Cybersecurity Policy Report, Proposed Ban on Foreign Equipment in Submarine Cables Backed by DHS, (Jan 9, 2026)
Organizations Mentioned:United States Telecommunications, Inc.
By Lynn Stanton
The Department of Homeland Security has told the FCC that it “concurs with implementing baseline cybersecurity and physical security standards for new submarine cable license applicants” and that it “concurs with the FCC’s proposed rule to prohibit the use of foreign adversary affiliated principal equipment as part of the standard conditions for submarine cable license applicants and licensees.”
DHS was responding to a further notice of proposed rulemaking (FNPRM) adopted by the FCC last August in OI docket 24-523 and MD docket 24-524 that sought comment on additional measures to further guard submarine cables against foreign adversaries and incentivize the use of submarine cable repair and maintenance ships owned by U.S. or allied entities (CPR, Aug. 8, 2025).
The FCC unanimously adopted the FNPRM at the same time it approved a report and order that, among other things, included a presumption of denial for applications for submarine cable licenses by foreign adversary-controlled applicants. The FNPRM’s proposals include a presumptive exemption from Team Telecom review license applications that meet a “high-level security standard.”
In previously filed comment, stakeholders were generally supportive while offering suggestions for improvements (CPR, Dec. 1, 2025).
In comments filed yesterday, DHS urged the FCC to adopt standard conditions on submarine cable licenses “designed to give DHS and the FCC ongoing information about cable system operations, such as submission of an annual report on principal equipment and vendors used, security policy updates, and other reporting requirements.
“Alternatively, the FCC could consider requiring compliance with a streamlined, standardized version of a mitigation agreement a standard condition to granting a submarine cable license. This would obviate the need for bespoke risk review and mitigation agreement negotiations for each and every cable, a clear regulatory win, while enhancing the resilience of cable infrastructure by equally applying security standards that protect our critical infrastructure across all submarine cables,” DHS added.
DHS also said it “concurs with the FCC’s proposed rule to implement a ‘blanket’ license for SLTE [submarine line terminal equipment] owners and operators. DHS believes that SLTE owners, regardless of their interest in the larger cable system, are fundamentally involved in the operation of the cable and can install equipment that may affect a cable’s operation. Therefore, DHS believes that a ‘blanket’ license for SLTE owners is a good step to foster the resiliency of this critical infrastructure. As the FCC proposes, these ‘blanket’ SLTE licensees would be different entities from the cable owners and operators already required to be applicants or licensees.”
It said it “supports the proposed exception for repair and maintenance activities related to submarine cables, particularly for the wet segment of cables. DHS recognizes that there are only a finite number of specialized cable repair ships worldwide and that many cable faults and outages occur beyond the territorial waters of the United States.”
“DHS also notes that the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector already requires the submission of installation, maintenance, and repair plans for submarine cable systems as part of its review process. DHS supports the FCC’s proposal to codify this requirement in its rules, as it enhances transparency, facilitates interagency coordination, and supports effective risk management for critical communications infrastructure,” it added.
News: FederalLegislation DataSecurity