NLRB Advice Memoranda, Arcadia Medical Resort of Talbot, National Labor Relations Board, (Apr 25, 2022)
Case 19-CA-280611. April 25, 2022. 347-6040-7500; 530-4825-6700; 530-4850-6700 and 530-6067-4000.
Ronald K. Hooks, Regional Director Region 19
Richard A. Bock, Associate General Counsel Division of Advice
The Region submitted this case for advice as to whether a nursing home owner-operator is a "perfectly clear" successor under Spruce Up Corp. [1] and, if so, whether the Employer's purchase of the Predecessor's assets "free and clear" of the Predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement, pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, [2] relieves the Employer of its obligation to bargain with the Union over initial terms and conditions of employment. [3] We conclude that the Employer is a "perfectly clear" successor under extant law and that the bankruptcy court's "free and clear" sale order does not insulate the Employer from its bargaining obligations, which arose from its own post-sale conduct. Given that the Employer forfeited the right to set initial terms under current Board law, this case is an appropriate vehicle to urge the Board to overrule Spruce Up and adhere to the plain language of the Supreme Court's "perfectly clear" caveat in Burns. [4] Alternatively, we conclude that even if the Employer were only an ordinary Burns successor, some, if not all, of its changes were unlawful because they were not announced as part of employees' initial terms. Additionally, since the Employer unilaterally ceased dues checkoff upon taking over operations, if warranted, the Region should use this case to argue that the Board should overrule Valley Hospital Medical Center [5] and return to the holding of Lincoln Lutheran of Racine. [6]
FACTS
WA3 OP Talbot LLC d/b/a Arcadia Medical Resort of Talbot ("the Employer") operates a nursing home and rehabilitation center located in Renton, Washington. Prior to March 2021, Talbot Rehabilitation Center, LLC ("the Predecessor") operated the facility. Under the Predecessor, Local 775 of the Service Employees International Union ("the Union") represented a unit that included restorative aides, certified nursing assistants, and licensed practical nurses. The parties had negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement, which was effective September 17, 2020 through August 31, 2022.
I. Bankruptcy Proceedings
In September 2020, Goldner Capital Management LLC ("Goldner") offered to buy the Predecessor along with two other nonunionized companies. Under an agreement negotiated between Goldner and the three companies, each facility would file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, move to have their individual cases jointly administered, and then sell their assets to Goldner "free and clear" of all liabilities and obligations pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. [7] Goldner set up three limited liability corporations, including the Employer, to act as purchasers. On December 18, 2020, the Predecessor and the other two companies (collectively, "the Debtors") filed separate petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington. The Predecessor failed to give the legally-required notice of the bankruptcy to the Union at the outset of the bankruptcy proceeding. [8] Similarly, although its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union was still in effect, the Predecessor failed to list it as an executory contract in its initial filings.
On December 22, 2020, the Debtors filed a motion seeking the Bankruptcy Court's permission to sell their assets free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests ("Sale Motion"). Attached was the Asset Purchase Agreement and Operations Transfer Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") to which the Debtors and the Employer were parties. In relevant part, the Purchase Agreement states:
Except with respect to the Collective Bargaining Agreement by and between [the Predecessor] and SEIU 775 (the "CBA"), the Business is not subject to any collective bargaining agreements. Sellers are not in default in any of their obligations under the CBA and the CBA is in full force and effect. Sellers have provided a true and correct copy of the CBA to Buyers. Sellers will provide any notice required to be provided under the CBA in connection with the transaction contemplated by this Agreement and will provide a copy of such notice to Buyers.
On February 5, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order ("Sale Order") approving the Sale Motion. [9] In relevant part, the Sale Order states that the purchased assets of the Debtors, including the Predecessor's facility, "shall be sold free and clear of … collective bargaining agreements and obligations …." The Sale Order also declares that "the Buyers shall have no successor or vicarious liabilities of any kind or character, including, but not limited to any theory of … labor law … now existing or hereafter arising … with respect to the Debtors, or any obligations of the Debtors arising prior to and including the Closing Date."
The Predecessor did not provide notice to the Union of the impending sale or the Sale Motion at any point during the bankruptcy proceeding, notwithstanding that Article 25 of the collective-bargaining agreement required it to give notice of a sale "as soon as possible, but in no case later than thirty (30) days" prior to the sale.
