Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—PREGNANCY—Accounting professor’s pregnancy discrimination verdict affirmed on appeal in Michigan Tech case, (Jun 25, 2026)

By Steven Melendez

The Sixth Circuit let stand the verdict and summary judgment rulings ending separate race and sex discrimination claims.

A Sixth Circuit panel let stand both a jury verdict finding Michigan Technological University discriminated against a former professor on the basis of pregnancy, and summary judgment rulings that disallowed her claims of national origin, race, and sex discrimination. The university argued that the former professor failed to establish an adverse action based on her pregnancy, but the appeals court found that the merit increase she received after her maternity leave—lower than that of her husband, who was also an assistant professor of accounting, and allegedly attributed by the Dean to her maternity leave and failure to do service work—was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discrimination (Guo v. Michigan Technological University, Nos. 24-1891/25-1077 (6th Cir. June 23, 2026, unpublished)).

Assistant professors. The plaintiff, according to the court, “a Chinese-born, Asian woman,” and her husband, were assistant professors of accounting at Michigan Tech. The two were both on a tenure track with a six-year tenure clock, beginning in August 2015, and receiving the same starting salary.

In Fall 2016, their second year at the university, the plaintiff was assigned to serve on a Research Committee and, at the same time, informed the university she was pregnant. The Dean of the College of Business also offered her a nine-month faculty fellowship including a $1,750 stipend. At the end of calendar year 2016, both she and her husband received merit-based pay increases of 1.5 percent, according to the court.

Maternity leave. In Spring 2017, she took maternity leave, through a leave option that provides “one semester at full pay while being relieved from teaching duties for the duration of the leave of absence but continuing to perform their other duties at 50% in a research capacity including graduate student supervision,” with no mention at the time of service responsibilities.

While she was on leave, she indicated she could keep organizing a seminar series via email. She also alleged that during an annual review, the Dean suggested she should use her time on leave for “something work related,” and that he reminded her of her tenure timeline even after she said she needed the time for parenting and recovery. The Dean also expected her to continue to perform service duties, though at some point he was notified employees should be relieved from such duties while on leave, according to the ruling.

Return to work. She resumed normal duties in Fall 2017, and she and her husband both received fellowships with identical stipends, but in the end of the year, she received a 1.13 percent merit raise—which she calculated to be the lowest in the College of Business—while her husband received a 2.24 percent raise. In a February 2018 interim review, the Dean allegedly said her teaching needed improvement, told her she needed to “build her research pipeline,” and said she was expected to perform research and service duties while on leave. In an April 2018 meeting, where she asked about her low raise, the Dean allegedly said it was because she took maternity leave and failed to do enough service. She also complained to him that he was discriminating against her around this time.

Soon after, the university declined to renew two database subscriptions important to both her and her husband’s research. At the end of 2018, she again received a smaller merit raise than her husband. In January 2019, the Dean told her she was expected to handle all responsibilities for a student volunteer income tax clinic. She accepted and was authorized to buy tax software for the clinic. That same month, she received a formal reappointment from the university, though the Dean noted her service work “needs improvement.” In February 2019 she reported to a university administrator that the Dean was discriminating against her.

Moved and resigned. In April 2019, an associate dean raised concerns about her supervision of the tax clinic, and she stepped down from running that program. A laptop with the tax software disappeared from her office, and though she reported the occurrence as a suspected theft, it was found to be removed by the university for clinic use. At the same time, her husband resigned and accepted a new position in Camden, New Jersey. The couple moved, and she resigned from Michigan Tech in August. The university failed to pay her fellowship stipend for the 2018-2019 school year, according to the court ruling.

Lawsuit. She ultimately filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC and subsequently sued Michigan Tech and the Dean, alleging violation of the Equal Pay Act, and that Michigan Tech had committed race, sex, and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA). She also brought a Section 1981 race discrimination claim and Section 1983 race, national origin, and sex discrimination claims against the Dean.

The district court granted summary judgment to the university and Dean on claims besides pregnancy discrimination, and granted qualified immunity to the Dean. A magistrate judge found her ELCRA claim improperly pleaded because she used the term “gender” instead of “sex,” but a district judge reversed that ruling. At trial, a jury found Michigan Tech liable for pregnancy discrimination under the ELCRA and awarded $5,000 in economic damages and $200,000 for emotional distress. Both parties appealed.

Summary judgment. She argued the district court improperly granted summary judgment to the university and Dean.

With regard to the Equal Pay Act claim, the district court pointed to causes other than sex for pay disparities between the professor and her husband, including his higher teaching output and greater—and more prestigious—research publication output. The appeals court upheld that ruling.

The district court also issued summary judgment against her Title VII and ELCRA claims for race, sex, and national origin discrimination, saying she failed to make a prima facie case. The appeals court upheld these rulings. She failed to make a case that actions like the cancellation of the databases she used, or the Dean’s criticism in her four-year review—which she argued was a constructive discharge—were the result of discrimination, the appellate panel found. She also failed to provide a male comparator for allegations of sex discrimination, the court found, besides her husband, where the school provided justification for disparate treatment.

With regard to retaliation claims, the court found she failed to show causation between her discrimination complaints and adverse actions like the database cancellation, failure to pay her stipend, or search of her office for the tax program laptop. Various events also took place too far after her complaints for temporal proximity to justify an inference of causation, the appeals court ruled.

She also failed to show why the Dean should not receive qualified immunity, failing to show he violated a clearly established constitutional right, the appeals court found.

Pregnancy discrimination. Michigan Tech argued the pregnancy discrimination claim should not have gone before the jury. Her ELCRA claim referred to “gender,” rather than “sex,” and while sex discrimination encompasses pregnancy discrimination, Michigan Tech argued gender discrimination is a separate category under ELCRA. But the appeals court noted that gender discrimination was not added to the statute until years after her complaint.

The university also argued that a district judge’s ruling referred to her “pregnancy discrimination claim” in the singular, but a subsequent district judge in the case allowed both federal and state claims to go before the jury. But the appeals court discounted that argument, noting the judge appeared to refer to both “claim” and “claims” interchangeably, that there would be no clear reason why the federal but not state claim would be allowed, and that the second judge had authority to allow both to proceed.

Michigan Tech also argued she failed to establish an adverse action based on her pregnancy. But the appeals court found her claim regarding her lower merit increase than her husband after her maternity leave, allegedly attributed by the Dean to her maternity leave and failure to do service work, was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find discrimination.

The university also failed to convince the appellate judges that certain evidence, such as evidence “regarding certain previously-rejected adverse-action allegations,” like the removal of the laptop and database cancellations, should not have been allowed at trial. The district court told the jury it could consider them as evidence of intent, including whether there was “hostility, animus, or ill feeling,” not as adverse actions, and it did not err in allowing them to be presented, according to the ruling.

The case is Nos. 24-1891/25-1077.

Judge: Larsen, J.

Attorneys: Brian J. Farrar (Sterling Employment Law) for Peng Guo. Mary Massaron (Plunkett Cooney) for Michigan Technological University and Dean L. Johnson.

Companies: Michigan Technological University

Cases: PregnancyDiscrimination RaceDiscrimination SexDiscrimination PayDiscrimination NationalOrigin Discrimination StateLawClaims KentuckyNews MichiganNews OhioNews TennesseeNews