 17, 2023)
    • Stepping Stones Children"s Center, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 13, 2023)
    • White Labs Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 24, 2023)
    • SpaceX, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 13, 2023)
    • AT&T Mobility, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Feb. 16, 2023)
    • Amazon.com Services, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 12, 2023)
    • Kona Grill, National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 12, 2023)
    • IAM CREST International Aerospace Machinist District Lodge 751 (IAM CREST), National Labor Relations Board, (Dec. 16, 2022)
    • Washington Teachers Union, National Labor Relations Board, (Nov. 4, 2022)
    • Grove Bay Hospitality Group, National Labor Relations Board, (Oct. 22, 2022)
    • Rotten Johnny's Wood Fire Pizza, National Labor Relations Board, (Sept. 21, 2022)
    • Object Computing, National Labor Relations Board, (Sept. 8, 2022)
    • Crosby's Drugs, Inc., National Labor Relations Board, (Aug. 23, 2022)
    • Rocky Mountain Prep, National Labor Relations Board, (Aug. 1, 2022)
    • Northstar Insurance Advisors, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Jul. 19, 2022)
    • Huntington Ingalls Industries, National Labor Relations Board, (Jul. 12, 2022)
    • RE: UTC Railcar Repair Services, LLC d/b/a UTLX, National Labor Relations Board, (Jun. 21, 2022)
    • Starbucks Corporation, National Labor Relations Board, (May 24, 2022)
    • Operating Engineers Local 428 (Transdev Srvcs., Inc.), National Labor Relations Board, (May 11, 2022)
    • Amazon.com Services, LLC (“Amazon 5”), National Labor Relations Board, (May 11, 2022)
    • Auburn Memorial Medical Services, National Labor Relations Board, (May 10, 2022)
    • Chicago and Midwest Regional Jt. Bd. (Detroit Athletic Club), National Labor Relations Board, (May 5, 2022)
    • Kroger d/b/a Jay C Food Stores, National Labor Relations Board, (May 4, 2022)
    • Arcadia Medical Resort of Talbot, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 25, 2022)
    • Arcadia Medical Resort of Parkside, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 5, 2022)
    • PARK LAWN CORP. - MIDWEST REGION, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 15, 2022)
    • PARK LAWN CORP. - MIDWEST REGION, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 15, 2022)
    • TEAMSTERS LOCAL 682 (BRECKENRIDGE MATERIAL COMPANY), National Labor Relations Board, (Feb. 25, 2022)
    • LAZ Parking Mid Atlantic, LLC, d/b/a LT Transportation, National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 4, 2022)
    • United Steelworkers Local 4294 (Cerro Flow Products LLC), National Labor Relations Board, (Jan. 3, 2022)
    • SEIU 1199NW & Cascade Behavioral Health Hospital, National Labor Relations Board, (Oct. 28, 2021)
    • International Union of Elevator Contractors Local 19 (Thyssenkrupp)., National Labor Relations Board, (Oct. 13, 2021)
    • Kroger Texas, L.P., National Labor Relations Board, (Oct. 6, 2021)
    • Care Park of River Oaks Association II. (case closing email), National Labor Relations Board, (Sept. 7, 2021)
    • DLP Marquette General Hospital LLC D/B/A UP Health System Marquette, National Labor Relations Board, (Aug. 23, 2021)
    • The Missouri Democratic Party, National Labor Relations Board, (Aug. 19, 2021)
    • Virginia Mason, National Labor Relations Board, (Jul. 26, 2021)
    • Steven Trudell d/b/a Trudell Entertainment LLC, Trudell and Associates LLC, and Your Generation In Concert, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Jun. 11, 2021)
    • Int”l Union of Operating Engineers, National Labor Relations Board, (Jun. 4, 2021)
    • Operating Engineers Local 150 (Central Contracting Services), National Labor Relations Board, (May 27, 2021)
    • California Nurses Association (Methodist Hospital of Southern California), National Labor Relations Board, (May 26, 2021)
    • Third Street Station, National Labor Relations Board, (May 7, 2021)
    • Drew's Tire Pros, National Labor Relations Board, (May 3, 2021)
    • Trader Joe's, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 28, 2021)
    • UFCW (Kroger), National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 14, 2021)
    • IBT, Teamsters Locals, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 13, 2021)
    • Renewal by Andersen LLC KC, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr. 9, 2021)
    • IBEW Local 176 (Inland Electric), National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 25, 2021)
    • Amazon, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 25, 2021)
    • ILWU Local 19 (PMA/SSA Marine), National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 23, 2021)
    • Amazon.com, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 12, 2021)
    • Lewis Plastics, National Labor Relations Board, (Mar. 3, 2021)
  • Articles
  • Articles

    NLRB Advice Memoranda, Northstar Insurance Advisors, LLC, National Labor Relations Board, (Jul 19, 2022)

    Case 14-CA-285828. July 19, 2022

    Andrea J. Wilkes, Regional Director Region 14

    Richard A. Bock, Associate General Counsel Division of Advice

    United States Government
    National Labor Relations Board

    OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

    Advice Memorandum

    S.A.M.