II. The Employer's Takeover of the Predecessor's Operations
Prior to taking over operations, the Employer did not communicate with employees nor announce any changes to terms and conditions of employment. On March 9, the Predecessor's administrator emailed the Union's representative that the facility had "just received notification that the new management/owners are starting on Monday, 3/15," and promised to engage in any further discussions necessary "to ensure a seamless transition." At the time, the Predecessor and the Union were in the midst of processing grievances that had arisen, in part, due to the Predecessor changing payroll servicers in 2020. These grievances concerned the failure to deduct and remit dues, the failure to properly reflect pay rates and leave accrual, as well as an unrelated discharge of a nurse. Between March 15 and March 23, the Union and the Predecessor met regularly to resolve these grievances, with the Predecessor stating that the "new owners/management" would remedy them. On March 15, the Predecessor posted a flyer next to the timeclock informing employees that it was again switching payroll servicers, that paid time off amounts would carry over to the new provider, and that no time would be lost.
The Employer held a post-transition meeting with employees at some point in March or April. During that meeting, the Employer's new administrator announced that employees would only be able to carry over 40 hours of paid time off and, as of August 1, hours in excess of that amount would be lost. The Employer did not communicate any other changes in employment terms at this meeting.
On March 23, the Predecessor's administrator [10] informed the Union representative that the new payroll company stated it would not be deducting Union dues until "they" renew the "contract" with the Employer. [11] The administrator also noted that the license had been processed the day before "to approve the ownership." [12]
On April 9, the Employer's attorney called the Union representative regarding the new ownership of the Talbot facility. The attorney requested a copy of the collective-bargaining agreement and the Union representative asked about the grievance regarding the discharged nurse. The Employer's attorney responded that the discharge occurred during the Predecessor's operation of the facility and the new owner had neither the capability nor the interest in returning the nurse to work.
There was no hiatus between the Predecessor's and the Employer's operations and the Employer did not go through any formal hiring process, such as requiring that the Predecessor's employees submit applications, interview for positions, or provide proof of their credentials. Employees simply showed up for their shifts as usual and performed their duties just as they had under the Predecessor. However, sometime after the transition, the Union representative learned that the Employer directed employees to fill out paperwork through an online portal and that many employees were struggling with it. Employees worried that, if they did not submit job applications through the online portal, they would be discharged. It was also around this time that the Union discovered that employees were either not receiving their anniversary wage increases or that their wage increases had been rescinded. On May 12, the Union representative emailed the administrator about the difficulties employees were having with the online portal. The Union representative also protested the Employer's failure to pay anniversary wage increases provided for in the collective-bargaining agreement. On May 13, the Union representative emailed the administrator again about these issues, noting that the Union was "more than willing to meet and bargain." The administrator subsequently called the Union representative and explained that the Employer's online portal was for employee onboarding and not for employees to apply for jobs. In the end, the Employer only asked employees to provide W-4 forms.
On May 15, the Union filed a grievance with the Employer over its changes to how much paid time off employees could accrue, its refusal to cash out paid time off that was lost, and its reduction of paid time off accrual rates. The Employer ignored these grievances. On May 19, the Union renewed its grievance regarding dues checkoff because the Employer was, like the Predecessor, failing to collect and remit dues. The Employer refused to discuss the grievance, insisting that any discussion of setting up dues checkoff be part of bargaining for a new collective-bargaining agreement. On June 28, the Union representative issued a formal bargaining demand to the Employer, reiterating its May request. Since then, the parties have held a number of bargaining sessions to negotiate a new collective-bargaining agreement. However, they have not yet reached agreement on a contract.
