Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, TORT CLAIMS—8th Cir.: Cardiologist’s ‘notice to leave’ meant she resigned, absent other explanation, (Nov 5, 2025)

By Cathleen Calhoun, J.D.

“Resignation defeats the essential element of proximate cause required to state a claim for tortious interference with a contract.”

A cardiologist who was placed for work at a medical center by her contractor employer and later gave the employer “notice to leave” failed to show the essential element of proximate cause required to state a claim for tortious interference with a contract, the Eighth Circuit ruled, affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claim. The court also did not find that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment and file a second amended complaint (Tukaye v. Troup, No. 24-1934 (8th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025)).

While working at the medical center, the cardiologist had complained about the quality of health care provided by a white cardiologist. The medical center threatened to drop the contract with the cardiologist’s employer if she were not reassigned, but she provided her contractor employer with notice to leave, and the medical center renewed the contract. The cardiologist sued the medical center for tortious interference with contract, violations of due process, and employment discrimination.

Tortious interference. The district court dismissed the cardiologist’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The cardiologist argued that the district court improperly dismissed her tortious interference claim when it inferred her “notice to leave” was equivalent to a resignation, and her resignation was a superseding and intervening cause of her harm.

For a claim for tortious interference with a contract under Arkansas law, the cardiologist was required to plead sufficient facts to show: (1) a valid contractual relationship existed between herself and her contractor employer; (2) the medical center knew about this contractual relationship; (3) the medical center intentionally induced or caused a breach or termination of that contract; and (4) the medical center proximately caused the cardiologist’s harm.

The court found that while the cardiologist did not use the word “resignation,” she did not offer an alternative explanation of how her “notice to leave” could be interpreted as anything other than a resignation. According to the court, the plain meaning of the language used suggested that the cardiologist “provided notice of her intention to voluntarily leave her employment,” and, as a result, the cardiologist did not show that the district court erred when it determined that her actions amounted to a resignation.

The cardiologist’s resignation defeated the essential element of proximate cause required to state a claim for tortious interference with a contract, the court ruled. Accepting her allegations as true, her amended complaint failed to state a claim for relief that was plausible on its face.

Post-judgment relief. In addition, the cardiologist argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment and file a second amended complaint. The court disagreed, finding that the cardiologist did not identify any manifest error of law or fact justifying relief under Rule 59(e).

According to the cardiologist, the district court should have considered the five factors governing leave to amend pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), and that consideration of those factors supported the relief sought.

Further, the cardiologist did not identify any newly discovered evidence that was unavailable to her at the time she filed her original complaint and amended complaint. Instead, she asserted only that her proposed second amended complaint remedied the deficiencies in her prior pleadings by including additional factual allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. However, the court noted, “This is exactly the type of post-judgment amendment that Rule 59 is designed to prohibit.”

The court observed that the cardiologist had two opportunities to present factual allegations sufficient to state a claim for tortious interference that was plausible on its face but each time she failed to plead sufficient facts. Since the cardiologist failed to meet the Rule 59 standard, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion to alter or amend the judgment for purposes of filing a second amended complaint.

The case is No. 24-1934.

Attorneys: Lucien R. Gillham (Sutter & Gillham) for Deepali Tukaye. Gabriel Douglas Mallard (Mallard Gardner) for Matt Troup. Jenna Allison Adams, Arkansas Municipal League, for City of Conway and Health Facilities Board, [of Conway Regional Medical Center].

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