    512-5012-0125

    512-5012-0133-1100

    512-5012-0175

    512-5012-3322

    512-5036-6720-2000

    512-5036-6720-7500

    The Region requested advice as to whether the Employer's handbook rules prohibiting employee use of its email and other electronic communication systems for personal use and discharging the Charging Party for communicating with coworkers about terms and conditions of employment by using those systems violated extant law and, per GC Memorandum 21-04, whether this case could serve as a vehicle to overturn Rio All-Suites Hotel and Casino. [1] We conclude that the Employer's rule governing use of its email and communication systems—which included employees' personal electronic devices—as well as its termination of the Charging Party was unlawful under extant law and, as such, the Region should use this case to urge the Board to find that Rio All-Suites is an unsuitable standard for the modern workplace and must be overruled. Instead, employees should have the right to use employer email and other electronic communications systems for nonbusiness purposes, absent a showing by the employer of special circumstances that justify specific restrictions.

    FACTS

    The Employer is an insurance company with about half of its employees working at its office in Wentzville, Missouri, and the other half working in remote locations. The Employer's handbook includes an Acceptable Use of Electronic Communication policy and an Electronic Mail and Voice Mail Monitoring policy (collectively, “IT Policy”), which state, in pertinent part:

    Acceptable Use of Electronic Communication. This policy contains guidelines for Electronic Communications created, sent, received, used, transmitted, or stored using company communication systems or equipment and employee provided systems or equipment used either in the workplace, during working time or to accomplish work tasks. “Electronic Communications” include, among other things: messages, images, data or any other information used in email, instant messages, voice mail, fax machines, computers, personal digital assistants (including Blackberry, iPhone, iPad, tablet, smart phone or similar devices), text messages, pagers, telephones, cellular and mobile phones including those with cameras, Intranet, Internet, backup storage, information on a memory or flash key or card, jump or zip drive or any other type of internal or external removable storage drives. In the remainder of this policy, all of these communication devices are collectively referred to as “Systems.”

    Employees may use our Systems to communicate internally with co-workers or externally with clients, suppliers, vendors, advisors, and other business acquaintances for business purposes. Use of the company's system for personal use is strictly prohibited.

    …

    Our Systems and Electronic Communications are not confidential or private. The company's right to use, access, monitor, record and disclose Electronic Communications without further notice applies equally to employee-provided systems or equipment used in the workplace, during working time, or to accomplish work tasks.

    Employees may not use our Systems in a manner that violates our policies including but not limited to Equal Employment Opportunity, No Harassment, Sexual Harassment, Confidentiality of Client Matters, Care of Client Records, Protecting Company Information, Non-Solicitation, Distribution, and Internet Usage. Employees may not use our Systems in any way that may be seen as insulting, disruptive, obscene, offensive, or harmful to morale. Examples of prohibited uses include, but are not limited to: sexually-explicit drawings, messages, images, cartoons, or jokes; propositions or love letters; ethnic or racial slurs, threats of violence or bullying, or derogatory comments; or any other message or image that may be in violation of company policies or federal, state, and local law.

    …

    Nothing contained herein shall preclude an employee from engaging in conduct protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.

    …

    Electronic Mail and Voice Mail Monitoring. We recognize your need to be able to communicate efficiently with fellow employees and clients. Therefore, we have installed electronic mail (email) and voice mail systems to facilitate the transmittal of business-related information within the company and with our clients. The email and voice mail systems are intended for business use only. The use of company email and/or voice mail systems for personal use is strictly prohibited. (Emphasis added.)

    The Charging Party began working as ​     ​ at the Employer's Wentzville office in ​     ​ [2] ​     ​ was tasked with ​     ​ The Employer's performance data regarding ​     ​, provides that performer compared to ​     ​ co-workers. During this same period, however ​     ​ also received several “coachings”—non-disciplinary guidance from a manager—for failing to follow the Employer's official script and procedures in dealing with potential ​     ​, excessive time-clock errors (on ​     ​, and failing to ask requisite medical questions and sending unqualified individuals to insurance agents (on ​     ​ [3] .)

    On ​     ​ the Charging Party texted a coworker about ​     ​ concern that the Employer miscalculated the Charging Party's overtime pay and ​     ​ suspicion that ​     ​ was not the only one. ​     ​ further indicated that ​     ​ had a plan of action but needed to garner a better understanding of the facts. On o around this same date, the Charging Party spoke with a different coworker about the potential pay discrepancy. That coworker said that ​     ​ had had the same issue in the past and notified the Employer but never heard back. [4]

    The following afternoon, on ​     ​ the Charging Party used Microsoft Teams (“Teams”) to send the following question to approximately ​     ​ other ​     ​ “How long have you been working for [the Employer]?” Several employees responded by asking who ​     ​ was or why ​     ​ was asking this question, while others just answered ​     ​ question outright. ​     ​ intended to follow up by inquiring about ​     ​ suspected pay discrepancy, but ​     ​ Supervisor told ​     ​ that ​     ​ needed to stop working and requested-that the Charging Party come with ​     ​ to ​     ​ office. Once there. ​     ​ stated that the Charging Party created a disturbance by questioning ​     ​ coworkers about their years of service when they had no idea who ​     ​ was and why ​     ​ was asking this question. The Charging Party initially stated that ​     ​ was just trying to get to know ​     ​ coworkers; however, ​     ​ then admitted that ​     ​ was trying to investigate whether anyone else noticed a discrepancy in their paycheck ​     ​ told the Charging Party they would review the issue, and the Charging Party responded that ​     ​ would continue conducting ​     ​ own investigation too. The Charging Party returned ​     ​ desk but did not resp d to any of the responses ​     ​ received to ​     ​ original question.

    The next day ​     ​ the Charging Party met with ​     ​ and following ​     ​ explanation of the calculations, agreed that ​     ​ paycheck was in fact correct. However, the Charging Party remarked that while ​     ​ paycheck may be correct, the Employer should confirm there is not a discrepancy for the rest of the ​     ​ because, if there was an issue and it remained unresolved, it would hurt morale, cause employees to look for other jobs, and, ultimately, cost the Employer revenue.