ACTION
We conclude that the Employer is a "perfectly clear" successor that had an obligation to bargain with the Union prior to setting initial terms and conditions and that the bankruptcy court's "free and clear" sale does not relieve the Employer of this obligation. Accordingly, the Employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally reducing paid time off accrual amounts, reducing paid time off accrual rates, eliminating paid time off cashouts, eliminating anniversary wage increases, and refusing to process grievances. Alternatively, we conclude that some, if not all, of these changes were likewise unlawful even if the Employer were only an ordinary Burns successor because they were not announced as part of employees' initial terms. Finally, we conclude that, because the Employer did not bargain with the Union prior to the cessation of dues checkoff, if warranted, [13] the Region should use this case to urge the Board to overrule Valley Hospital. [14]
I. Perfectly Clear Successorship
a. The Employer is a “perfectly clear” successor under Spruce Up
Upon acquiring a business, a new employer has an obligation to bargain with the union that represented its predecessor's employees if the new employer continues its predecessor's business in substantially the same form and if a majority of its workforce was formerly employed by the predecessor. [15] However, a new employer is not bound by the predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement or its substantive terms and ordinarily may unilaterally set initial terms and conditions of employment. [16]
Upon acquiring a business, a new employer has an obligation to bargain with the union that represented its predecessor's employees if the new employer continues its predecessor's business in substantially the same form and if a majority of its workforce was formerly employed by the predecessor. [17] However, a new employer is not bound by the predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement or its substantive terms and ordinarily may unilaterally set initial terms and conditions of employment. [18]
Under Burns, a successor must "initially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before [it] fixes terms" if it is "perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit." [19] The Board has limited the "perfectly clear" exception to situations where the new employer actively or tacitly misleads employees or their union into believing that the employees will be retained by the successor under the same terms and conditions, [20] or at least fails to "clearly announce" its intent to establish new terms and conditions prior to or simultaneous with its invitation to accept employment. [21] Thus, an employer becomes a "perfectly clear" successor if it is silent as to changing the existing working conditions at the time it indicates to employees or their union that it intends to hire the predecessor's employees, [22] or fails to give "sufficiently clear" notice that employees' existing working conditions will change. [23] For example, an announcement of new terms and conditions that is "general" or "speculative" will not suffice. [24]
In Specialty Envelope Co., [25] the Board found that an employer was a "perfectly clear" successor where it assumed operations with the predecessor's workforce and only thereafter announced changes in terms and conditions of employment. Viewing the circumstances from the employees' perspective, the Board found that the successor conveyed an intent to employ the predecessor's workforce by having employees report to work as usual without being required to complete employment applications or even ask to be employed by the successor. [26] As in Specialty Envelope, here the Employer never required employees to apply for their jobs. It simply asked them to provide W-4 forms after they had already been hired. [27] Indeed, in response to employees' fear that they may be discharged if they did not complete the Employer's online forms, the Employer's administrator explicitly denied that the Employer was requiring job applications. Instead, the online platform was described as "employee onboarding," something that, by definition, is only necessary after an employee has been hired. This absence of any genuine hiring process, combined with the Employer assuming operations by bringing in the Predecessor's employees to report to work as usual, makes it "perfectly clear" that the Employer intended to retain the Predecessor's workforce.
And, as in Specialty Envelope, the Employer here waited to announce changes to terms and conditions until after the Predecessor's employees reported to work as usual. The Employer made this decision despite ensuring that it would have the opportunity to make such an announcement before assuming operations. In negotiating the Purchase Agreement, the Employer secured for itself the right to access the Predecessor's premises before the sale to "advise [employees] of [the Employer's] proposed plans with respect to the hiring of employees" and "the benefits which will be offered." But the Employer chose not to avail itself of this right. Instead, the Employer waited to announce its initial terms until after it assumed operations with the Predecessor's workforce. It was not until after adopting the Predecessor's workforce as its own that the Employer announced that employees could no longer accrue as much paid time off and that they would lose any paid time off in excess of 40 hours within mere months. Other changes, such as eliminating anniversary wage increases, were never announced at all. Rather, the Employer tacitly allowed employees to believe that these terms and conditions of employment were unchanged. Only later did employees discover that their employment with the Employer was under materially different terms than those of the Predecessor. By having the Predecessor's employees return to work while remaining silent as to intended changes to terms and conditions of employment, the Employer forfeited its right to set initial terms. [28]
b. The Bankruptcy Court's "Free and Clear" Sale Order Does Not Extinguish the Employer's Bargaining Obligation as a "Perfectly Clear" Successor Under the Act
Having found that the Employer is a "perfectly clear" successor, the issue remains whether the Bankruptcy Court's Sale Order nonetheless shields the Employer from liability under the Act. We conclude that it does not because the Bankruptcy Court's Sale Order only extinguishes liabilities of the Debtors, not those of the Employer that arose because of its own post-sale conduct.
