Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES—D. Md.: Political appointee, fired over divisive Facebook posts, gets speech claim tossed on qualified immunity grounds, (Dec 19, 2025)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

The employee alleged he was unlawfully fired over his posting of memes supporting a 17-year-old armed civilian who fatally shot two people during protests over a police shooting of a black man in Kenosha, Wisconsin.

Qualified immunity barred Maryland’s former deputy director of community initiatives from pursuing a First Amendment retaliation claim against the executive director who fired the deputy director from his appointed position after he posted politically divisive memes on a Facebook group page supporting Kyle Rittenhouse during his criminal trial and condemning the actions of the protestors. Dismissing the Sec. 1983 claim brought against the state official in his individual capacity after it was revived on appeal, a federal district court ruled that it was not “clearly established” by applicable law, including the Elrod-Branti exception for public employees in certain policymaking positions, that termination of the employee based on his social media posts violated his First Amendment rights (Love v. McAdams, No. 1:21-cv-02029-JRR (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2025)).

In January 2015, the Maryland governor appointed the employee to serve as the state’s deputy director of community initiatives. In this role, he was the lead staff member on all special events and initiatives for the governor’s office of community initiatives (GOCI).

Facebook posts. On August 28, 2020, the employee used his private Facebook account to visit a group page called “Inside Maryland Politics,” where individuals were discussing the “civil unrest” occurring in Kenosha, Wisconsin, following the police shooting of Jacob Blake. On the group page, the employee discussed his support for Kyle Rittenhouse, the 17-year-old armed civilian who fatally shot two people during a confrontation at the protests. In particular, he posted several memes that he claimed expressed his belief that Rittenhouse’s actions may have been justified under the doctrine of self-defense and condemned the actions of the protestors.

Termination. The next day, August 29, he awoke to press at his home due to the attention his Facebook posts had received. He called the executive director (ED) of the governor’s office, who told him that they would “get through this.” However, on August 30, the ED called and informed him that “he had been terminated due to his Facebook posts on Mr. Rittenhouse’s potential justification under the doctrine of self-defense.” The following day, he received his official termination letter from the ED via email. Either the ED or his representative issued a public statement on behalf of the governor’s office stating: “These divisive images and statements are inconsistent with the mission and core values of the Office of Community Initiatives. Earlier today, I relieved this employee of his duties.”

Procedural background. The employee sued the state, the governor, the ED, and several other state officials. He alleged several claims of First Amendment retaliation as well as wrongful discharge under state and federal law. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that their sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction and/or that the employee failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims with prejudice.

The Fourth Circuit mostly affirmed in an unpublished opinion, but relevant here, reinstated and remanded his Sec. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the ED in his individual capacity. At issue now was the ED’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

Elrod-Branti exception. The ED focused on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—“whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged event.” The applicable law at issue related to a public employee’s First Amendment rights and the applicability of the Elrod-Branti exception, which presents a limitation on a public employee’s First Amendment rights. The narrow exception, which stems from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Elrod v. Burns, 42 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), provides that policymaking employees may be terminated for their political beliefs if “party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”

Two-part test. The Fourth Circuit has adopted a two-part test for conducting the Elrod-Branti analysis. First, a court considers whether the employee’s position involves “government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation.” If it does, the court examines “the particular responsibilities of the position to determine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation or political allegiance is an equally appropriate requirement.”

Speech rights not “clearly established.” Applying this analysis, the court concluded that the parameters of the employee’s First Amendment rights were not “clearly established” such that a reasonable person in the ED’s position would understand that his termination violated the law. In particular, he held a political special appointment and such positions, according to Maryland’s statutory designation, “relate[] to political interests or concerns,” and either “require[]the provision of meaningful direct or indirect input into the policy-making process” or “provide[] access to confidential information.”

Job duties not “merely logistical.” While the employee urged that GOCI oversees non-partisan functions, a reasonable official could conclude that at least some of the agency’s work, including its involvement with racial minority communities and “cultural values and public policy,” involved “government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation.” Moreover, the employee’s position was not only statutorily designated as one that either provided input into the policymaking process or had access to confidential information, but it also included duties of representing GOCI and the governor’s office at meetings and trainings, leveraging community relationships to advance the agency’s priorities, developing the goals of the Commission on Caribbean Affairs, and promoting “public education and awareness of issues and concerns of Native Americans in Maryland.” Contrary to the employee’s contention, such duties are not “merely logistical” in nature.

The court found the legal authority on which the employee relied unavailing. While those cases generally acknowledge First Amendment rights of public employees and protection of free speech on social media, at issue here was binding precedent establishing that “certain public employees can be terminated for political association in order to give effect to the democratic process.” Whether the ED was entitled to qualified immunity thus turned on whether it was clearly established by applicable law, including the Elrod-Branti exception, that terminating the deputy director based on his social media posts violated his First Amendment rights, and the cases he cited did not show that it was.

The case is No. 1:21-cv-02029-JRR.

Judge: Rubin, J.

Attorneys: Arthur M. Love, pro se. Robert A. Scott, Office of the Attorney General, for Steven McAdams.

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