    Two days later, on ​     ​ summoned the Charging Party to a meeting with the Employer's ​     ​ in which ​     ​ learned ​     ​ was being terminated. The meeting began by the Employer's ​     ​ noting that the Charging Party had been talking about ​     ​ pay and asking if ​     ​ had been talking about ​     ​ pay with other employees. The Charging Party responded, “I'm listening.” ​     ​ explained that the Charging Party was being terminated because ​     ​ work performance was unsatisfactory; ​     ​ discussed ​     ​ pay with other employees and, in doing so, used Teams for a non-business purpose; and ​     ​ talked about ​     ​ with coworkers. ​     ​ further explained that the Teams messages ​     ​ sent inquiring a out years of service had caused a disruption in the workplace nd, furthermore, they had coached ​     ​ several times and yet ​     ​ performance had not improved. At no time during the meeting did the ​     ​ reference the Employer's IT Policy. [5] Similarly, the Charging Party's termination letter merely states that ​     ​ was terminated due to “unsatisfactory overall work performance.” The Employer did not reference the IT Policy as a reason for the Charging Party's termination until the Region began investigating the charge at issue in this case.

    ACTION

    We conclude that the IT Policy is unlawful under Rio All-Suites [6] because the Employer's ban of nonbusiness use of its email and other electronic communication systems included employees' personal devices at work. In enforcing this unlawfully overbroad rule to substantiate the Charging Party's termination, we conclude that the termination was also unlawful under Continental Group. [7] In the alternative, we conclude that irrespective of the unlawful rule, the Employer's reasons for terminating the Charging Party were purely pretextual and thus, under Wright Line, [8] the Charging Party was unlawfully terminated for engaging in protected concerted activity. Lastly, given the violations of extant law, the Region should use this case to urge the Board to overrule Rio All-Suites and hold that employers cannot prohibit employees from using company email and other electronic communications systems for nonbusiness use absent a showing by the employer of special circumstances that justify specific restrictions.

    A. Overbroad IT Policy

    In Rio All-Suites, the Board overturned Purple Communications, Inc. [9] and reinstated the standard announced in Register Guard [10] that an employer's property rights allow it to restrict the nonbusiness use of its IT resources “absent proof that employees would otherwise be deprived of any reasonable means of communicating with each other, or proof of discrimination.” [11] Thus, under extant law, employers have near complete authority to control how employees use company email or other communication software that runs on the Employer's IT resources. The Board did not, however, extend the employer's authority to encompass employees' personal devices.

    Thus, the IT Policy is unlawful under Rio All-Suites because it prohibits employees from using their own personal devices for nonbusiness use. The Employer's IT Policy specifies that “employee provided systems or equipment”—which includes, among other things, “computers, personal digital assistants (including Blackberry, iPhone, iPad, tablet, smart phone or similar devices) text messages, … cellular and mobile phones”—are strictly prohibited for personal use. These restrictions covering employees' own devices apply “either in the workplace, during working time or to accomplish work tasks.” The rule's use of the phrase “either,” along with the disjunctive “or,” conveys that the rule prohibits all nonbusiness use of employees' personal devices in three circumstances: in the workplace, during working time, or while accomplishing work tasks. As such, employees are effectively prohibited from using their personal devices for non-business purposes during the entire workday regardless of whether they are on working time. The Employer has offered no evidence that such a broad prohibition was necessary to promote production or discipline. Neither Rio All-Suites nor any other Board precedent supports such a broad restriction. In fact, Supreme Court precedent strictly prohibits it. [12]

    In the alternative, we also conclude that the IT Policy is unlawfully broad because it enables the Employer to surveil the personal devices of its employees. As provided in the IT Policy: “Electronic Communications are not confidential or private. The company's right to use, access, monitor, record and disclose Electronic Communications without further notice applies equally to employee-provided systems or equipment used in the workplace, during working time, or to accomplish work tasks.” Such an intrusive exercise of surveillance on personal devices is unsupported by Rio All-Suites or any other Board decision. Such a broadly drafted rule creates the impression of surveillance, which is enough to chill employees' engagement in Section 7 activity on their personal devices during nonworking time.

    B. Unlawful Termination

    We conclude that the Charging Party's Teams messages constituted protected concerted activity and ​     ​ termination was unlawful because the Employer relied upon its unlawfully broad IT Policy to substantiate the Charging Party's termination or, in the alternative, the Employer terminated the Charging Party in retaliation for ​     ​ protected concerted activity and attempted to justify its decision with pretextual sons.

    i. Protected Concerted Activity

    For employees to enjoy the Act's protection, two elements must be satisfied: “the activity they engage in must be ‘concerted,’ and the concerted activity must be engaged in ‘for the purpose of … mutual aid or protection.’” [13] The Charging Party's actions—attempting to initiate a conversation with ​     ​ coworkers about a potential pay discrepancy—incontrovertibly constitutes an action in the interest of mutual aid or protection. [14] As such, the Charging Party's conduct is protected under Section 7 if it was concerted.

