Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—M.D. Fla.: Transgender police officer, fired after misgendering complaint, moves ahead with some claims, (Nov 5, 2025)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

However, dismissing his First Amendment retaliation claims, the court found the “main thrust” of his speech was an employee grievance about being misgendered at work, which was not a matter of public concern.

A transgender police officer who, after beginning his transition from female to male and complaining about workplace misgendering, was allegedly forced to undergo a fitness for duty exam by a “Christian counselor” and terminated after being deemed psychologically “unfit” to perform his duties, plausibly alleged Monell liability against the city for his Section 1983 claim of sex discrimination. The police chief also failed to escape the claim on qualified immunity grounds. Ruling on the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss, a federal district court in Florida also advanced the officer’s Title VII retaliation claims to discovery, but dismissed his First Amendment retaliation claim since his expression of his gender identity at work was not “speech,” and his complaints about misgendering—though made as a private citizen—were not on a matter of public concern. The court also tossed his due process and disability bias claims (Schanley v. City of Sarasota, No. 8:25-cv-00408-WFJ-SPF (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2025)).

Announces transition to male. The officer began working for the Sarasota Police Department in 2015, and at that time presented as a female with long hair and used “she/her” pronouns. On August 20, 2021, the officer sent an email to the patrol captain and police chief stating that he was transgender and was going to proceed with the transition process. The email requested, moving forward, that the staff call him “Eli” (instead of “Elise”) and use the pronouns “he/him.” The chief forwarded the email to HR and various officials, including the official who replaced the chief when he retired in August. On October 11, 2023, the officer submitted a formal request to change his first name, but SPD denied the request because he failed to legally change names.

Complaints about misgendering. In July 2022, the officer was moved to the day shift, where he allegedly endured constant misgendering by coworkers who refused to use his preferred name and pronoun. On August 23, he sent an email to the captain regarding the ongoing issue of misgendering and requested assistance in addressing it. That same day, he met with a lieutenant off-site to discuss the misgendering. Despite his complaints, leadership and most of the rank and-file employees continued to misgender him daily, which he considered to be a sign of disrespect.

Investigation. On April 7, 2023, the officer was notified that there was going to be a formal investigation by internal affairs in connection with a domestic violence call that he responded to on March 26. He was placed on administrative leave, and the police chief also required that he submit to a fitness for duty examination (FFDE) for a psychological evaluation.

Psych exam. On April 10, he was instructed to see an alleged “Christian counselor” who would administer the FFDE. When he inquired about the reason for being subjected to the FFDE, no justification was provided. He also claimed a male officer who was subject to IA investigations for similar reasons was never ordered to submit to a FFDE.

Deemed unfit. On April 11, he met with the counselor in her office, which was decorated with religious-themed items. On April 18, she submitted a written report that allegedly contained numerous fabricated statements or faulty assumptions. Referring to the officer with the she/her pronoun, the counselor stated that “she” was often harassed while in uniform by various men because of the way “she” looked physically, and “her” inability to defend herself “both physically and psychologically is not conducive to confrontation” since “she reacts by submitting.” The counselor concluded that the officer’s inability to do the job was caused largely by “her psyche unconscious psychological pathology,” which made the officer “a danger to herself and the public.” The officer met with his supervisors to review the report and pointed out the various inaccuracies and fabrications.

Terminated. Nevertheless, on April 24, the city formally terminated the officer based on the determination of the report. Relying on the termination letter’s statement that his medical benefits would be retained until May 31, he scheduled gender-related surgery for May 25. However, he received a letter from the insurer stating he was no longer covered.

Lawsuit. He brought this lawsuit alleging a myriad of claims against the city, including sex discrimination under Sec. 1983, the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) and Title VII; First Amendment and Title VII/FCRA retaliation; Due Process violations; and disability discrimination. He also brought constitutional claims against the police chief in his individual capacity.

