Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES—7th Cir.: Corrections department rule on use of force not unconstitutionally vague as applied, (Jun 10, 2026)

By Robert Margolis, J.D.

“Person of ordinary intelligence” could reasonably determine what “last resort” means.

An Illinois Department of Corrections Rule stating in relevant part that “[f]orce shall be employed only as a last resort …” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to corrections officers who used force on an inmate when other options were available, the Seventh Circuit held. The court affirmed a district court’s summary judgment dismissal of claims brought by several officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the department violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by terminating them for using force in violation of the rule. The court reasoned that a “person of ordinary intelligence” had a “reasonable opportunity” to figure out that “last resort” means “try all other reasonable methods first,” such that the rule is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to officers who used force despite other options being available (Hundley v. Brookhart, No. 24-2833 (7th Cir. June 9, 2026)).

Use of force. When a wheelchair-bound inmate as part of a protest a lack of post-surgery medical supplies given to him refused to place his hands in a “cuffing port” to have his handcuffs removed—inmates are not permitted to be handcuffed in their cells—the officers used force in an attempt to remove the handcuffs. That course was chosen rather than activating the “tactical team” with special training in extracting inmates from cells, or alerting a supervisor, which is common protocol during unusual incidents. The inmate became belligerent at the officers’ attempt. Because the officers were concerned he may have been injured when they attempted to remove the handcuffs, and medical staff ordinarily do not enter cells, they decided the inmate would have to be removed to the shower area. When he refused, a struggle ensued and the officers dragged him out of his shell, across a concrete floor, and into the shower area. After the inmate grabbed and broke an officer’s duty belt, they pepper sprayed him and tethered him to the shower, where he remained for approximately two hours before the medical unit arrived.

None of the officers disclosed in their incident reports that they dragged the inmate to the shower. Their reports included additional misstatements. After an internal investigation, followed by administrative hearings and an appeal to the Illinois Civil Service Commission, the department discharged the officers for violating the rule, requiring officers to use force only as a last resort. The Commission concluded the officers were aware they had other options and had adequate time and opportunity to pursue them before entering the cell and trying to remove the handcuffs.

Lawsuit. The officers sued the warden, the Commission, the department, and several others, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, because the department’s use of force rules were unconstitutionally vague such that the officers could not have known that their actions violated the rules. The federal district court, concluding the rules were not unconstitutionally vague, granted the defendants summary judgment. The officers appealed.

Vagueness standard. To survive a vagueness challenge, a law or rule need not describe with complete precision the prohibited behavior, but, in the words of the court, “need only give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what the rules prohibit.” Citing, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 110 (1972). When government rules regulate employee behavior, rather than the general public, then the government enjoys even greater latitude, and a rule “is impermissibly vague only if it fails to convey adequate warning to reasonable employees as to a sufficiently defined range of inappropriate conduct that may result in discipline.” Hicks v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 109 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations omitted). And given the unique safety and security concerns in prisons, prison employers receive even greater “latitude in their discipline decisions” than ordinary government employers. Id. at 902.

Applying that standard here, the court had little trouble holding that the use-of-force rule was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the officers in this case. The rule at issue provides, “[f]orce shall be employed only as a last resort or when other means are unavailable or inadequate and only to the degree necessary to achieve a permitted purpose.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 501.30(a). The Administrative Code defines “force” as “physical contact used to coerce or prevent some action on the part of a committed person, and the use of chemical agents.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 501.20(a).

As the court reasoned, no matter the circumstances, the term “last resort” is easy to interpret. “It very clearly means ‘try all other reasonable methods first.’” Reasonable officers would have to have known that other options were available to them before entering the cell to forcibly remove the inmate’s handcuffs, including notifying a superior officer, talking to the inmate to try to de-escalate the situation, or calling the tactical team. While the officers argued they were not “required” to do any of those things, the court found this argument missed the point. They were not terminated for failing to take any of those particular actions, but rather for failing to use force as a last resort. It is not for the court to determine what the best course of conduct would have been, but only to determine whether the department violated the officers’ constitutional rights by terminating them for failing to comply with a rule that the court determined was not unconstitutionally vague. Finding this case “is not at the margins” because after the inmate did not heed the initial command to place his hands in the cuffing port (perhaps “one resort’) the officers went straight to the use of force with several other options available to them, such as those described above.

The case is No. 24-2833.

Judge: Rovner, I.

Attorneys: John A. Baker (Baker Baker + Krajewski) for Derek Hundley, Robert Kamp, and Travis Ochs. Jonathon Studer, Office of the Attorney General, for Dee Dee Brookhart, Kelly Richardson, Rob Jeffreys, Camile Lindsay, John Eilers, and Marc Hodge.

Companies: Illinois Department of Corrections; Illinois Civil Service Commission

Cases: IndividualRights PublicEmployees Discharge IllinoisNews IndianaNews WisconsinNews