Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—PREGNANCY—N.C. App.: North Carolina appellate court affirms dismissal of pregnancy discrimination case, (Dec 19, 2025)
Law Firms Mentioned:Elliot Morgan Parsonage | Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
Organizations Mentioned:Elliot Morgan Parsonage, PLLC | Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP | Strata Solar, LLC
By Ursula Furi-Perry, J.D., MBA
The court declined to expand public policy beyond statutory text, noting the legislature’s repeated decision not to add pregnancy as a protected category.
The North Carolina Court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s dismissal of an attorney’s claims against a law firm for wrongful discharge based on sex and pregnancy, and disability discrimination, declining to expand public policy beyond statutory text, and noting the state legislature’s repeated decision not to add pregnancy as a protected category. In affirming dismissal of the disability-based claim, the appeals court observed that, under the state’s Persons with Disabilities Protection Act, a qualifying disability must substantially limit major life activities and must not be temporary or transitory. However, the court reversed dismissal of the sex discrimination claim, concluding that the attorney adequately alleged membership in a protected class, satisfactory job performance, termination, and circumstances giving rise to an inference of sex-based discrimination (Edwards v. Strata Solar, LLC, N.C. App. (Dec. 17, 2025)).
Attorney. The plaintiff was an attorney hired by the defendant employer in late 2022 following an active recruitment process for a senior legal role. During recruitment, the employer allegedly represented that the plaintiff would be groomed quickly for a deputy general counsel position, assuring her that remaining in the same role after a year would reflect a failure on the employer’s part. The plaintiff expressed concern about being the only woman on the legal team but accepted the position based on these assurances. During her approximately three months of employment, she received positive feedback and met or exceeded expectations in her only performance evaluation.
Pregnancy and miscarriage. In December 2022, the plaintiff learned she was pregnant after years of difficulty conceiving. Due to the early stage of the pregnancy and concern that her pregnancy might negatively affect advancement opportunities, she did not immediately disclose this information to the employer. In January 2023, the plaintiff experienced a miscarriage accompanied by medical complications; she required medical treatment and intermittently worked remotely, communicating her medical needs to the employer. She later fully disclosed the miscarriage to her supervising attorney and requested continued remote work accommodations.
Additional documentation. The employer requested medical documentation to verify the plaintiff’s absences, a request the plaintiff alleged was not imposed on similarly situated male colleagues who requested medical leave or remote work. After providing documentation, the plaintiff alleged that management became skeptical, distant, and critical of her reliability, and told her that she needed to “repair” relationships with senior leadership and that she had never truly been considered for the promised promotion.
Termination. Despite receiving a positive performance review shortly before, the plaintiff was terminated in early March 2023, allegedly for being untrustworthy and not a team player. She filed suit in a North Carolina Superior Court, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. After dismissal without prejudice, she refiled asserting wrongful discharge based on sex and pregnancy, and disability discrimination. The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), and the plaintiff appealed.
Not an expressly protected category. First, the court upheld dismissal of the pregnancy-based wrongful discharge claim, holding that pregnancy is not an expressly protected category under the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, which lists sex, but not pregnancy, as a protected classification. The court declined to expand public policy beyond statutory text, noting the legislature’s repeated decision not to add pregnancy as a protected category. “Adopting a theory of pregnancy discrimination enlarges the scope of § 143- 422.2 beyond its text and would judicially recognize a cause of action the legislature has not enacted,” the appellate court noted. “Furthermore, aside from a criminal statute excepting breastfeeding women from indecent exposure prohibitions, plaintiff largely cites to executive orders, rather than statutes, to show the existence of a public policy protecting mothers from employment discrimination due to pregnancy. The language plaintiff offers is insufficient to point us to such a policy’s expression.”
Disability-based claim. The court also affirmed dismissal of the disability-based claim, holding that under the Persons with Disabilities Protection Act, a qualifying disability must substantially limit major life activities and must not be temporary or transitory. The plaintiff’s allegations described short-term medical complications that resolved within weeks and did not plausibly establish a qualifying disability or employer knowledge of such a disability at the time of termination, the court held.
Sex discrimination claim revived. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the sex discrimination claim, concluding that the plaintiff adequately alleged membership in a protected class, satisfactory job performance, termination, and circumstances giving rise to an inference of sex-based discrimination. These included her status as the only full-time female attorney, differential treatment compared to male colleagues, the abrupt shift in management’s attitude following her medical disclosure, and termination shortly after a positive evaluation. The court emphasized that, though pregnancy itself is not protected, facts related to pregnancy may support an inference of sex discrimination without expanding statutory public policy, and as the plaintiff’s allegations plausibly supported such an inference, dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage was premature.
The case is No. COA 25-605.
Judge: Arrowood, J.
Attorneys: R. Michael Elliot (Elliot Morgan Parsonage) for Rebecca Edwards. Phillip J. Strach (Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough) for Strata Solar, LLC.
Companies: Strata Solar, LLC
Cases: PregnancyDiscrimination DisabilityDiscrimination Discrimination Discharge NorthCarolinaNews