Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—DISABILITY—8th Cir.: EEOC verdict in favor of deaf trucker upheld, (Jul 11, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

It was unclear how providing nonverbal communication during training would fundamentally alter the ability of a trucking company to carry goods in interstate commerce—the company’s primary purpose.

Affirming a jury verdict in favor of the EEOC on behalf of a deaf truck driver and the findings of the district court during the ensuing bench trial on equitable relief, the Eighth Circuit discerned no error on the issues concerning a directed verdict on the issue of causation, summary judgment in favor of the driver on the trucking company’s affirmative defenses, adverse evidentiary rulings against the trucking company, the denial of the company’s motions for judgment as a matter of law, the grant of injunctive relief to the EEOC, and the authorization of an award of prejudgment interest (EEOC v. Drivers Management, LLC, No. 24-2286 (8th Cir. July 10, 2025)).

The truck driver is a deaf individual who obtained a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) variance in 2015, clearing the way for him to obtain a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL). He subsequently enrolled in Roadmaster, a driving training school owned by the defendant trucking company, and received his CDL upon completion of the course.

Job application. Prior to completing his training, the driver applied for a position as an over-the-road truck driver with the trucking company. Because he had fewer than six months of experience, the company’s policy obligated the driver to go through a placement driver program, wherein he would drive throughout the country with a trainer for four to six weeks.

During the hiring process, the driver spoke with the trucking company’s vice president of safety and compliance who inquired about his ability to safely operate a truck and the accommodations that were provided to him as part of the training program. According to the vice president, she researched potential accommodation options prior to this conversation. However, there was no documentation of such research. After discussing the driver’s previous accommodations, the vice president told the driver, “No, I’m sorry, we can’t hire you because of your deafness” and ended the call.

Lawsuit. Subsequently, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of the driver, alleging that the trucking company violated the ADA when it failed to hire the driver because of his deafness and need for a reasonable accommodation. After discovery and the filing of pre-trial motions, the case proceeded to a jury trial.

Both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law. The trucking company argued it was entitled to such a judgment because the driver was not qualified for the position and there was no evidence of intentional discrimination sufficient to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. The EEOC argued that the company admitted it did not hire the driver because he was deaf and thus the jury could only find in its favor on the issue of causation. The district court granted the EEOC’s motion and the case was submitted to the jury, which awarded the driver $75,000 in compensatory damages and $36 million in punitive damages. The district court reduced the punitive damages amount to $300,000, the statutory maximum.

After the jury verdict, the case continued to a bench trial to determine applicable equitable relief. The district court found the driver was entitled to backpay. It also directed the EEOC to submit additional evidence detailing the calculations for a prejudgment interest award which the court later granted in the amount of $11,000. Finally, the court concluded injunctive relief was appropriate, ordering the trucking company to keep a record of any deaf truck driver applications with FMCSA exemptions and to report those records to the EEOC for a period of three years.

Renewed motion. Subsequently, the trucking company filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and also moved for a new trial. The company raised several challenges concerning the directed verdict, the grant of summary judgment in favor of the driver on the trucking company’s affirmative defenses, adverse evidentiary rulings against the trucking company, the denial of the company’s motions for judgment as a matter of law, the grant of injunctive relief to the EEOC, and the authorization of an award of prejudgment interest. The district court denied the motion and this appeal followed.

Directed verdict. First, the court considered the company’s challenge to the district court’s decision to enter a directed verdict on the issue of causation. Here, the court found that there was no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the driver was rejected for any reason aside from his deafness given the direct evidence of discrimination proffered by the EEOC. The company ended the driver’s employment interview by stating, “No, I’m sorry, we can’t hire you because of your deafness.” In addition, the company stated in a sworn interrogatory that its “position [wa]s that a deaf student driver could not safely complete the over-the-road training portion of Werner’s student driver program.” Based on this, the district court concluded that the company’s position was that the driver was not qualified for the position because he was deaf.

Distinction? Disagreeing with this conclusion, the company argued that there was a distinction between not hiring the driver because he was deaf and not hiring him as a consequence of his deafness. The court was not moved, noting that the alleged consequences of the driver’s disability merely described the disability itself.

Further, the company contended that it did not hire the driver specifically because he was deaf and that his deafness made him unqualified for the position. On this point, the court noted that while the issue of the driver’s qualifications was a question for the jury, the company’s reason for failing to hire him was not. Thus, the court found no error in the entry of a directed verdict on the issue of causation.

Undue hardship. Next, the trucking company argued that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on its undue hardship defense. Here, the court found that the company had produced virtually no evidence about how providing non-verbal cues would fundamentally alter its business, nor did it cite any financial burden it would incur by accommodating the driver. As the district court noted, it was unclear how providing nonverbal communication during training would fundamentally alter the ability of a trucking company to carry goods in interstate commerce—the company’s primary purpose.