    Although protection for joint employee action “lies at the heart of the Act,” individual employee action is concerted if it is sufficiently linked to group action. [15] Individual conduct has been found concerted both in the form of preliminary discussions [16] and where such conduct is the logical outgrowth of earlier collective discussions. [17] This has included preliminary communications by a lone employee addressing coworkers that seek to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action, as well as statements directed to management communicating a truly group complaint. [18] In addition, employee communications about vital categories of workplace life, such as wages or job security, are “inherently concerted” notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence that group action has been contemplated. [19]

    Here, the Charging Party's Teams messages were concerted. First, they were the logical outgrowth of the Charging Party's conversations with two coworkers the day prior regarding the potential pay discrepancy. Those two conversations were clearly concerted, as they concerned the Charging Party and ​     ​ coworkers' wages and the Charging Party's plan of action, which the Charging Party stated was subject to ​     ​ obtaining a better understanding of the facts. The evidence demonstrates that the Charging Party sent the Teams messages for this purpose—to facilitate a wider discussion about who else may be affected by the potential overtime pay discrepancy and what they, the aggrieved employees, should do about it. Second, in addition to a “logical outgrowth” theory, we conclude the Charging Party's Teams messages were concerted because they were the type of inchoate activity that precedes group action for the purpose of improving working conditions. Thus, although the Employer prevented the Charging Party from continuing the conversation and explicitly broaching the subject of pay with ​     ​ coworkers, “almost any concerted activity for mutual aid or protection has to start with some kind of communication between individuals, [and thus] it would come very near to nullifying the rights of organization and collective bargaining guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act if such communications are denied protection because of lack of fruition.” [20] Therefore, we conclude that the Charging Party's Teams messages constituted protected concerted activity.

    ii. Discharge was Pursuant to Unlawfully Broad Rule

    In Continental Group, the Board explained that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by issuing discipline pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule where the employee violated the rule by “(1) engaging in protected conduct or (2) engaging in conduct that otherwise implicates the concerns underlying Section 7.” [21] In fact, this principle holds true even in situations in which an employer could have otherwise lawfully prohibited the conduct at issue if it had promulgated a narrowly tailored rule in the first place. [22] Nevertheless, an employer may avoid liability for discipline imposed pursuant to an overbroad rule “if it can establish that the employee's conduct actually interfered with the employee's own work or that of other employees or otherwise actually interfered with the employer's operations, and that the interference, rather than the violation of the rule, was the reason for the discipline.” [23] But an employer's mere citation of the overbroad rule as the basis for discipline will not suffice to meet that burden. Rather, the employer must demonstrate that it relied on the employee's interference with production and not simply the violation of the overbroad rule. [24]

    As previously discussed, the Charging Party engaged in protected concerted activity by attempting to start a conversation with coworkers about a potential pay discrepancy via Teams and the Employer asserts ​     ​ was subsequently terminated, in part, due to ​     ​ infringement of the unlawfully broad IT Policy. The unlawful portion of the rule—i.e., entirely prohibiting the nonbusiness use of employees' personal devices in the workplace and creating the impression employees' personal devices are under surveillance—was not applicable to the Employer discharging the Charging Party for ​     ​ misuse of Teams. However, in Continental Group, the Board did not exonerate employers who were careless in promulgating rules that mixed lawful and unlawful provisions. In fact, the Board did quite the opposite by clarifying that even though employers may have the authority to lawfully restrict some Section 7 activity, “if an employer fails to exercise that authority … by promulgating an invalid rule[,] the employee activity that could otherwise be prohibited retains its protected character.” [25] As such, the Board is not responsible for removing illegal portions of otherwise lawful rules, and employers, like the Employer here, must endure the consequences of interweaving lawful restrictions with unlawfully broad provisions like the IT Policy.

    The Employer cannot demonstrate that, regardless of its unlawfully broad IT Policy, the Charging Party's discharge was justified because ​     ​ protected concerted activity created a disturbance in the Employer's production and that disturbance, not the violation of the rule, was the reason for the discharge. Beyond ​     ​ and ​     ​ vaguely informing the Charging Party that ​     ​ Teams messages created a disruption, the Employer's defense of the charges does not stress that the Charging Party was terminated for creating a disruption, nor has it produced evidence demonstrating that ​     ​ Teams message created a disruption in the Employer's workforce. [26] Therefore, we conclude that the Charging Party's discharge pursuant to an unlawfully broad IT Policy violated Section 8(a)(1).

    iii. In the Alternative, the Charging Party was Discharged for Engaging in Protected Concerted Activity

    Motive-based violations of the Act, such as discharging an employee for union or protected concerted activities, are analyzed under the Wright Line burden-shifting framework. [27] Under that test, the General Counsel bears an initial burden of demonstrating that protected activity was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action, as established by the following elements: (1) protected activity by the employee, (2) employer knowledge of that activity, and (3) animus on the part of the employer. [28] The burden then shifts to the employer to establish that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected activity. [29]

    Here, the General Counsel can satisfy her initial burden of demonstrating that the Charging Party's discharge was motivated by animus toward ​     ​ attempt to talk to ​     ​ coworkers about their pay. As previously discussed, the Charging Party en ged in protected concerted activity by using Teams to begin a discussion with ​     ​ co-workers about a potential pay discrepancy. While the Employer may have been initially unaware of the Charging Party's motive in asking others about their tenure with the Employer, the Charging Party quickly disclosed that ​     ​ was attempting to discern whether anyone else noticed a discrepancy in their pay. And there is clear evidence of animus. Upon learning the Charging Party's motivation, the Employer closely scrutinized ​     ​ performance record, disciplinary history, and Teams chats. Significantly, three days after ​     ​ sent the Teams messages, the Employer terminated the Charging Party and cited ​     ​ discussion of pay on Teams as one of the reasons.

