Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RELIGIOUS—9th Cir.: Flight attendants fired after commenting on Equality Act revive religious bias claims, (Jun 25, 2026)
Law Firms Mentioned:Barnard Iglitzin & Lavitt | Seyfarth Shaw
Organizations Mentioned:Alaska Airlines, Inc. | Association of Flight Attendants-CWA AFL-CIO | Petro-Tex Oil & Gas Company, Inc. | Seyfarth Shaw, LLP
By Ronald Miller, J.D.
The fact that the employee was terminated after posting a facially religious statement provided the initial grounding for a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether she was terminated because of her religious beliefs.
Two flight attendants at Alaska Airlines demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Alaska Airlines terminated them because of their religious beliefs and whether their union attempted to cause or acquiesced in their firing on this unlawful basis, ruled the Ninth Circuit, reversing summary judgment in favor of the airline and union. According to the employees, their employer and union fired them for expressing religious views about the Equality Act. The appeals court further held that the Railway Labor Act’s duty of fair representation did not impliedly preempt the employees’ state-law anti-discrimination claims against the union. Because the record permitted a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive and pretext, they raised triable issues under Title VII. Judge Christen filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part (Brown v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 24-3789 (9th Cir. June 24, 2026)).
Employee communications. Alaska Airlines maintains an internal intranet communication network for employee communications. The employer posts messages and employees are invited to reply and comment. The employer maintains various rules for the comments section. Among other things, commenters must be “civil and respectful,” “disagree respectfully,” and use appropriate language. The employer’s typical practice is to remove any comment that violates its policies. If the employer deletes three of an employee’s comments, the employee is blocked from future commenting under a “three-strikes” policy. Moreover, the employer maintains a zero-tolerance policy for “harassment or discrimination of any kind.”
Equality Act. On February 25, 2021, the employer posted an announcement of the company’s support for the Equality Act, a proposed federal law that would extend certain federal nondiscrimination requirements to cover discrimination involving sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity in various contexts. Employees were allowed to comment on the company’s Equality Act announcement.
The plaintiff employees are Christians who worked as flight attendants at Alaska Airlines. Both were members of the union representing flight attendants.
Shortly after the employer posted about the Equality Act, one of the employees posted a response. The employer initially responded to the employee’s post, stating that supporting the Equality Act was not about regulating morality. A union official sent an email to union colleagues writing that “Employees get to be bigots in their private lives and to express their bigoted and misinformed opinions while not at work.”
Later that day, the second employee felt religiously compelled to post a response. She stated that the act will force every American to agree with controversial government-imposed ideology on or be treated as an outlaw. That same day, her comments were flagged. Another union official posted in a chat with other union officials: “Can we PLEASE get someone to shut down comments.”
That night, the employer deleted the comments of both employees, shut down further comments, and began investigating both employees. The employer subsequently changed its commenting rules to remove the three-strikes policy. It also revised its policy to state that comments should not “express partisan or personal (such as religious or political) opinions.”
Investigations. On March 4, 2021, investigators interviewed the second employee. They noted that during the meeting, she identified herself as Christian. She stated that she posted to express concerns about the Equality Act’s impact on religious people, women, and children. On March 19, 2021, the employer determined that her comments violated the company’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies and terminated her employment.
The union filed a grievance on behalf of the employee but discouraged her from raising her concerns about the employer’s treatment of her religious beliefs in the grievance process. Her grievance was denied on April 13, 2021, and the employer refused to afford her a “last chance agreement” to be conditionally reinstated.
On March 11, 2021, investigators met with the first employee. She did not state that her comments were based on her Christian faith. Instead, she told investigators that her post was merely posing a “philosophical” question. During the grievance process, the employee argued that the employer was discriminating against her based on her religious beliefs and asked for a religious accommodation. The employee was terminated on March 19 based on her violation of the company’s anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policies. The union elected not to arbitrate her grievance.
Discrimination claims. The employees filed this lawsuit asserting Title VII and collateral state-law claims against the employer and the union for discrimination on the basis of religious belief. They also claimed that their union discriminated against them based on their religious beliefs during the employer’s internal investigation.
The district court concluded that the Railway Labor Act’s federal duty of fair representation preempted the employees’ state-law anti-discrimination claims against the union, dismissing these claims. It also granted summary judgment to the employer and union against the employees’ Title VII and remaining state-law claims.
Title VII claims. In this case, the appeals court found the employees both established, at minimum, a genuine dispute as to the first three elements of their prima facie case. They claimed they were discriminated against based on their religious beliefs, a protected ground. Both employees were qualified for their positions as flight attendants. Both had good working relationships with LGBTQ colleagues, with no history of negative interactions. Finally, they suffered an adverse employment action. Thus, their Title VII claims boiled down to whether the record created a genuine dispute of material fact whether the employer and the union discriminated against them based on their religious beliefs.
Employer discrimination. With respect to the second employee, the appeals court determined that she produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her Title VII and state-law claims against the employer and union. Her post on its face reflected the expression of religious belief. During the investigation, she defended herself by maintaining that her post was grounded in her religious beliefs, specifically requesting a religious accommodation.
The fact that the employee was terminated after posting a facially religious statement by a company (and cooperating union) that understood the religious basis for the post provided the initial grounding for a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether she was terminated because of her religious beliefs.
