Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RACE—N.D. Ind.: Lack of evidence of decisionmaker animus dooms Title VII, Section 1981 claims, (Jun 9, 2026)

By Robert Margolis, J.D.

His relationship with coworkers became problematic, with coworkers accusing him of being “combative”…

A former United States Steel Corporation (USS) employee, an African-American man who was found to have made a false statement in violation of a last-chance agreement and was terminated as a result, having provided no evidence that the labor relations representative who made the decision to terminate him was motivated by racial animus, failed to survive summary judgment against his Title VII or Section 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims, a federal district court held. The court granted summary judgment motions brought by USS and the plaintiff’s union, United Steelworkers Local 1066, after examining his claims under both the Seventh Circuit’s “holistic” approach to summary judgment on discrimination claims and the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework (Robins v. USW Local 1066, No. 2-20-cv-63 (N.D. Ind. June 5, 2026)).

Incidents. The employee worked for the employer for a little more than one year, during which time he was represented by the union. His relationship with coworkers became problematic, with coworkers accusing him of being “combative” and “fish[ing] for fights,” and the employee accusing them of “covert racism.” He pointed to an incident of one coworker playing audio from a podcast on black-on-black crime in a manner he found “offensive by nature.” The labor relations representative met with the employee and his coworkers and instructed them to learn to work together.

LCA. Another incident occurred in a parking lot, where the employee contended that the same white coworker pulled up in his car, and either made physical threats using racial epithets or racially disparaging remarks that did not threaten physical harm. When the labor relations representative investigated, he found that the employee provided inconsistent information when first reporting the incident to the employer’s ethics hotline and later when the representative interviewed him about the incident. He thus suspended the employee for five days. The employer informed the union that it would be taking further action against the employee, leading the union and the employer to negotiate the last-chance agreement (LCA), in which the employee agreed that any failure to abide by its terms, including any violation of company policy such as by making a false statement, would subject him to termination.

Third incident. After he agreed to the LCA, a third incident occurred. The employee told his supervisor he needed a day off to work on home repairs, and he was directed to make the request through the call-off clerk. He did not do that, however, believing it would be denied. Instead, he told the clerk he needed to be off due to illness. While the employee claimed he was in fact ill, he could provide no supporting evidence, such as documentation from a doctor, so he was suspended again for five days. The suspension was converted to termination after a fact-finding hearing where it was determined he provided false information to the call-off clerk in violation of the LCA. The union filed three grievances over the termination, which were denied. After that, the decision to appeal shifted to the USW’s parent organization, USW International, which decided to withdraw the grievance rather than arbitrate. The NLRB dismissed the employee’s challenge to this decision as meritless.

The employee then sued both the employer and the union for discrimination and retaliation. The defendants each moved for summary judgment.

Seventh Circuit. In the Seventh Circuit, a plaintiff facing summary judgment in a discrimination or retaliation case can proceed under either the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis, or the “holistic” framework of Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). Under Ortiz a court looks at all the evidence and determines “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Id. at 765.

Union. The employee proceeded exclusively under Ortiz in his discrimination and retaliation claims against the union. Under that analysis, he was required to present evidence from which it could be inferred that the union refused to arbitrate the employee’s grievance because of his race. The employee provided no such evidence. Instead, he relied on the workplace incidents described above and the history of racial tension between the employee and his coworkers. But none of that could be attributed to the union. The record showed that the union took steps early on to reverse a transfer and return the employee to a facility he preferred, later investigated disputes between the employee and his coworkers, and worked to ensure the employee was given an LCA rather than terminated when he was found to have made inconsistent statements about the parking lot incident.

As to the union’s handling of his grievance after termination, there was no evidence that the union did not honestly believe the reasons for withdrawing rather than arbitrating—that it would take several months, the employee would not get paid, and the employee’s lack of seniority would work against him. There was no evidence any decision was made because of his race. This lack of evidence doomed both the discrimination and the retaliation claims, the court held.

Employer. The employee used both the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting and Ortiz holistic methods for his discrimination claims against the employer. But his failure to identify any similarly situated employees outside of his protected class who were treated more favorably, an element of his prima facie case, was fatal. While the employee pointed to the coworker who played the podcast and then was involved in the parking lot incident, the two were not similarly situated because the employee was disciplined and ultimately terminated for making inconsistent and then false statements, and there was no evidence the coworker committed that violation of company policy.

The employee presented as evidence of pretext the various incidents he claimed showed racial animus, but because he could not establish his prima facie case, the court evaluated that evidence under the Ortiz holistic approach. The court held that evidence failed to show pretext because there was no evidence the decisionmaker, the labor relations representative, took any adverse actions because of the employee’s race. Even if a jury could conclude that the discrepancies in the employee’s reports about the parking lot incident provided the labor relations representative with “a convenient excuse for something [he] wanted to do regardless … pretext alone is not enough; [the employee] must also show that the explanations are a pretext for the prohibited animus.” Napier v. Orchard Sch. Found., 137 F.4th 884, 893 (7th Cir. 2025). Because nothing in the record allowed for an inference of racial discrimination by the decisionmaker, the claim failed.

The same was found as to the employee requesting a day off for illness because he feared he would be denied if he asked for the time for home repairs. Merely believing he would have been treated differently because of race is not evidence of discrimination, circumstantial or otherwise.

Finally, the same lack of evidence of racial animus on the part of the decisionmaker led the court to grant summary judgment on the retaliation claims as well. There was no evidence the decisionmaker did not honestly believe the employee provided conflicting reports about the parking lot incident, or that he did not honestly believe the employee falsely stated he was sick when he sought time off.

The case is No. 2-20-cv-63.

Judge: Rodovich, A.

Attorneys: Paul J. Cummings (Law Offices of Paul Cummings) for Michael Robins. Stephen A. Yokich (Dowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich) for USW Local 1066. Dorothy D. McDermott (Law Offices of Paul Cummings) for United States Steel Corp.

Companies: USW Local 1066; United States Steel Corp.

Cases: RaceDiscrimination Discrimination Retaliation IndianaNews