    The Employer cannot satisfy its burden of demonstrating that it would have discharged the Charging Party in the absence of ​     ​ protected concerted activity. [30] The Employer attempts to paint the Charging Party as a chronic underperformer who, despite many non-disciplinary coaching sessions, frequently failed to follow the script and sent unqualified customers to the licensed insurance agents. In addition, the Employer cited three written warnings—for ​     ​ a time-logging error, and a performance issue—the Charging Party received during the ​     ​ worked for the Employer. However, the Employer's justifications are unpersuasive. A closer look at the statistics demonstrates that the Charging Party was an average to above-average ​     ​ And while ​     ​ may have received several written warnings, ( the Employer has failed to explain why ​     ​ “disruption” of the workplace via Teams warranted immediate discharge. [31] Indeed, the Employer's progressive discipline procedure called for issuance of a final written warning or suspension. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the Employer would have so closely scrutinized the Charging Party's record and concluded that was no longer a good for fit for the Employer had it not been for the Charging Party's protected concerted activity. In fact, ​     ​ use of Teams to discuss the pay issue not only triggered the Employer's investigation, but it was the most prominent issue mentioned during ​     ​ termination meeting. Furthermore, the Employer did not cite the IT Policy and the Charging Party's non-business use of Teams a basis for discipline until it responded to the Region's investigation. [32] As such, the Employer has failed to demonstrate that it would have discharged the Charging Party in the absence of ​     ​ use of Teams for protected concerted activity; therefore, ​     ​ discharge violates the Act.

    C. The Board Should Overrule Rio All-Suites and Expand Purple Communications to Include Other Forms of Electronic/Information Technology

    In 2019, the Board in Rio All Suites overruled Purple Communications and returned to the previous standard created some 12 years earlier in Register Guard, which enables employers to bar employees from using their IT systems, including email, for nonbusiness purposes. In attempting to justify this conclusion, the Board largely parroted the same dubious property-rights analysis and disingenuous summary of the modern workplace that the Board used in Register Guard, overlooking the developments in technology that occurred in the ensuing 12 years. As the workplace and technology have continued evolving, especially during these past years of the COVID-19 pandemic, relying on these principles to restrict employee communications at work is even more inappropriate in 2022 than it was in 2007. As such, the Region should urge the Board to revisit and overturn Rio All-Suites and expand upon the reasoning in Purple Communications to provide employees with a right to use for nonbusiness purposes company email and any other electronic communication platform that is used in their workplace.

    The standard set forth in Purple Communications is not only firmly rooted in Supreme Court and Board precedent, but a practical acknowledgment of the challenges workers face in the modern workplace. The Board emphasized, in conformity with long held views of the Supreme Court, that the workplace is “uniquely appropriate” and “the natural gathering place” for workers to discuss their terms and conditions of employment that may one day blossom into concerted activity and collective organization. [33] As businesses began to rely upon email as a primary source of communication, teleworking increased, and face-to-face interaction became less frequent, the Board reasoned that workers must also be able to use this medium to communicate because the loss of the freedom to communicate correlates to the loss of the freedom to organize. [34] Furthermore, the Board explained that personal devices and social media accounts are inadequate alternatives for coworkers to communicate about workplace issues. Personal email, texting, and social media may seem like suitable substitutes at first blush, but it is an illusory option. So many employees “have no regular face-to-face contact with each other at work, and no practical way to obtain each other's email addresses, social media account information, or other information necessary to reach each other individually or as a discrete group.” [35] In addition to the obvious logistical pitfalls, there is simply no replacing the organic development of relationships and trust that take shape when employees communicate with one another in a work environment. [36] Thus, the Board embraced its responsibility “to adapt the Act to the changing patterns of industrial life” [37] by adopting a common-sense standard under which employees who have been given access to their employer's email system in the course of their work are “entitled to use the system to engage in statutorily protected discussions about their terms and conditions of employment while on nonworking time, absent a showing by the employer of special circumstances that justify specific restrictions.” [38]

    In contrast, the Rio All-Suites decision “overruled Purple Communications and, in its place, resurrected an approach that not only is out of touch with modern workplace realities, but that also contradicts basic labor law principles.” [39] The shortcomings of the majority's opinion can be distilled down to three main errors. First, the Board misconstrued the rights and interests of employees who have been granted permission to be on and use the employer's property with those of nonemployees. [40] This misclassification is crucial because rather than engaging in the requisite balancing of an employer's managerial interests against an employee's right to organize—as is required by Hudgens, [41] Beth Israel Hospital, [42] and Eastex [43] —the Board inexplicably treated employees as nonemployees, enabling employers to use Babcock & Wilcox [44] to justify elevating their property interests above the Section 7 rights of employees. [45] Second, the majority's attempt at equating antiquated forms of workplace equipment with email is disingenuous. [46] As thoroughly analyzed in Register Guard's dissent, bulletin boards, fax machines, telephones, televisions, and scraps of paper are nothing like email's “sophisticated networks designed to accommodate thousands of multiple, simultaneous, interactive exchanges”—rather, they involve “far more limited and finite resources.” [47] The majority also misconstrued the precedential weight of the Board's equipment cases by constructing an absolute ban on employees' non-business use of employer email systems upon statements that were best understood as dicta, not controlling precedent. [48] Third, the majority “impermissibly under-weight[ed] employees' Section 7 rights while impermissibly over-weighting employers' property rights” without substantiating why such an imbalance of interests was necessary to protect the employer from an undefined harm. [49] Instead, the majority merely relied upon an alternative means test and fantasized about a fictional “typical workplace” in which face-to-face interaction, personal devices, and social media provides so much opportunity for workers to communicate with one another that access to company email is wholly unnecessary. [50]