Monell claim. The court first rejected the city’s contention that the officer’s Section 1983 claim of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause must be dismissed because he failed to plausibly allege a basis for municipal liability, nor was the police chief entitled to qualified immunity. While the defendants argued that he did not have final policymaking authority over the adverse actions at issue since the city charter only vests the city manager with final policymaking authority, the officer’s allegations suggested that the chief was either a final policymaker or a subordinate who had been delegated authority to make decisions that were not constrained or subject to meaningful administrative review. The court also rejected the city’s reliance on the three-step grievance process outlined in the police union’s contract since the officer claimed the city barred his opportunity to participate in the process. Finally, at the time, clearly established law prohibited the alleged gender discrimination.

Title VII retaliation claims. The court also rejected the city’s bid to dismiss his Title VII and FCRA retaliation claims, rejecting the city’s contention that he failed to plausibly allege that he engaged in protected activity or that causation could be inferred. In particular, he claimed that he participated in the city’s anti-harassment and internal complaint process by objecting to misgendering in August 2022 and mid-April 2023. The latter complaint—made just six days before he was fired—was sufficiently close temporal proximity to establish causation.

No “expressive” speech. Turning to the officer’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the court held that that he failed to sufficiently allege that simply presenting as a transgender male at work is protected expressive conduct. While he plausibly alleged that he intended to communicate a message of public concern about his gender identity and the rights of transgender individuals, he failed show that a reasonable person would interpret his physical appearance as an attempt to convey some message. His sole description that he “kept his hair short” was insufficient. Without any specific factual allegations of what his appearance looked like, the court could not find that “simply presenting as one’s preferred gender identity at work automatically qualifies as expressive conduct.” He also failed to cite any Eleventh Circuit precedent suggesting that an expression of one’s gender identity in the workplace can be considered protected expressive speech for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Private speech. The court next found that he plausibly alleged that his two emails and one off-site discussion relating to misgendering were made as a private citizen and not as a public employee. Under Garcetti, the “controlling factor” was whether his statements were made pursuant to his official duties, and here, his complaints of misgendering were all instances of speech that were not ordinarily within the scope of his duties as a police officer. Although the Eleventh Circuit has found that “reporting conduct that interfered with... ordinary job duties” can mean a plaintiff is speaking as an employee if the reporting is done “pursuant to those duties,” here, at most, the employee only alleged that the intentional refusal by coworkers to use his preferred name and pronouns was taken as a sign of disrespect.

Not matter of public concern. Although the court concluded that he sufficiently alleged that he was “at times” speaking as a private citizen, rather than a public employee, his First Amendment retaliation claims still failed to pass muster since his complaints about being misgendered were not made on a matter of public concern. Thus, they did not qualify for First Amendment protection. Rather, they were all instances where his goal was to further his own private interest of not being misgendered. Indeed, his allegations largely focused on how coworkers treated him and how that conduct affected him, and he did not relate concerns about misgendering to the public or attempt to involve the public in any manner.

No due process violations. He also failed to plausibly allege that the city and police chief violated his substantive due process rights in penalizing him for exercising his fundamental right to express his gender identity by depriving him of employment and career opportunities. First, it is well established that he did not have a fundamental right to employment and career opportunities. Moreover, his substantive due process claim for an alleged violation of his freedom of expression was not appropriate since he already brought a First Amendment retaliation claim.

The court also dismissed his procedural due process claim since, as an at-will employee, he could not demonstrate he had a property interest in continued employment. Insofar as he pointed to the city’s premature termination of his health insurance, he did not cite any statute, regulation, ordinance, or contract that conferred a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving gender change surgery, nor did he allege that the city refused to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.

Failure to exhaust disability claims. The court also dismissed the officer’s ADA and FCRA claims of disability discrimination due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Though he checked the “disability” box on his EEOC charge, the rest of the allegations did not refer to any actual or perceived disability, nor did he even mention a diagnosis of gender dysphoria.

The case is No. 8:25-cv-00408-WFJ-SPF.

Judge: Jung, W.

Attorneys: Neil L. Henrichsen (Henrichsen Law Group) for Eli Schanley. Amy Kathleen Recla (Jackson Lewis) for City of Sarasota.

Companies: City of Sarasota

Cases: SexDiscrimination DisabilityDiscrimination Discrimination Discharge IndividualRights PublicEmployees CoverageLiability Procedure FloridaNews