Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PROCEDURE—8th Cir.: Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge project labor agreements required by Minnesota municipalities, (Jul 11, 2025)

By Ronald Miller, J.D.

Because the contractors do not have to join a union, they have no First Amendment speech or associational claims of their own.

Contractors, an individual employee, and a union that objected to project labor agreements (PLAs) required by some Minnesota municipalities, the Eighth Circuit has concluded, lacked standing to challenge the agreements on First Amendment grounds. Under the PLAs, only members of a pre-approved union can work on municipal construction jobs. The district court determined that none of the plaintiffs had standing to sue, and that, even if they did, they could not succeed on a First Amendment claim. The appeals court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss based solely on a lack of standing (Christian Labor Association v. City of Duluth, No. 23-2450 (8th Cir. July 10, 2025)).

Project labor agreements. In several Minnesota cities, only members of a pre-approved union can work on municipal construction jobs. When bidding on projects, winners must follow “project-labor agreements,” which require sourcing workers from pre-approved unions. The contractors in this case allege that the project-labor agreements have caused them to miss out on lucrative work.

Rather than comply, the contractors have refused to bid on projects in those cities. They also decided to sue, alleging that the project-labor and union-security provisions violate the First Amendment.

The district court determined that none of the plaintiffs had standing to sue. Further, it concluded that, even if they did, they could not succeed on their First Amendment claim. The contractors appealed.

Standing. To satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must allege (1) “an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” A second variety is prudential standing. Usually, when plaintiffs “fail[] to establish [prudential] standing” for First Amendment claims, it is because they are asserting someone else’s right to speak or associate, not their own.

Contractors. With respect to the contractors who have passed on municipal projects with project-labor agreements, there is little doubt they have alleged an injury, which gives rise to Article III standing when it is directly traceable to the challenged action. The problem is that “the relevant constitutional claims” “belong to their employees,” not to them. Because the contractors do not have to join a union, they have no First Amendment speech or associational claims of their own.

To the extent they try to rely on their close relationship with their employees, there was no hindrance to the employees’ ability to protect their own interests.

Declaratory judgment. Seeking a declaratory judgment does not change the analysis. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, courts may “declare... rights and other legal relations,” but only for the “interested party seeking such declaration.” Any decision here could only declare the rights of the “interested party”—the employees—who object to joining one of the preapproved unions. On the other hand, their employers have no rights of their own that need declaring. Only the employees can sue in federal court.

Employees. An individual employee named as a plaintiff in the suit was the only plaintiff who might qualify. He does not want to join a pre-approved union because he opposes their message. However, he was under no obligation to join one, because the project-labor agreements exempt supervisors.

More than half the time, the employee “direct[s]” other employees as a “site superintendent” who “manage[s] crews,... on-site production and building, [and] other trades and subcontractors coming in.” Even when he has his “tools on,” he still “operate[s] more as a foreman” by “direct[ing] projects [and] making sure things are flowing properly [and] being done correctly.” He also reviews bids to see what others will “be doing on [a] project” and “estimat[ing] [the] hours required for” it. Then, once a project starts, he “ha[s] the authority to... purchase... materials” without someone else having to approve the order first. His duties also extend to hiring and firing decisions.

Other “secondary indicia” point in the same direction. The fact that other employees usually hear about personnel decisions from him created the impression that he has “some extra degree of supervisory authority.” Further, his job title of “site superintendent” suggested special decision-making authority. Because he checked nearly all the boxes for a supervisor, he had no obligation to join a union, and so had not standing to challenge the PLAs.

Union. Without the individual employee, the union had no injury of its own and lacked standing. Although the union tried to rely on associational standing, which would allow it to vindicate the First Amendment rights of its members, it failed to identify one or more of its members who would have standing to sue in their own right.

Accordingly, the appeals court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss based solely on a lack of standing.

The case is No. 23-2450.

Judge: Stras, D.

Attorneys: Jonathan Franklin Mitchell (Mitchell Law) for Christian Labor Association. Jessica J. Fralich, Duluth City Attorney’s Office, for City of Duluth.

Companies: Christian Labor Association; City of Duluth

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