Where two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts to regard each as effective, absent a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary. [29] When circumstances arise that present a conflict between the underlying purposes of the Act and the Bankruptcy Code, the issue "must be resolved in a way that accommodates the policies of both Federal statutes." [30]
It is well settled that the Board is the exclusive public agent chosen by Congress to enforce the Act, subject only to review in the United States Courts of Appeals. [31] Accordingly, "the institution of bankruptcy proceedings generally does not deprive the Board of jurisdiction or authority to entertain and process" unfair labor practice cases. [32] The determination of whether an employer is a successor under the Act is a question of substantive labor law over which the Board has primary jurisdiction. [33] Assessing whether a purchaser is a successor-whether an ordinary Burns successor or a "perfectly clear" successor under the Burns caveat-depends upon several factors that establish a "substantial continuity," including the makeup of the successor's employee complement, the extent to which employees of the new company perform the same jobs under the same employment conditions and supervision, and the degree of similarity between the products or services offered, the production process, and the customers. [34] The Board applies the Burns successorship doctrine in the same manner where a successor employer purchases a predecessor's assets through bankruptcy as it does where a successor acquires a business by other means. [35] This flows from the fact that the duties of a successor arise where a "new employer makes the conscious decision to maintain generally the same business" and to retain the predecessor's workforce, or at least hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor, all of which generally occurs post-sale. [36] By their very nature, the Burns factors cannot be measured before a business has been sold to, or operated by, a putative successor.
The Bankruptcy Code, conversely, focuses on eliminating liabilities that a bankrupt business incurs before selling its assets. The primary goals of Chapter 11 of the Code are "the preservation of the business as a going concern and the maximization of the assets recoverable to satisfy claims." [37] Consequently, when a debtor seeks to sell its business "free and clear" under Chapter 11, [38] the goal is to maximize the purchase price of the debtor's assets to benefit creditors of the bankrupt business. [39] But while a bankruptcy court may permit assets to be sold "free and clear" of any interest against the bankruptcy estate under Section 363(f) of the Code, it cannot insulate a purchaser's liability where the claim arose after the sale due to the purchaser's own conduct. [40] Thus, while a bankruptcy court may discharge obligations under the Act that arose before a predecessor's bankruptcy petition, a successor's post-sale conduct can create new obligations. [41]
The Board's 2005 decision in Foodbasket Partners [42] demonstrates how the Board's successorship principles, which are based on the successor's own conduct, do not interfere with the policy underpinnings of the Bankruptcy Code's "free and clear" sale rules protecting an asset purchaser from liability for the predecessor's misconduct. In Foodbasket Partners, the predecessor had filed for bankruptcy, its assets were sold to one of its creditors pursuant to a "free and clear" bankruptcy court order, and then the respondent employer subsequently purchased six of the bankrupt employer's stores. [43] The Board adopted the ALJ's conclusion that the free and clear sale did not privilege the employer to ignore its Burns bargaining obligation. [44] The ALJ explained that the employer incurred its bargaining obligation as a successor based on its own conduct, rather than that of the predecessor. [45] The ALJ also explained that the employer's post-bankruptcy third-party purchase of the predecessor's assets, upon which its Burns bargaining obligation was premised, was not the kind of pre-bankruptcy "liability" the Bankruptcy Code was designed to extinguish. [46]
Similarly, in NLRB v. Horizons Hotel, [47] an employer filed for bankruptcy and sold its assets "free and clear" of liabilities and encumbrances pursuant to a bankruptcy court's order. The purchaser then refused to hire a unit of the predecessor's employees because of their union affiliation and, with regard to another unit, refused to recognize and bargain with the union even where it had hired a majority of the predecessor's employees. [48] The First Circuit upheld the Board's determination that the purchaser was a Burns successor and had violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, specifically rejecting the purchaser's argument that the free and clear bankruptcy sale protected it from such liability. In reaching this conclusion, the court declared that the purchaser was "not here being held responsible … for the conduct or liability of a prior owner" but was being held "responsible for its own unlawful acts." [49]
The rationale underpinning these cases is equally applicable to the "perfectly clear" successorship context. [50] The Employer here created its own liability, independent of Predecessor's liability that was discharged through the "free and clear" sale. First and foremost, the Employer alone is responsible for failing to consult the Union over initial employment terms. The Employer would not be facing liability under the Act had it abided by its bargaining obligation as a "perfectly clear" successor. Indeed, the Employer was well aware that the workforce was represented because the Purchase Agreement specifically mentioned the bargaining relationship and acknowledged that the Employer had received a copy of the most recent labor agreement. And there was ample time to bargain over establishing different employment terms than those offered by the Predecessor between early February, when the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale, and its takeover of operations in mid-March. Instead, the Employer made no effort to consult with the employee's representative prior to setting initial terms. Thus, as in Horizons Hotel, the Employer's own unlawful post-sale actions create the need for relief under the Act.