    Purple Communications was a carefully reasoned decision that produced a long overdue standard for the modern workplace; nevertheless, new technological advancements and dramatic shifts in workplace organization have made it apparent that the Board must again recalibrate its outlook on workplace communication and expand the Purple Communications standard to include other employer electronic communication systems. This is unsurprising, as the Purple Communications Board presciently observed that “technological changes are continuing; indeed, they are accelerating.” [51] What is surprising is the speed at which this accurate prediction came to fruition. Merely five years after Purple Communications was decided, the workforce evolved dramatically:

    • “Forty percent more U.S. employers offered flexible workplace options than did [in 2014].” [52]

    • By 2019, “5.7 million employees (4.1% of the U.S. employee workforce) telecommuted half-time or more”—compared to the 3.3 million people cited in Purple Communications. [53]

    • “Regular telecommuting grew 216% between 2005 and 2019, more than 11 times faster than the rest of the workforce (which grew 20%) and 54 times faster than the self-employed population (which grew by 4%).” [54]

    None of this growth would be possible without email and IT systems connecting workplaces as seamlessly as if employees were all still working within the same physical location. Upon the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, even workplaces that did not anticipate offering telework embraced the option:

    • “Telework accounted for about 50% of paid work hours between April and December 2020, compared with 5 percent before the pandemic.” [55]

    • As compared to the 4.1% cited in 2019, “[b]etween July and September 2021, 13% of jobs in U.S. private sector businesses involved teleworking full time and 22% involved teleworking at least some of the time.” [56]

    • “54% of pandemic teleworkers said that, if they had a choice, they'd want to work from home all or most of the time when the coronavirus outbreak is over. A third say they'd want to work from home some of the time …. Some 46% of those who rarely or never teleworked before the coronavirus outbreak say they'd want to work from home all or most of the time when the pandemic is over.” [57]

    As illustrated by these statistics, the “typical workplace” as contemplated by the Board in Rio All-Suites is atypical by today's standards. [58] However, it is important to note that email is not, in and of itself, making the traditional office obsolete. A myriad of applications, including, but not limited to, Slack, WhatsApp, Discord, WebEx, Teams, Zoom, Hangouts, GoToMeeting, Drive, and Dropbox, have further revolutionized the way companies operate and enabled workforces to stay in constant contact with both their employees and documents despite being located anywhere in the world. [59] In fact, in many workplaces, some of these applications are the preferred platform to conduct business instead of email. [60]

    For this reason, it is vital that the Board not only reinstate Purple Communications, but also expand it to include any other communication software that a workforce might utilize. Whether it be email or an application, “these technologies are now the infrastructure for employee interactions in the same way that the walls of a breakroom or benches of a cafeteria have always been recognized,” and as such, employees must have the right to use these spaces to communicate, develop relationships, and form the requisite trust needed to build collective action. [61] To hold otherwise would be a conscious failure to adapt to the modern workplace and protect employees' most basic right to communicate with one another.

    CONCLUSION

    The Region should issue complaint, absent settlement, alleging that the Employer's unlawfully broad IT Policy and related discharge of the Charging Party violated Section 8(a)(1). The Region should also use this case to argue that the Board should overrule Rio All-Suites and adopt a modified Purple Communications standard that protects employees' rights to use email and any other communication platform that they are authorized to use in the workplace for non-business purposes during non-working time, while still providing employers with an opportunity to demonstrate special circumstances that justify specific restrictions.

    /s/

    R.A.B.

    ADV.14-CA-285828.Response.NorthstarInsurance ​     ​

    Footnotes

    1

    368 NLRB No. 143 (2019).

    2

    All dates hereinafter are in 2021.

    3

    The forms used to record the Charging Party's three written warnings list the following progressive disciplinary steps: counseling session, verbal notice, written notice, final written notice, suspension without pay, termination, and documentation only.

    4

    The Employer had no knowledge of these conversations.

    5

    We credit the Charging Party's version of events in contrast to the Employer's officials, who, during the Region's investigation, alleged that they noted the improper use of Teams as a reason for termination.

    6

    368 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 8.

    7

    357 NLRB 409, 412 (2011).

    8

    251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).

    9

    361 NLRB 1050 (2014).

    10

    351 NLRB 1110, 1118 (2007), enforced in relevant part and remanded sub nom. Guard Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

    11

    Rio All-Suites, 368 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 1, 8.

    12

    See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tennessee, 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (employer ban on employees distributing literature on company property—even during non-working time—and with no assertion the rule was necessary to promote production or discipline, held unlawful).

    13

    Alstate Maintenance, LLC, 367 NLRB No. 68, slip op. at 2 (2019) (quoting Section 7 of the Act).

    14

    See, e.g., Northfield Urgent Care, LLC, 358 NLRB 70, 80 (2012) ("there is no more vital term and condition of employment than one's wages"); Parexel Int'l, 356 NLRB 516, 518 (2011) ("wage discussions among employees are considered to be at the core of Section 7 rights"); Triana Industries, 245 NLRB 1258, 1258 (1979) ("wages are a vital term and condition of employment").

    15

    Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB 882, 883-84, 887 (1986) (Meyers II), aff'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). See also Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1984) (Meyers I) (core concerted activity is that which is "engaged in with or on the authority of other employees"), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).

