Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, RETALIATION—N.D. Ohio: Worker fired after making threats in response to alleged groping advances retaliation claims, (Sep 29, 2026)

By Mandavi Singh, LL.M.

The employee’s threat to “cut” anyone who touched her again did not necessarily strip her harassment complaint of protection, particularly when workers involved in actual violence kept their jobs.

A mozzarella production worker who was fired one day after telling HR she would “cut” the next employee who touched her may take her retaliation claims to a jury. The employee made the threat while reporting that a coworker had allegedly groped her, and a federal district court in Ohio declined to find that her manner of opposing the alleged sexual harassment was so unreasonable that it automatically lost statutory protection. Although the cheese manufacturer had a legitimate reason for treating the threat seriously, evidence that two employees who engaged in actual workplace violence received suspensions rather than termination created a factual dispute over whether the stated reason for firing her was pretextual (Jackson v. Miceli Dairy Products Co., No. 1:25-cv-00387 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2026)).

Sexual misconduct. The employee began working as a mozzarella production worker at the cheese manufacturer’s Cleveland factory in April 2023. During her approximately three-month tenure, she alleged that her direct supervisor regularly made sexual remarks, including calling her “little booty cousin” and joking about wanting to slap her buttocks.

She also accused a coworker of sexually inappropriate conduct. He allegedly asked why she was looking at him as though she wanted to perform a sex act on him and made another sexually suggestive remark after dairy from the mozzarella machinery splashed onto her face. The coworker admitted simulating sex acts and pantomiming ejaculation while she was nearby.

Confrontation. Tensions between the two culminated in a June confrontation after the coworker tried to get her to return to work following an extended break. The employee insulted him and threatened to have her child’s father assault him. She maintained that the coworker also threatened her, although another witness described her as the aggressor. The coworker later testified that she picked up a knife during the confrontation, which she denied. The court found a factual dispute over whether that occurred but considered the issue immaterial because the employer did not contend that the alleged knife incident caused her eventual termination. Both employees were placed on administrative leave while the company investigated. The employee submitted a formal complaint about the coworker, and both eventually received final written warnings and returned to work.

HR voicemail. About a month later, on July 31, another coworker allegedly groped the employee. She called HR and left a voicemail: “The next time one of your employees puts their hands on me or touches my ass again, I’m going to cut them. Just to let you know.”

The company terminated her the following day, explaining that her threat against other employees violated company policy. She sued for hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII and Ohio law. She later abandoned the hostile work environment claims, leaving the retaliation claims at issue on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

Protected opposition. Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court first addressed whether the voicemail could constitute protected opposition to sexual harassment despite the accompanying threat.

Opposition receives protection only when it reasonably communicates a challenge to an unlawful employment practice, is expressed reasonably, and rests on a good-faith belief that the challenged conduct is unlawful. Citing Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Technologies, Inc., 793 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2015), the court stressed that an employee need not complain with “absolute formality, clarity, or precision.”

The voicemail sufficiently communicated a harassment complaint. The employee’s reference to coworkers putting their hands on her or touching her buttocks could reasonably be understood as complaining about unwanted sexual touching. Her use of “again” also indicated that she was reporting recurring conduct. Whether she expressed that opposition reasonably presented a more difficult question. The employer had a legitimate interest in maintaining an orderly workplace free from threats. But the court also recognized that complaints about discrimination and harassment can generate “heated emotions and frustration,” warranting some allowance for intemperate or unprofessional language.

While the employee had gone beyond unprofessional language by threatening violence, her statement nevertheless arose in the context of responding to alleged unwanted physical touching. Whether threatening to “cut” someone went too far therefore depended partly on the disputed circumstances surrounding the alleged harassment.

Threat. The court expressly emphasized that it did “not condone” the threat, calling it “improper and uncalled for.” But it distinguished conduct so extreme that no rational jury could find the employee’s manner of opposition reasonable from situations in which reasonableness depends on disputed facts.

The Sixth Circuit had not definitively established at which stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis the reasonableness of an employee’s opposition should be considered. The court concluded that reasonableness could be relevant both to whether the employee engaged in protected activity and later to the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason and pretext.

At the prima facie stage, however, summary judgment based on the manner of opposition was appropriate only when the employee’s actions were so “blatantly unreasonable” that every rational juror would agree. The employee’s threat did not meet that threshold on the disputed record. A jury remained free to conclude that it justified her dismissal, but she was entitled to attempt to show that the threat did not actually motivate the employer’s decision.

One-day turnaround. As to the other elements of her prima facie case were, the court found these were readily established. HR received the voicemail, and the company expressly relied on it in the termination letter. Her firing was also unquestionably an adverse employment action.

The timing supplied evidence of causation. The employer fired her just one day after the alleged harassment complaint. Again relying on Yazdian, the court explained that when an adverse action follows protected activity very closely, temporal proximity itself can provide sufficient evidence of causation at the prima facie stage.

In response, the employer argued that it fired her for threatening coworkers, not for complaining about harassment. But the court refused to import that legitimate nondiscriminatory reason into the initial prima facie inquiry. The employee therefore established a prima facie retaliation case.

Violence comparators. The threat readily satisfied the employer’s burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. The dispute instead centered on pretext, where the employee presented evidence of two workers who engaged in actual violence but kept their jobs.

The coworker involved in her June confrontation previously had pushed another employee into a wall. Rather than firing him, the company imposed a three-day suspension, a final warning, and 90 days of probation. A second employee had “became violent,” thrown a chair in an office and charged at a supervisor in an apparent attempt to provoke a physical confrontation. He also received only a three-day suspension, even though the incident occurred about three months before the employee’s termination.

Neither incident involved a knife or blade. A jury therefore could conclude that threatening someone with a knife was more serious than pushing a coworker into a wall or throwing a chair, supporting the employer’s decision to impose a harsher penalty. But the opposite conclusion was also permissible. As the court explained, a rational jury could decide that “actual violence is worse than threats of violence.” If so, there was a “strong chance” that the employer’s reliance on the employee’s threat was pretextual. Because a reasonable jury could reach either conclusion, neither party was entitled to summary judgment on retaliation.

The court accordingly granted the employer summary judgment only on the hostile work environment claims the employee had abandoned. It denied the employer’s motion in all other respects and denied the employee’s summary judgment motion, leaving her Title VII and state-law retaliation claims for further proceedings.

The case is No. 1:25-cv-00387.

Judge: Brennan, B.

Attorneys: Alisa Rose Adams (Adams Law) for Samantha Jackson. Andrew J. Wolf (Hahn, Loeser & Parks) for Miceli Dairy Products Co.

Companies: Miceli Dairy Products Co.

Cases: Retaliation Discharge Discrimination SexualHarassment OhioNews