Furthermore, the Employer could have avoided being classified as a "perfectly clear" successor altogether but chose not to take the steps necessary to do so. Rather than adopting the predecessor's workforce as its own, it could have advertised positions and conducted a genuine hiring process. Although the Purchase Agreement required that the Employer retain two-thirds of the 329 staff members employed across all three nursing homes it purchased, the bargaining unit at the Predecessor's facility was only 70 employees. This meant the Employer could have refused to hire some or all of the Predecessor's employees on a non-discriminatory basis, avoided becoming a "perfectly clear" successor (and maybe even a Burns successor), and still complied with the terms of the Purchase Agreement. Likewise, the Employer could have prevented "perfectly clear" successorship from attaching if it had clearly announced new terms and conditions to the Predecessor's employees. [51] Indeed, the Purchase Agreement explicitly preserved its right to communicate with employees about hiring and benefits, yet the Employer chose not to avail itself of that opportunity. Instead of running the risk of losing the Predecessor's experienced employees and needing to hire replacements during a nationwide shortage of nurses, the Employer silently adopted the Predecessor's workforce as its own and allowed employees to believe nothing would change. [52] In short, the Employer had a clear chance here to avoid a bargaining obligation over initial terms: it could have looked beyond the predecessor's workforce for hiring and it had the right to meet with existing employees to announce initial terms that deviated from the preexisting terms. But the Employer made "the conscious decision" not to do either. [53]
The Employer argues that it cannot be a "perfectly clear" successor because the Sale Order extinguished any obligation that the Employer be bound by the Predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement. [54] But this defense misses the mark. Even a "perfectly clear" successor is "not required as a legal matter to adopt their predecessor employer's collective-bargaining agreement." [55] Rather, it is only required-as a statutory matter, not a contractual one-to maintain the status quo until bargaining with the union to agreement or impasse. [56]
Further, the cases cited by the Employer in support of its position are inapposite. For example, the Employer primarily relies on Local Joint Executive Board v. Hotel Circle, Inc., [57] which held that "the unique features of labor agreements do not overcome the plain language of the Bankruptcy Act" and that a debtor could reject an "onerous and burdensome" collective-bargaining agreement. The Employer argues that, by allowing a debtor to reject a collective-bargaining agreement, the court implicitly sanctioned rejecting such agreements through "free and clear" sales as well. But that decision predates the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bildisco, [58] which was in turn abrogated by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which imposed a strict set of requirements on debtors seeking to reject collective-bargaining agreements. [59] Similarly, in Auto Workers v. Morse Tool, Inc. [60] the district court denied a union's appeal from a bankruptcy court decision allowing the sale of a debtor's assets "free and clear" of the collective-bargaining agreement, but only on the basis of mootness. And while the bankruptcy court in In re Lady H Coal Co. [61] held that a debtor could sell its assets "free and clear" of a collective-bargaining agreement even after failing to satisfy the strict requirements contained in Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, the court declined to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law "as to objections raising successor liability based on other bodies of federal law."
The particular circumstances of this case make imposing a duty to bargain over initial terms especially compelling. The Debtors did not file a motion pursuant to Section 1113 to reject the Predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement and thus never met the strict requirements necessary to do so. [62] Indeed, the Debtors failed to give notice of the bankruptcy to the Union or the Board and, therefore, neither had opportunity to object to the Debtors' Sale Motion seeking to abrogate the collective-bargaining agreement. Though it was technically the Debtors' responsibility to notify the Union of the bankruptcy "free and clear" sale under Section 363, [63] the Employer's hands are not entirely clean either. As noted above, it clearly knew of the Union's representational status and the collective-bargaining agreement but said nothing until after the sale went through.
Based on the foregoing, it is wholly appropriate to seek relief under the Act for the Employer's failure to honor its obligation to bargain over initial terms of employment after adopting the Predecessor's workforce as its own.
II. Alternative Burns Theory
Alternatively, even assuming the Employer was not a "perfectly clear" successor, it still had an obligation to bargain with the Union before implementing unilateral changes that were not announced as part of its initial terms.