    16

    See, e.g., Meyers I, 268 NLRB at 494 (even a statement that "in its inception involves only a speaker and a listener" may be protected because it is "an indispensable preliminary step to employee self-organization" (quoting Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 NLRB 1313, 1314 (1951))); Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB 151, 153 (2014) ("The requirement that, to be concerted, activity must be engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing group action does not disqualify merely preliminary discussion from protection under Section 7," and "almost any concerted activity for mutual aid or protection has to start with some kind of communication between individuals").

    17

    See, e.g., Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 306 NLRB 1037, 1038-39 (1992) (individuals' uncoordinated refusals to work overtime were logical outgrowth of earlier concerted protest over hour reductions), enforced, 53 F.3d 261 (9th Cir. 1995).

    18

    See Alstate Maintenance, LLC, 367 NLRB No. 68, slip op. at 3 (quoting Meyers Industries (Meyers II), 281 NLRB at 887; see, e.g., Timekeeping Systems, 323 NLRB 244, 244, 248 (1997) (employee's unilateral company-wide email to coworkers in response to employer's email about vacation plan changes constituted concerted activity); Whittaker Corp., 289 NLRB 933, 933 (1988) ("the activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much ‘concerted activity’ as is ordinary group activity" (quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969))).

    19

    See Alternative Energy Applications, 361 NLRB 1203, 1206 n.10 (2014) (stating "employee wage discussions are ‘inherently concerted,’ and as such are protected, regardless of whether they are engaged in with the express object of inducing group action"); Hoodview Vending Co., 359 NLRB 355, 357 (2012) (stating "employee conversations about job security are inherently concerted"), incorporated by reference, 362 NLRB 690, 690 n.1 (2015).

    20

    Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted).

    21

    357 NLRB at 412.

    22

    Id. at 411-12. The Board reasoned that "because the mere maintenance of an overbroad rule creates a potential chilling effect on the exercise of protected rights, it is reasonable to infer that the enforcement of such a rule would have a similar, or perhaps even greater, chilling effect on the exercise of protected rights, even if it is enforced against activity that could have been proscribed by a properly drawn rule." Id. at 411.

    23

    Id. at 412.

    24

    Id.; see, e.g., Butler Medical Transport, LLC, 365 NLRB No. 112, slip op. at 4 (2017) (concluding that the employer failed to establish its affirmative defense because it did not produce any evidence demonstrating that the discriminatee's social media post interfered with its operations); Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 360 NLRB 1004, 1005 (2014) (discharge upheld because employee's disclosure of confidential client rates hurt the employer's business and the "gross misconduct" was so inherently unlawful that it would not create a chilling effect among other employees).

    25

    Continental Group, 357 NLRB at 411 (citing Trico Industries, 283 NLRB 848, 848 n.1, 851-52 (1987) (holding that employee's brief conversations with union president during worktime did not lose the protection of the Act, where the conversations did not violate any published rule or interfere with production), and Greentree Electronics Corp., 176 NLRB 919, 919 (1969) (stating that "discharge based on worktime distribution of cards in the absence of a valid rule is suggestive that the employer was reacting to the protected aspect of the employee's conduct, rather than considerations of plant efficiency"), enforced, 432 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970)).

    26

    Even if the Employer argued that the Charging Party created a disruption, this argument would be unpersuasive. At most, the Charging Party's message may have surprised and confused recipients for a brief moment before their focus quickly returned back to their task at hand. Particularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to think that the ​     ​ were any more affected by the unanticipated Teams message than they would be when receiving a spam call, email, or text from an unknown individual; thus, it is highly improbable it interfered with their production to any degree of significance.

    27

    251 NLRB at 1089.

    28

    Tschiggfrie Properties, Ltd., 368 NLRB No. 120, slip op. at 1 n.3, 5-6 (2019). In briefing Wright Line issues the Re on should include relevant arguments from ​     ​ urging the Board to overrule Tschiggfrie Properties, Ltd., 368 NLRB No. 120 (2019), and Electrolux Home Products 368 NLRB No. 34 (2019). It should also follow the guidance in ​     ​ Starfish Family Service, Case 07-CA-278787, Significant Advice Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 2021, and urge the Board to overrule Alstate Maintenance, LLC, 367 NLRB No. 68 (2019).

    29

    368 NLRB No. 120, slip op. at 1 n.3, 5.

    30

    There is evidence in the record that suggests the Charging Party used Teams for nonbusiness purposes in the past. We are unaware of any discipline that ​     ​ or any other employee, received for violating the IT Policy in this manner. The Region should consider further investigating this issue, as more evidence of disparate treatment could further bolster the pretext argument.

    31

    As previously noted, the Employer has not produced any evidence demonstrating that the Charging Party's messages created a disruption in the workplace. See supra pp. 10-11.

    32

    The Board relies on both shifting and false explanations for an employee's discharge, such as those listed above that the Employer proffered here, to conclude that they are simply a pretext meant to conceal an employer's true, unlawful motive. See, e.g., Con-Way Freight, 366 NLRB No. 183, slip op. at 3-4 (2018); Lucky Cab Co., 360 NLRB 271, 274 (2014), enforced, 621 F. App'x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (unpublished decision); Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co., 279 NLRB 1298, 1299 (1986), enforced, 833 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir. 1987).

    33

    Purple Communications, 361 NLRB at 1054-55; see NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tennessee, 415 U.S. at 325 ("The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to the employees."); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978) (the workplace is "a particularly appropriate place for [employees to exercise their Section 7 rights], because it is the one place where [employees] clearly share common interests and where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their union organizational life and other matters related to their status as employees" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. 793, 801 n.6 (1945) (concluding that employees were denied their "‘full freedom of association’ in the plant on their own time, the very time and place uniquely appropriate and almost solely available to them therefor" (citation omitted)).

