Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—DISABILITY—D. Kan.: School employee fired after surgery because she had no available leave advances accommodation claim, (Jun 9, 2026)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

“The record evidence suggests—strongly so—that the defendant mistakenly believed that it needn’t accommodate plaintiff because she had exhausted her leave.”

A school district employee not only initiated the interactive process when she told her employer she had back surgery and needed to miss work, but also her doctor’s note stating she “no work until re-evaluated on 10/10/2023” was sufficient for a jury to find she was not asking for an indefinite amount of time off from work, a federal court in Kansas ruled. Denying summary judgment on her ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, the court also found evidence of a specific, vacant position that could have accommodated her disability. The court, however, dismissed her discrimination and retaliation claims (Kidwell v. Blue Valley Unified School District 229, No. 25-2004-DDC (D. Kan. June 4, 2026)).

Back surgery. As a special education para educator, the employee had to twist, bend, and lift more than five pounds. When she woke up with back pain in September 2023, she told her employer she needed to see her chiropractor even though she had already exhausted her accrued leave. She had back surgery the next day.

Doctor’s note. Her employer asked when she could return to work and when she said she did not know, it asked for a doctor’s note predicting her earliest possible return date. In response, she provided a note stating that she “no work until re-evaluation on 10/10/2023.” She was fired two days later because she did not have any remaining leave.

The employee then sued, asserting claims under the ADA for failure to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation.

Failure to accommodate. Moving to dismiss her failure-to-accommodate claim, the school district argued that the employee never requested an accommodation. Disagreeing, the court pointed out that the parties agreed she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, the district conceded that she requested leave, and it knew the leave was for a medical need. Taken together, said the court, a reasonable jury could conclude she put the district on notice she needed time off due to a health issue.

Plausibly reasonable accommodation. As to the school district’s assertion the employee failed to identify a plausibly reasonable accommodation, a jury, the court again observed, could find she requested an accommodation when she communicated that she had back surgery and needed to miss work, which triggered the district’s duty to engage in the interactive process. While the school district argued that the doctor’s terse note extinguished the good faith communications between the parties, it made no effort to determine how likely it was she would return on October 10; what the prognosis for her disability was; or whether she could return to work in the near future.

Rather, said the court, there was evidence suggesting the district short-circuited the interactive process by firing the employee shortly after receiving the doctor’s note. “When an employer does not engage in the interactive process,” the court observed, “that employer will unlikely be able to establish the absence of a disputed fact” about “the existence of a reasonable accommodation.”

Temporary leave. The employee argued that a combination of two accommodations—temporary leave and reassignment—could have facilitated her continued employment. The district, however, argued that the doctor’s note was a request for indefinite leave. While the note was terse, a reasonable jury, the court stated, could find it suggested a return date and that the employee was not asking for an indefinite amount of time off from work.

Though the school district faulted the employee for failing to provide a clearer estimate of when she could return, it could have asked her for more information and thus continued the interactive process, said the court, noting that the doctor’s note specifically stated “If you have any questions or concerns, please don’t hesitate to call.” Instead of clarifying with her medical provider, the district fired her. In sum, the court explained, a reasonable jury could conclude that short-term leave represented a reasonable accommodation.

Reassignment. While the defendant next argued that even assuming she could have returned on October 10, she could not perform the essential functions of bending, twisting, and lifting, the employee countered that the district could have reassigned her to a vacant position. Rejecting the district’s contention that she did not request a transfer, the court pointed out that it fired her without exploring reasonable alternatives.

Nor was the court swayed by its assertion she did not identify a reasonable vacant position as she offered evidence there was a vacant computer-para position that was not physically demanding. Declining the district’s request to exclude this evidence because the employee relied upon an individual who did not have personal knowledge to testify about a vacancy, the court pointed to her affidavit testimony that she had “personal knowledge of the facts set forth” and that she based her assertion of a vacancy on her observation that defendant “underpaid the position and would routinely hire a substitute to temporarily fill the vacancy.”

This, said the court, was sufficient to support a finding she had personal knowledge of the matter. And while the district argued that the individual was not a manager and did not work for HR, these were credibility arguments for the factfinder to evaluate. Accordingly, the court found the employee sufficiently established that a vacant position was available and that the district could have accommodated her by reassigning her to that position. Thus, the court denied summary judgment on her failure-to-accommodate claim.

Disability discrimination. Turning to the employee’s disability discrimination claim, the court assumed without deciding that she established a prima facie case. It also found that the district court proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firming the employee—she “could not perform the essential functions of her job” and “had exhausted all leave available to her and did not have information suggesting a return date.”

Noting that the employee failed to address pretext and only feebly asserted that bad faith could be inferred because the district claimed it engaged in the interactive process when it hadn’t, the court found this failed to suggest her employer fired her for any reason other than she had exhausted her leave. “In other words,” said the court, “while a factfinder properly could conclude that defendant didn’t engage in the interactive process, plaintiff hasn’t demonstrated why a reasonable factfinder could take that point and conclude that defendant’s explanation for firing plaintiff is ‘unworthy of credence.’” Accordingly, the court found the employee failed to raise a triable issue she was unlawfully fired because of her disability.

Retaliation. Granting summary judgment against her retaliation claim as well, the court, explained that “The long and short of it is this: plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence from which a jury could find that defendant ‘acted with a retaliatory animus when it terminated’ her.”

The case is No. 25-2004-DDC.

Judge: Crabtree, D.

Attorneys: Henry W. Tanner, Jr. (The Law Firm of Henry Tanner) for Esther Kidwell. Madison A. Perry (Spencer Fane) for Blue Valley Unified School District 229.

Companies: Blue Valley Unified School District 229

Cases: DisabilityDiscrimination Discrimination Discharge Retaliation KansasNews