Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, WAGE-HOUR—CLASS ACTIONS—7th Cir.: Fired African-American firefighter’s Title VII claims avoid claim preclusion, (Jun 9, 2026)

By Jason Albright, J.D.

He had voluntarily dismissed a state-court lawsuit challenging the administrative decision that led to his firing.

The doctrine of claim preclusion bars a fired African-American firefighter from litigating in federal court most claims he brought previously in a voluntarily dismissed state-law action, but not his Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims, the Seventh Circuit found. A federal district court had concluded that his entire federal suit was foreclosed based on an adverse administrative ruling in his state case under Illinois law, but state administrative decisions have no preclusive effect as to Title VII claims until the decision has been reviewed in state court and culminated in a judgment that is then treated like any other judgment, and the district court correctly rejected the defendants’ arguments that the voluntary dismissal of the state-court action itself had any preclusive effect (Strickland v. City of Markham, No. 24-3262 (7th Cir. June 8, 2026)).

Firefighter and EEOC interview. The plaintiff worked as a firefighter for the City of Markham Fire Department for over a decade.

In 2020, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interviewed him during an investigation into discrimination claims brought by a former firefighter. In the interview, the plaintiff described race-based discrimination he had witnessed against the former firefighter and how the fire chief allegedly failed to address it.

Alleged retaliation. The firefighter alleged that after the interview, the chief and the fire department retaliated against him by singling him out for minor disciplinary issues and denying him a promotion.

Discharge. In January 2021, the department brought administrative charges against the firefighter. After hearings on the charges, the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners terminated his employment in April 2021, finding that he had lied to detectives during an arson investigation and had put fire department employees at risk by coming to work while infected with COVID-19.

State-court lawsuit and administrative proceedings. The next month, he filed a lawsuit in state court challenging the Board’s decision. The court remanded while retaining jurisdiction over the case and instructed the Board to enter an amended decision with additional information.

The Board did so and again discharged the firefighter. After the Board issued its amended decision in April 2022, he voluntarily dismissed his state-court lawsuit. He did not otherwise seek direct review of the amended administrative decision in state court.

Federal lawsuit. In the meantime, in March 2022, he had already filed suit in federal court. He alleged that the City of Markham and the fire chief discriminated against him based on race and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII and Illinois state law, and denied him equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants’ claim preclusion argument. After he voluntarily dismissed his suit in state court, the City of Markham and the fire chief moved to dismiss the federal complaint. They argued that his claims were precluded by the outcomes of the Board hearing and the state-court suit.

Federal action barred. Under Rule 12(d), the district court converted the defendants’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment, and applying 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the district court concluded that Illinois claim preclusion principles barred his federal action. First, it determined that under Illinois law, the Board’s decision was a final judgment on the merits because the proceeding was judicial in nature and was not timely challenged. Next, the court explained that although the former firefighter’s state and federal suits asserted different theories of relief, both actions shared an identity of the causes of action because they arose from the same operative facts: his termination. There also was no dispute over the identity of the parties. Finally, the district court concluded that he had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate his claims, as required by Illinois law and general due process principles.

He timely appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

Title VII claims revived. Vacating the judgment with respect to the former firefighter’s Title VII claims, the Seventh Circuit first observed that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give full faith and credit to the “judicial proceedings of any court” of a state. However, In University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that Section 1738 extends by its terms to only a state court’s judgment, not to “unreviewed” state administrative proceedings. Those administrative proceedings receive preclusive effect at most through federal common-law rules of preclusion, and under federal common law, administrative proceedings alone cannot preclude Title VII claims.

Thus, at least as to Title VII claims, state administrative decisions have no preclusive effect until the decision has been reviewed in state court and culminated in a judgment that is then treated like any other judgment. The district court thus erred by concluding that the Board’s decision here, standing alone “regardless of the subsequent dismissal,” could preclude the former firefighter’s Title VII claims.

And as for his voluntary dismissal of his state court suit, the district court correctly rejected the defendants’ arguments that this dismissal itself had any preclusive effect. “A voluntary dismissal in state court may, in principle, amount to a state court’s judgment for purposes of § 1738,” the Seventh Circuit observed. “But § 1738 still requires federal courts to afford that judgment only the same preclusive effect it would receive in the state’s courts.” Under Illinois law, voluntary dismissals should not be treated as final judgments on the merits where there are no claim-splitting concerns, and the district court expressly saw no such concerns here.

The district court thus erred in dismissing the former firefighter’s Title VII claims on claim preclusion grounds.

Other claims precluded. The former firefighter’s Section 1983 and state-law claims, however, were precluded. As the district court recognized, Illinois law provides that claim preclusion can apply to administrative decisions where the proceeding is adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature, and where the losing party fails to seek timely judicial review of the decision. Here, because the former firefighter allowed the administrative decision to ripen into a final judgment on the merits by not challenging it in state court, his Section 1983 and state-law claims were barred by Illinois claim preclusion principles incorporated by federal common-law claim preclusion, even if not by Section 1738.

The case is No. 24-3262.

Judge: Per Curiam.

Attorneys: Jacob D. Exline (Kurtz, Sleper & Exline) for Vairrun Strickland. Michael J. Hayes, Jr. (Odelson, Murphey, Frazier & McGrath) for City of Markham and Anthony Mazziotta.

Companies: City of Markham

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