Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, LABOR—UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES—7th Cir.: Seventh Circuit affirms denial of Section 10(j) injunction absent ‘extraordinary’ harm showing, (Sep 21, 2026)

By Jason Albright, J.D.

“Compelled by its expansive view of Starbucks, the majority has carved a new path, making irreparable harm all but impossible to prove in the absence of ‘extraordinary’ circumstances.”

The NLRB was not entitled to a Section 10(j) injunction against Laborforce, LLC, which changed its employees’ pay and benefits to reflect its own assessment of their nonunion status, in response to petitions it received from some employees requesting decertification of their union, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Citing Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024), the federal appeals court observed that Section 10(j) injunctions are “extraordinary” remedies that are “never awarded as of right,” and that the Board’s Regional Director must satisfy the traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctions to justify such relief. The Regional Director failed to do so here, the appeals court found, absent a demonstration of irreparable harm beyond the mere “mine-run risks of harm present in many labor disputes.” Judge Maldonado dissented, rejecting what she characterized as the majority’s “buy-off-the-employee approach to the NLRA” (Hamada v. Laborforce, LLC, No. 25-3110 (7th Cir. Sept. 18, 2026)).

M&K Truck Centers. M&K Truck Centers operates truck dealerships that service and sell semi-tractors across several midwestern states. One of its dealerships is in Summit, Illinois, and the Summit dealership, like other M&K operations, leases its employees from Laborforce, LLC, and M&K Employee Services (collectively “Laborforce”).

Local 701. Employees at the Summit dealership have been represented by Automobile Mechanics’ Local 701, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO since the 1950s, and the most recent collective bargaining agreement between Laborforce and the union went into effect on October 1, 2020. It was supposed to last until September 30, 2027. The labor contract did not define the “bargaining unit” of employees at the Summit dealership to which it applied, but it did reference employees in both the parts and service departments.

Union steward’s decertification petition. Around October 2022, however, a union steward who worked in the parts department became dissatisfied with the union and its “[i]mproper representation,” and he began collecting signatures to decertify the union. Laborforce did not encourage, interfere with, or assist in the decertification process, and in July 2023, the steward presented his decertification petition to the general manager of the Summit dealership. The petition was signed by 19 of the 31 parts department employees but none of the service department employees.

Notice to union. Shortly after the steward presented his petition, Laborforce notified the union that it would withdraw recognition as to parts department employees at midnight on September 30, 2023.

Memo to employees. Laborforce also posted a memo to all Summit parts department employees, announcing that on October 1 they would receive a “new payrate consistent with the payrate at non-union M&K Truck Center facilities in the area,” a new insurance plan that would “provide[] all of the same major benefits as your current health plan” with “no co-pay,” and a new 401(k) plan “with a company match of 3%.”

Unit clarification petition. While awaiting the formal withdrawal date, Laborforce filed a unit clarification petition with the NLRB to determine which employees constituted the bargaining unit covered by the labor contract. Its petition described the existing unit as “All Parts and Service Department Employees,” and it proposed to limit that unit to “All Service Department Employees.” Laborforce explained that it sought this clarification because the “Parts Department has demanded employer withdraw recognition of Union on their behalf.”

Denied. The Board denied the unit clarification petition, stating that “the Parts employee classification has historically been included in the bargaining unit, and there is no evidence that this classification has undergone recent changes in duties or responsibilities” sufficient to justify a midterm clarification.

Withdrawal of recognition in parts department. Laborforce nonetheless proceeded to withdraw union recognition with respect to the parts department employees at midnight on September 30, 2023. Consistent with its withdrawal, the employer stopped responding to grievances from the union, and it implemented new increased wage rates and benefits packages for parts department employees.

Second decertification petition and full withdrawal of recognition. The steward was not finished with his decertification efforts, however. A Board employee informed him that “in a typical case,” he would need “to get the entire shop,” both the parts and service departments, to support decertification. He thus presented a second decertification petition in June 2024. This second petition was signed by a combined majority of employees in both departments, 36 out of 70 in all.

Laborforce again acted quickly, notifying the union that it was withdrawing recognition for both departments effective immediately. It posted a memorandum to all parts and service department employees, confirming that it would no longer recognize the union and specifying pay and benefits changes.

ULP charges. The union filed multiple charges with the Board alleging that Laborforce violated the NLRA. The Board’s Regional Director then issued an administrative complaint in June of 2024, alleging that Laborforce’s first withdrawal of recognition with respect to parts department employees was unlawful because the first petition was signed by only a minority of the bargaining unit.

In September 2024, the Regional Director amended the complaint, alleging that Laborforce’s second withdrawal of recognition for both parts and service department employees was also unlawful because it was tainted by the earlier withdrawal. An ALJ for the Board conducted an evidentiary hearing on these alleged unfair labor practices (ULPs) in October 2024.

