Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE—CHEMICAL PRODUCTS—3d Cir.: Dismissal of claims against Monsanto upheld in worker’s Roundup cancer case, (Apr 17, 2026)

By Pankhuri Bhatnagar, B.A. LL.B.

The case was time-barred as it was filed more than ten years after product delivery.

In an action brought against an herbicide manufacturer by a worker alleging that exposure to the product’s carcinogenic chemical caused his testicular cancer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint. The appeals court held that the claims were barred by the Indiana Products Liability Act’s ten-year statute of repose because the action was filed more than ten years after the latest possible product delivery, the statute is not subject to equitable tolling, and the worker’s attempt to invoke the statutory eight-to-ten-year accrual exception was forfeited because it was not raised before the district court (Miller v. Monsanto Co., No. 25-2847 (3d Cir. Apr. 14, 2026)).

Background. A man worked at Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., an agricultural facility in Indiana, for approximately six months beginning in June 2011. He claimed he was exposed to glyphosate-based Roundup® herbicides during that period and was diagnosed with testicular cancer in November 2012. More than a decade later, in January 2024, he filed a products liability action against the herbicide’s manufacturer, Monsanto Company, asserting claims for negligence, strict liability for design defect and failure to warn, and breach of implied warranties. The manufacturer moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion in September 2025, holding that the claims were barred by the Indiana Products Liability Act (IPLA) statute of repose. The worker appealed.

Legal standard. At the time of exposure and his subsequent diagnosis, the worker was a resident of Indiana. The parties accordingly agreed that the IPLA applied to his claims, which governs all product liability actions brought by a user or consumer for physical harm caused by a product, regardless of the theory asserted, as per Hathaway v. Cintas Corp. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 669, 673 (N.D. Ind. 2012). The statute imposes a ten-year statute of repose requiring that an action be commenced within ten years after delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer (Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b)). Notably, the repose period is not subject to equitable tolling as per Cortez v. Cook, 27 F.4th 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2022). A limited exception allows filing within two years of accrual if the cause of action arises between eight and ten years after delivery (Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1).

Statute of repose. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the claims were untimely on the face of the complaint. The worker alleged that his last exposure to Roundup® occurred in November 2011. Based on that allegation, the products must have been delivered to the initial user no later than that date. Because the first action against the manufacturer was not filed until June 2022, more than ten years after the latest possible delivery, the claims fell outside the IPLA’s repose period. Although statute-of-limitations defenses are typically affirmative defenses, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the time bar is apparent from the complaint itself. Applying de novo review, the court found no error in concluding that the action was barred as a matter of law.

Statutory exception. The worker argued that his claims fell within the IPLA’s statutory exception permitting suit where the cause of action accrues between eight and ten years after delivery, effectively extending the filing period to twelve years. He contended that his cancer diagnosis occurred within that window and therefore rendered his claims timely. The court declined to consider this argument because it was not raised before the district court. Citing Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009) and Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 2011), the court reiterated the settled rule that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited absent exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances arise only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice or address significant public interest concerns as per Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017). No such circumstances existed here. Although the worker was proceeding pro se, even pro se litigants must comply with procedural rules. Therefore, the dismissal was affirmed.

The case is No. 25-2847.

Judge: Per curiam.

Attorneys: Jeremy G. Miller, pro se. Kelly E. Farnan (Richards Layton & Finger PA) for Monsanto Co.

Companies: Monsanto Co.

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