Having the burden to prove its affirmative defense, the company failed to do so, said the court. Its failure to provide any evidence as to how the accommodation would affect its business as a whole was fatal to its challenge on appeal, and the grant of summary judgment against this defense was not in error.

Direct threat. Turning to the company’s direct threat affirmative defense, the court found its challenge to the grant of summary judgment to be also without merit. The only person who allegedly inquired into whether the driver’s disability constituted a direct threat was the vice president of safety and compliance. However, it was undisputed that she did not conduct the required “individualized direct threat analysis.”

Although the vice president stated she called relevant trucker associations concerning research on deaf truckers, she provided no evidence that such calls ever took place and no evidence of discussions concerning the driver individually in light of his prior training. This one-size-fits-all approach was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the direct threat defense, said the court, and it discerned no error as to this issue.

Evidentiary rulings. Next, the company challenged several evidentiary rulings on the basis of relevance and prejudice.

Stray remarks. First, the company argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting “stray remarks by non-decisionmakers” that occurred two years after the decision was made to reject the driver. However, the court here found that the comments in question were especially relevant here, given that the company admitted that it did not hire the driver because of his disability and the EEOC sought to prove the company was motivated by animus, not safety concerns, in its decision. In addition, the EEOC produced other evidence which, taken together with the comments, would allow the jury to find intentional discrimination for purposes of punitive damages.

Further, the court rejected the company’s argument that the probative value of the comments was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence was not unfair on its own, observed the court, and the district court is given great discretion when ruling on Rule 403 challenges. As such, the court here found no abuse of discretion.

Other companies’ accommodations. Turning to the company’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of other trucking companies’ accommodations for deaf drivers on the basis of relevance, the court was unmoved.

The EEOC was not utilizing this evidence to prove that the trucking company had to adopt the same accommodations as other companies. Rather, it was using this evidence merely to prove that the trucking company could do so and had refused to do so. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence.

Subsequent driving record. As to trucking company’s contention that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence under Rule 403 of the driver’s subsequent driving record while employed by other trucking companies, the court agreed with the EEOC’s assertion that these arguments relied on “the same prejudicial assumption[s]” the district court sought to keep from the jury—that any subsequent accidents were due to the driver’s deafness.

The issue at trial was whether the driver’s training without verbal cues was a reasonable accommodation, explained the court. His subsequent accident history while driving alone was not relevant to this issue. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion on this issue.

JMOL. Next, the trucking company argued that the district court erred by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law, contending there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the driver was qualified or that the company acted with malice or reckless indifference.

On the issue of qualification, it was undisputed that the driver had the requisite waiver from the FMCSA when he applied for the position. As such, the claim that he was unqualified failed as a matter of law.

As to whether the driver was physically qualified as a matter of law, the company argued that he was not because eliminating the essential function of contemporaneous communication with the trainer during driver training is not a reasonable accommodation. However, the court found this argument failed because the essential function requirement focuses on the desired result—safe driving—rather than the means of accomplishing the essential function.

On the issue of submitting punitive damages to the jury, the court found the driver had presented sufficient evidence of malice at trial. Accordingly, the district court did not err in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury.

Injunctive relief. Turning to the trucking company’s challenge to the equitable award of injunctive relief, the court found that, given the company’s intentional discrimination, lack of good faith, and previous lack of record-keeping for deaf applicants, the injunction serves the public by requiring the company to report deaf applicants directly rather than allowing the company to wait until a victim of discrimination approaches the EEOC. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion by the district court on this basis.

Prejudgment interest. Finally, the court addressed the issue of prejudgment interest. The company’s only argument on appeal was that the EEOC waived the issue by failing to raise it before trial. The court here noted that it had previously allowed a party to request prejudgment interest for the first time posttrial because the award is equitable, and that other circuits also allow an award of prejudgment interest even if not requested in a trial brief. As such, this argument was without merit and the district court did not commit error in awarding prejudgment interest.

The case is No. 24-2286.

Judge: Shepherd, B.

Attorneys: Meredith S. Berwick (Kennedy Hunt) for the EEOC. Patrick Joseph Barrett (Fraser Stryker) for Drivers Management, LLC.

Companies: Drivers Management, LLC; EEOC

Cases: Discrimination DisabilityDiscrimination EvidenceDiscovery RemediesDamages ArkansasNews IowaNews MinnesotaNews MissouriNews NebraskaNews NorthDakotaNews SouthDakotaNews GCNNews