Section 10(j) petition. Then, in January 2025, the Regional Director petitioned a federal district court for interim injunctive relief under Section 10(j). The Regional Director sought an injunction requiring Laborforce to, among other things, recognize and bargain with the union in good faith and rescind its unilateral changes to the employees’ wages and benefits.

ALJ’s findings. While the Section 10(j) petition was pending in the district court, the ALJ released her decision on the merits, finding that Laborforce had engaged in multiple ULPs. The ALJ determined that Laborforce’s first withdrawal of recognition for the parts department was unlawful because the disaffection petition had not been signed by a majority of the unit. And although the second petition cured that defect, the ALJ found that the second petition was tainted by the unremedied first withdrawal, coupled with Laborforce’s unilateral, favorable changes to the parts department’s wages and benefits, which would tend to “denigrate the Union.”

Denial of preliminary injunction and appeal. Four days later, the district court denied the Regional Director’s petition for a Section 10(j) injunction, finding that the Regional Director had failed to establish irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, or that an injunction was in the public interest. Because the parties had not yet submitted the ALJ’s opinion to the district judge, she issued her order without its benefit. The parties declined the district judge’s invitation to file a motion for reconsideration in view of the ALJ’s opinion, and the Regional Director’s appeal to the Seventh Circuit followed.

Starbucks. The appeals court initially observed that, in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024), the Supreme Court held that the Board’s Regional Director, like most ordinary plaintiffs, must meet the traditional four-factor test to justify a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j). Under that test, the Regional Director “must make a clear showing” that she “is likely to succeed on the merits” of her ULP claim, that “irreparable harm” will likely ensue “in the absence of preliminary relief,” that “the balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”

No irreparable harm. Here, the Seventh Circuit found that the regional director failed to make an adequate showing of irreparable harm. “To demonstrate irreparable harm,” the appeals court said, “the Director relies on generic claims about erosion of union support among employees and deprivation of the benefits of collective bargaining and union representation,” but she failed to “point to specific injuries beyond the risks of future harm that, in the Director’s telling, non-unionized employees generally face.”

Not a “serious and extraordinary” case. In the circumstances of the case, the Seventh Circuit concluded, the “employees’ lack of union representation while awaiting the Board’s action is not enough to make this a ‘serious and extraordinary’ case that requires in-junctive relief.”

First, noted the appeals court, “if a union falling out of favor suffices to show irreparable harm, then the irreparable-harm requirement will automatically be satisfied whenever the Director can show the Board is likely to succeed on the merits of certain unfair labor practices claims.” Starbucks, the Seventh Circuit argued, says the opposite. “[U]nlike some other statutes, § 10(j) does not establish ‘a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm … upon a finding of likelihood of success on the merits.’”

Right to refrain. Second, according to the Seventh Circuit, “the facts of this case implicate not only employees’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, but also their right ‘to refrain from any or all of such activities.’” In cases in which a Section 10(j) injunction “is as likely to defeat some employee rights as it is to vindicate others,” the court said, the Regional Director cannot make the required showing of irreparable harm. “That is particularly clear here, given the undisputed material benefits that Summit employees have obtained since exercising their right to withdraw recognition of the union.

In short, the appeals court concluded, the Regional Director’s “lackluster showing of irreparable harm” did not meet the standards set by statute or by Supreme Court precedent. The judgment of the district court was accordingly affirmed.

Dissent. In her dissent, Judge Maldonado argued that, although Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney changed several circuits’ approach to addressing Section 10(j) petitions, it did not change that of the Seventh Circuit, which has “long applied traditional equitable factors in assessing § 10(j) petitions.”

“Compelled by its expansive view of Starbucks,” Maldonado observed, “the majority has carved a new path, making irreparable harm all but impossible to prove in the absence of ‘extraordinary’ circumstances,” in spite of Seventh Circuit precedent holding that no such “serious and extraordinary circumstances” are required.

The dissent also took issue with the majority’s conclusion that there is no irreparable harm to the Board where employees benefit from an employer’s alleged ULPs or eventually choose to decertify the union following an alleged ULP. The Supreme Court, she noted, citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 580 n.1 (1969), “has rejected this buy-off-the-employee approach to the NLRA.”

The case is No. 25-3110.

Judge: Taibleson, R.

Attorneys: Laurie Monahan Duggans, National Labor Relations Board, for Angie Cowan Hamada. James Anthony Eckhart (Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary) for Laborforce, LLC, M&K Employee Services, Inc., and M&K Truck Centers.

Companies: Laborforce, LLC; M&K Employee Services, Inc.; M&K Truck Centers

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