Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, EVIDENCE, DISCOVERY—D. Utah: Company must supplement discovery responses despite justification in asserting improper-purpose objection, (Nov 5, 2025)

By Tulay Turan, J.D.

An attorney’s description of her own discovery requests as “a bunch of bullshit” did not make them objectively improper.

In a disability discrimination suit brought by a former England Logistics employee, a federal district court in Utah granted in part and denied in part the employee’s motion to compel supplemental responses to discovery requests where they were not so unreasonable as to suggest an improper purpose. The court found an Instagram video, which the employee’s attorney posted 15 minutes after emailing the requests, did not make the otherwise legitimate requests improper. In addition, the court denied the former employee’s motion for sanctions because England was substantially justified in asserting the improper-purpose objection based on the video. It also denied England’s motion for sanctions because the requests did not violate Rule 26(g) (Soqui v. England Logistics, No. 2:24-cv-00261 (D. Utah Oct. 31, 2025)).

The former employee brought a disability discrimination action against England, claiming the company discriminated against him by terminating him after he requested the accommodation of working from home.

Instagram post. On Friday, August 29, 2025, at 4:35 p.m., the former employee’s attorney emailed a second set of discovery requests to England’s counsel. Less than 15 minutes later, she posted an Instagram video that stated, “So if you know me in real life, you probably know that I am a petty-ass bitch. And one of my favorite things to do is drop a bunch of bullshit on opposing counsel’s desk at like 4:45 on a Friday afternoon, and then be like, thanks so much. Have a great weekend!.”

Refused to withdraw requests. After seeing the video, England’s counsel called and asked the attorney to withdraw the discovery requests, explaining that the Instagram statements were an admission that the requests were served for an improper purpose. The former employee’s attorney responded that the video was a joke and contended the requests were proper. Afte the call, the attorney declined to withdraw the requests. England then served its responses and objections, which included an objection to every request as improper based on the video. After conferring regarding the sufficiency of England’s responses, the parties were unable to resolve the dispute.

Motions filed. The former employee filed a motion to compel supplemental responses to the discovery requests and impose sanctions on England. The employee claimed England’s improper-purpose objection was “meritless” and it “improperly refused to respond” to legitimate discovery requests. England opposed the motion and filed its own motion for sanctions, arguing the attorney’s behavior demonstrated the requests were propounded for an improper purpose.

No improper purpose. Applying Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the discovery requests were not so unreasonable as to suggest an improper purpose, and the Instagram post did not make otherwise legitimate discovery requests improper. As such, the court overruled England’s Rule 26(g) objection. Likewise, because the requests did not violate Rule 26(g), the court denied England’s request for sanctions under that rule.

Not objectively improper. The court noted the attorney’s Instagram post was unprofessional and imprudent. However, her reference to the requests as “a bunch of bullshit” did not, on its own, establish that the requests themselves were objectively improper or propounded for an improper purpose.

Timing. Further, the court said the attorney’s stated enjoyment of serving discovery requests on a Friday afternoon did not demonstrate an objectively improper purpose related to their timing. “Where a party has thirty days to respond to such requests, the time of day and day of the week on which they are served has no practical effect on the burden or expense of responding,” the court wrote. The fact that she served these requests on a Friday afternoon did not objectively constitute harassment, cause unnecessary delay or increase the cost of litigation. For these reasons, her statements on Instagram, standing alone, did not establish that the substance of the requests or the timing of their service was improper.

Content of requests. In addition, the requests as a whole addressed relevant issues, the court said. They were not so broadly objectionable as to suggest an objectively improper purpose. The fact that England responded to some of the requests and asserted boilerplate objections to others undermined the notion that the requests overall were harassing, caused unnecessary delay, or needlessly increased the cost of litigation. But for the Instagram post, the court noted, there would be no basis to object to the content of the requests.

Objection was substantially justified. Turning to the client’s requests for sanctions and attorney fees, the court denied the motions because England was substantially justified in asserting the improper-purpose objection based on the attorney’s Instagram post. It was objectively reasonable for England to take her words at face value when she described her own discovery requests as “a bunch of bullshit.” England’s argument that this violated Rule 26(g) was legitimate.

Further, England did not simply refuse to respond to otherwise valid discovery requests on the basis of the attorney’s post. After the attorney declined to withdraw the requests, England served responses and substantive objections, without simply resting on an improper-purpose objection. England’s other objections addressed the substance of the requests and were legitimate. Its objections and overall approach to responding to these requests were substantially justified.

In addition, there was no evidence that England’s counsel used the improper-purpose objection to harass or bully the attorney. The record contradicted that claim. The emails and phone call between counsel reflected England’s legitimate, good faith attempts to resolve this dispute without court intervention. “England appropriately pursued the improper-purpose objection, and counsel’s statement that England might raise the issue in court if the requests were not withdrawn was justified,” the court wrote.

Other objections and responses. Finally, the court found that England must supplement its response to Interrogatories 10, 11, 12, and 14 and RFPs 19 through 24 and produce responsive documents. The interrogatories related to names of individuals that worked in the former employee’s division from 2019 to 2021, complaints of discrimination against the division’s director, other charges of discrimination against England, and communications about his termination. The RFPs sought communications about other employees’ accommodation requests and the former employee’s work performance and termination.

The court denied the former employee’s request as to an interrogatory regarding information about comparators to a potential comparator because the burden of responding outweighed its likely benefit. Also, two other interrogatories at issue were moot.

Thus, the court granted in part and denied in part the former employee’s motion to compel. It also denied both parties’ requests for sanctions.

The case is No. 2:24-cv-00261.

Judge: Oberg, D.

Attorneys: April L. Hollingsworth (Law Offices of April L. Hollingsworth) for Zachary Soqui. Aaron C. Hinton (Ray Quinney & Nebeker) for England Logistics Inc.

Companies: England Logistics Inc.

Cases: EvidenceDiscovery DisabilityDiscrimination Discrimination UtahNews