Moreover, other circumstantial evidence supported the inference that the employer may have terminated her based on her religious beliefs. Internal emails showed the company discussing how “[e]mployees actually do not have the right to believe that LGBTQ rights are ‘immoral.’” And the change in company policy that her post engendered came only after the CEO expressed concern about “[c]ensor[ing] people for having conservative Christian views.”
Further, communications involving union officials also supported the employee’s assertions of possible anti-religious bias. A reasonable jury could conclude that disparaging comments by a union official connecting the employee’s post with her religious faith suggested an infirmity in the employee’s religious beliefs.
In addition, the fact that the employee was terminated outright, rather than given any lesser punishment under the employer’s progressive discipline policy, contributed to the inference that she was terminated because of her religious beliefs.
Union discrimination. The second employee also established a genuine dispute of material fact over whether her union “discriminated against” her, “adversely affected h[er] status as an employee,” or “caused or attempted to cause” the employer to discriminate against her “because of” her religious beliefs. In this case, the union became immediately engaged in the employer’s efforts to investigate the two employees, even though it was “rare” for officials to get involved in discipline cases. Thus, there was a genuine dispute whether the union’s representation of the employee reflected bias against her because of her religious beliefs.
First employee. Turning to the first employee, the appeals court also held that she produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her Title VII and state-law claims against the employer and the union.
The employee’s post stated that: “As a company, do you think it’s possible to regulate morality?” Although she was known to wear a cross necklace and therefore may have been regarded as Christian within the company, her comment was not explicitly grounded in religious belief. Further, during the investigation, she did not describe her post in religious terms, claiming she was raising a “philosophical” question. She only expressly invoked her religious beliefs much later, after she had been terminated.
Religious beliefs. The appeals court observed that although the employee’s post did not expressly invoke religion, “morality” is often associated with religious beliefs. “Moral” beliefs about the matters addressed in the Equality Act—which concern sexual identity and orientation—can likewise be understood to include religious beliefs. Moreover, the employer acknowledged that its support for the Equality Act “touches on religious freedom concerns for some.” Thus, the employer could have reasonably understood that the employee was invoking beliefs about “morality” that are commonly tied to religion.
While the employer argued that it fired the employee for the neutral reason that she violated company anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policies, a reasonable jury could find the company’s stated reasons were pretextual. The employee’s notice of discharge asserted that her single-line comment, offered in the form of a question, was “offensive” and “discriminatory.” The employer characterized it as speech “that targets a group of individuals based on their legally protected characteristics.” Because her claims were tied into the second employee’s claims, the appeals court held that she created a triable dispute on her Title VII claim against the employer.
Title VII claim against union. The appeals court further held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact whether the union attempted to cause the employee’s termination based on her religious beliefs or acquiesced in it.
A union official was heavily involved in the employer’s efforts to investigate and discipline the employee. He repeatedly referred to the employee as a “bigot” and “bigoted.” Further, he said that management needs to send the employee’s “bigoted ass” packing.
Also, during the investigatory and grievance process, the employee claimed she felt pressured not to raise her religious objections to the Equality Act. Under these circumstances, the appeals court concluded that a jury should consider the question of whether the union violated Title VII in its handling of the employee’s investigation and grievance.
RLA preemption. Next, the appeals court addressed whether the Railway Labor Act (RLA) preempts the employees’ state law anti-discrimination claims against the union. Here, the court held that the RLA’s duty of fair representation did not preempt those claims.
The duty of fair representation requires unions “to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.”
The Ninth Circuit has not expressly addressed whether the duty of fair representation preempts claims under a state’s antidiscrimination statute. Here, the appeals court agreed with the Second and Eighth Circuits and held that the RLA’s duty of fair representation does not preempt the employees’ Oregon and Washington anti-discrimination claims against their union. State anti-discrimination law did not stand as an obstacle to the federal duty.
The district court reached a contrary conclusion on the preemption question. This opinion addressed only the union’s claim that the duty of fair representation preempts Oregon and Washington anti-discrimination law in their “entirety” when applied to unions. The appeals court held only that Washington and Oregon’s anti-discrimination laws “present[] no potential conflict so incompatible with federal labor laws that all of [their] provisions must fail.”
Partial concurrence and partial dissent. Judge Christen concurred in the majority’s conclusion that both employees demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact that should have prevented entry of summary judgment regarding: (1) whether the employees’ union attempted to cause or acquiesced in the termination of their employment on the basis of their religious beliefs; and (2) whether Alaska Airlines terminated one of the employees on the basis of her religious beliefs. The judge also agreed that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were not preempted by the RLA. However, he dissented on the decision to reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on the first employee’s claims against the employer because he did not agree that she demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the employer terminated her because of her religion.
The case is No. 24-3789.
Judge: Bress, D.
Attorneys: Stephanie N. Taub, First Liberty Institute, for Marli Brown and Lacey Smith. Lauren P. Watts (Seyfarth Shaw) for Alaska Airlines, Inc. Benjamin Berger (Barnard Iglitzin & Lavitt) for Association of Flight Attendants-CWA AFL-CIO
Companies: Alaska Airlines, Inc.; Association of Flight Attendants-CWA AFL-CIO
Cases: Discrimination ReligiousDiscrimination Labor UnionsMembers Discharge StateLawClaims AlaskaNews ArizonaNews CaliforniaNews IdahoNews MontanaNews NevadaNews OregonNews WashingtonNews GCNNews