    34

    Purple Communications, 361 NLRB at 1054-57 (analyzing Section 7 rights and omnipresence of email); see Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1972) ("organization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others"); see also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1978) (Section 7 "necessarily encompasses the right [of employees] effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite").

    35

    Purple Communications, 361 NLRB at 1054 n.18; see also Jeffery M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 921, 923-24 (2015) (many workers who might participate in collective action drives have little to no regular access to the Internet).

    36

    Cf. Tammy Katsabian, The Rule of Technology: How Technology is Used to Disturb Basic Labor Protections, 25 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 895, 933-34 (2021) (describing how important "familiarity, solidarity, and trust among workers" are to the formation of unions and these bonds are challenging to form in the modern workplace when workers cannot use the employer's communication platforms); Michael M. Oswalt, The Right to Improvise in Low-Wage Work, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 959, 965 (2017) (emphasizing that employees must be given an opportunity for "hanging out, shooting-the-breeze, even silly talk between coworkers" in the workplace because "[t]his kind of discourse leads to interpersonal trust, the indispensable catalyst of snap reactions and the life-force of collective improvisation").

    37

    Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 523 (1976) (citations omitted).

    38

    Purple Communications, 361 NLRB at 1054.

    39

    Rio All-Suites, 368 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 14 (Member McFerran, dissenting).

    40

    Id., slip op. at 17-19.

    41

    Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 521 n.10 (in ruling on whether warehouse employees had a Section 7 right to picket at their employer's store, the Court distinguished Babcock & Wilcox and emphasized that employees enjoy superior rights to nonemployees because employees already rightfully on the employer's property trigger the employer's management interests rather than its property interests—and "this difference is ‘one of substance’" (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956))).

    42

    Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 504-05 (affirming that employees had right to solicit and distribute literature in hospital cafeteria; distinguishing Babcock & Wilcox and explaining that "employees' interests are at their strongest" when the "‘activity [is] carried on by employees already rightfully on the employer's property,’" and thus the "‘employer's management interests rather than his property interests [are] involved’" (quoting Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 521 n.10)).

    43

    Eastex, 437 U.S. at 572-73 (holding employer's prohibition on distribution of literature was unlawful; clarifying that employer's "reliance on its property right is largely misplaced" because "as in Republic Aviation, [its] employees are ‘already rightfully on the employer's property,’ so that … it is the ‘employer's management interests rather than [its] property interests’ that primarily are implicated" (quoting Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 521 n.10)).

    44

    NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112 (concluding that "an employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution").

    45

    Rio All-Suites, 368 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 17 (Member McFerran, dissenting).

    46

    Id., slip op. at 19.

    47

    Register Guard, 351 NLRB at 1125-1126 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting).

    48

    Purple Communications, 361 NLRB at 1057-59 (thoroughly analyzing and discrediting the Board's reliance on past equipment cases as controlling precedent).

    49

    Rio All-Suites, 368 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 21-22 (Member McFerran, dissenting).

    50

    Id., slip op. at 22-23.

    51

    361 NLRB at 1066.

    52

    Latest Telecommuting Statistics, Global Workplace Analytics (June 2021), available at https://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/telecommuting-statistics.

    53

    Id.

    54

    Id.

    55

    Michael Dalton and Jeffrey A. Groen, Telework During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Estimates Using the 2021 Business Response Survey, Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (March 2022), available at https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2022.8.

    56

    Id.

    57

    Kim Parker et al., How the Coronavirus Outbreak Has – and Hasn't – Changed the Way Americans Work, Pew Research Center (Dec. 2020), available at https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/12/09/how-the-coronavirus-outbreak-has-and-hasnt-changed-the-way-americans-work/.

    58

    Keith Ferrazzi and Kian Goharo, Offices Are Obsolete—and So Are the Managers Who Insist You Must Go Back, Fortune (Mar. 2022) (explaining that companies fully embracing the flexibilities of the modern, telework centric workplace will thrive, whereas those stuck in the past will be victims of the "Great Resignation").

    59

    ​     ​ See Renewal by Andersen LLC KC, Case 14-CA-262563, Significant Advice Memorandum dated Apr. 9, 2021 (concluding that Rio All-Suites does not apply to situations in which the employer does not have a property interest in the third-party application or group chat that would justify it restricting employee use of the chat for Section 7 purposes during nonworking time).

    60

    See, e.g., Brandon Vigliarolo, Email out, Slack and Teams in for Business Communications, The Register (May 2022) (for the first time since it started measuring in 2016, an IT firm found that a slim majority of respondents (51 percent) said real-time communication apps like Slack and Microsoft Teams were their preferred method for internal communication); Fran Swanson, With Apple Slack Ban, an Opportunity to Return to Purple Communications, On Labor (Sept. 2021) (noting that Apple employees heavily rely upon Slack); John Herrman, Slack Wants to Replace Email. Is That What We Want?, N.Y. TIMES (June 2019) (discussing the proliferation of Slack and other communication applications that are replacing email); William C. Selfridge, A More Pixelated Union: A Look at the Path, to Unionization in the Video Game Industry Under Trump's National Labor Relations Board, 29 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 164, 189-90 (2020) (indicating that video game developers often rely upon Slack to communicate and the holding in Rio All-Suites effectively muzzled any chance of developers collectively organizing their workplaces).

    61

    Fran Swanson, supra note 60 (noting that the Board in Rio All-Suites ignored the realities of the modern workplace).

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