Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RACE—4th Cir.: State police supervisor not entitled to qualified immunity in race-based hostile work environment suit, (Jun 25, 2026)

By Mandavi Singh, LL.M.

Black drug task force officers plausibly alleged that a supervising sergeant participated in discriminatory exclusion and failed to address a racially offensive George Floyd image.

A Maryland State Police supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage in a suit alleging that he helped create and perpetuate a racially hostile work environment for two Black officers assigned to a multi-agency drug task force, the Fourth Circuit has found. Affirming the district court, the appellate court concluded that the officers plausibly alleged the supervisor personally participated in discriminatory exclusionary practices and tacitly authorized racial harassment after failing to respond when another supervisor circulated a racially offensive image of George Floyd. The court further held that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established under existing precedent, allowing the officers' hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to proceed (Gordon v. Heath, No. 23-2232 (4th Cir. June 24, 2026)).

Exclusion from key communications. Two Black Maryland State Police officers joined the agency's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force in 2019. They alleged that from the beginning of their assignments, they were treated differently from their white colleagues. According to the complaint, a supervising sergeant and a corporal who jointly led the task force rarely communicated directly with the officers while routinely holding informal meetings and maintaining group text chains that excluded them.

The complaint alleged that these informal channels were where desirable investigations, overtime assignments, and other career-enhancing opportunities were announced. Because they were excluded, the officers often learned about those opportunities only after they had already been assigned to white task force members, resulting in lost overtime pay and diminished professional opportunities. The officers further alleged that the supervising sergeant participated in the exclusionary communications and knew they were being left out.

Intensified alleged harassment. According to the complaint, tensions escalated on June 2, 2020, shortly after George Floyd's death sparked nationwide protests over race and policing. The officers alleged that the corporal circulated a text message depicting "a superimposed nude African-American male with exposed and enlarged genitals sitting on George Floyd's head and neck area" near a police vehicle. They claimed they were "upset and offended" by the image and that the supervising sergeant failed to discipline the corporal, report the incident, or initiate an investigation despite his supervisory authority.

The officers alleged that the supervising sergeant's failure to act deepened racial divisions within the task force, increased mistrust among officers, and left them concerned that fellow officers might not protect them during dangerous field operations such as executing search warrants and making arrests. One officer left the task force shortly afterward, while the other alleged that the hostile work environment continued until early 2022.

After filing charges with the EEOC and later bringing suit, the officers saw their race discrimination claims dismissed by the district court. However, the court permitted hostile work environment claims to proceed against the Maryland State Police under Title VII and against the supervising sergeant and the corporal in their individual capacities under Section 1981 through Section 1983. The supervising sergeant filed an interlocutory appeal challenging only the denial of qualified immunity.

Hostile work environment. Reviewing the denial of qualified immunity de novo, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that, because the appeal arose from a motion to dismiss, it was required to accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the officers' favor. The court explained that hostile work environment claims under Section 1981 are governed by the same principles applicable to Title VII claims, citing Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2001), although personal liability under Section 1983 requires allegations showing an official's own conduct rather than employer responsibility.

Applying the framework established in Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2018), the court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged unwelcome conduct based on race that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. The appellate court rejected the supervising sergeant's contention that employees must directly complain or confront a harasser before conduct can be considered unwelcome, explaining that the first element “is not a high hurdle,” and that “the nature of the conduct may indicate whether or not the conduct is unwelcome.”

The court found it reasonable to infer that the George Floyd image, viewed in its social context, was inherently offensive to the two Black officers. It also noted that the complaint specifically alleged the officers were upset by both the image and the supervising sergeant's failure to respond.

Racial discrimination. The Fourth Circuit also concluded that the complaint plausibly connected the alleged conduct to racial discrimination. Although exclusion from meetings and group texts might appear facially neutral in isolation, the court explained that Strothers permits courts to infer discriminatory intent from "the totality of the circumstances." The George Floyd image, the appellate court said, served as contextual evidence supporting the inference that the earlier exclusionary practices likewise occurred because of race rather than coincidence.

The appellate court further found that the complaint adequately alleged severe or pervasive harassment. It pointed not only to the repeated exclusion from overtime opportunities and desirable assignments but also to the offensive image, the supervising sergeant's alleged refusal to intervene, and the resulting deterioration of trust within the task force. According to the complaint, the officers no longer believed fellow task force members would adequately protect them during hazardous law enforcement operations. Those allegations, the court concluded, implicated both workplace safety and the officers' ability to perform their duties effectively.

The court rejected the supervising sergeant's argument that he could not be personally liable merely because he failed to discipline the corporal. Instead, it found that the complaint alleged more than passive inaction. It asserted that the supervising sergeant both participated in the exclusionary communication structure and consciously declined to respond after the racially offensive text message, permitting a reasonable inference that he helped perpetuate the hostile work environment. As the court summarized, the complaint plausibly alleged that the supervising sergeant "participated in and tacitly authorized a racially hostile work environment."

Right was clearly established. Turning to qualified immunity, the Fourth Circuit concluded that existing precedent gave reasonable supervisors fair notice that such conduct violated clearly established law. Relying in part on Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2007), the court observed that discriminatory treatment within law enforcement agencies can manifest through exclusion from informal workplace channels that distribute assignments, information, and operational support. The court also cited Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc), to emphasize that even a single incident of particularly serious racial harassment may support a hostile work environment claim.

Applying those precedents, the appellate court concluded that a reasonable supervisor would have understood that excluding the task force's only two Black officers from career-enhancing communications while failing to respond to an overtly race-based image circulated immediately after George Floyd's killing violated clearly established constitutional protections. The court concluded that existing authority left "no legitimate question" about the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct under the circumstances presented.

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying qualified immunity, allowing the officers' Section 1981 hostile work environment claim against the supervising sergeant in his individual capacity to proceed.

The case is No. 23-2232.

Judge: Gregory, R.

Attorneys: Joseph Eugene Spicer (Cohen Harris) for Don Gordon and Terrell Jones. Bruce Lawrence Marcus (MarcusBonsib) for Sergeant William C. Heath.

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