While an ordinary Burns successor is free to set initial terms and conditions of employment without bargaining with the union, a bargaining obligation then attaches as to subsequent changes the successor wishes to make. [64] In 301 Holdings, LLC, [65] the successor set initial terms by telling employees that work schedules would change, but omitted the fact that it would also reduce wages and discontinue health and welfare benefits. [66] The Board found that the successor had a duty to bargain with the union over these unannounced changes because, by telling employees that schedules would change, the successor implied "that all other terms and conditions would remain the same" and "could not thereafter unilaterally depart from those other terms and conditions." [67] Accordingly, 301 Holdings stands for the principle that "when a Burns successor announces a limited number of specific changes from the predecessor's terms and conditions of employment, it is those changes that define the permissible setting of initial terms: employees are entitled to conclude that all other terms will remain the same." [68] Thus, even where a successor lawfully sets initial terms, it may not unilaterally implement other changes that were not announced as part of initial terms. [69]
Here, the Employer held a post-transition meeting where it announced that employees could only carry over 40 hours of paid time off and that they would lose any balance over that amount on August 1. But even assuming this meeting occurred upon commencement of operations such that the announced caps on paid time off were part of initial terms, [70] the Employer did not convey that it would be implementing the other changes it subsequently made. It did not announce that it would stop cashing out lost paid time off, reduce paid time off accrual rates, or eliminate anniversary wage increases. Nor did the Employer announce that it would cut employees off from their Union by refusing to process grievances and ceasing dues checkoff. Instead, the Employer simply let employees discover these changes when they received their paychecks. Because it did not include these unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment as part of its initial terms, the Employer was not privileged to make them without first bargaining with the Union.
To the extent the Employer may argue that it acted lawfully as to any changes implemented prior to the Union's bargaining demand, we would reject such a defense because its bargaining obligation attached immediately upon its takeover of operations. Although Fall River Dyeing envisioned that a union would need to make a bargaining request before a bargaining obligation could attach, this requirement developed in circumstances where there was a "start-up period by the new employer while it gradually builds its operations and hires employees." [71] Such a requirement is not appropriate where "there is a rapid transition period with the immediate hiring of a full employee complement" because it is clear in those circumstances that a majority of its workforce consists of its predecessor's former employees and thus the successor can "easily discern its obligation" to assume that the incumbent union continues to enjoy majority status. [72] Indeed, in 301 Holdings, the Board found that the unannounced changes to wages and benefits were unlawful even though the union's demand for recognition did not come until well after they had been implemented. [73] Thus, the Employer cannot successfully defend any changes that were never announced to employees as a part of initial terms and were implemented unilaterally subsequent to the takeover, even assuming it was only a Burns successor. [74]
III. The Region Should Urge the Board to Overrule Valley Hospital and Return to Lincoln Lutheran
Finally, we conclude that, because the Employer unilaterally ceased deducting and remitting dues, the Region should use this case if warranted [75] as a vehicle to urge the Board to overrule Valle Hospita1 [76] The General Counsel has taken the position that the Board should restore the Board's well-reasoned prior holding in Lincoln Lutheran [77] that dues checkoff is not exempt from the basic rule that an employer may not unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment. Although Lincoln Lutheran and Valley Hospital involved an employer's conduct after an existing collective-bargaining agreement had expired, the principle that an employer may not alter preexisting terms and conditions of employment without first bargaining with the union applies with equal force in the context of "perfectly clear" Burns successorship. [78]
Here, the Employer is a "perfectly clear" successor that was obligated to bargain to agreement or impasse before setting initial terms of employment and making any changes thereafter. [79] Although the Predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement provided for dues checkoff, the Employer deviated from that status quo by ceasing the collection and remittance of dues to the Union and did so without consulting the Union. [80] Not only that, the Employer refused to discuss the Union's renewed grievance regarding dues checkoff, instead insisting on bargaining over a dues-checkoff arrangement as part of a new collective-bargaining agreement. The Employer's discontinuation of dues checkoff cut employees off from their chosen representative at a time when the Union and employees were in a "peculiarly vulnerable position." [81] Accordingly, this case would be a good vehicle to argue for a return to Lincoln Lutheran.
For the foregoing reasons, the Region should issue complaint, absent settlement, concerning the unilateral changes set forth above, seek to overrule Spruce Up, and, if appropriate, [82] urge the Board to overturn Valley Hospital.
/s/
R.A.B.
ADV.19-CA-280611.Response.Arcadia Medical Resort of Talbot
cc: Injunction Litigation Branch
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