Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PROCEDURE—7th Cir.: Complainant Information Sheet filed with state human rights department was not ‘charge’ for purposes of ADA timeliness, (Apr 30, 2026)

By Robert Margolis, J.D.

While the district court correctly held initial intake sheet was not a “charge” under Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, appellate court vacates dismissal and remands to district court to consider employee’s equitable tolling argument.

A “Complainant Information Sheet” (“CIS”) that an employee must file to initiate an investigation by the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) is not equivalent to a “charge” of employment discrimination that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) requires be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory incident, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held. Explaining that it is bound by precedent holding that a “charge” must include a request for the agency to take action, the court found that the CIS filled out by a former Ameren Illinois Company employee contained no such request. The IDHR did not finalize her formal charge until nearly two years after her termination, well outside of the 300-day period. The appellate court, however, vacated the district court’s dismissal of her case and remanded it to the district court, so it could consider her equitable tolling argument, which the appellate court noted “has some support in the currently incomplete record” (Ballard v. Ameren Illinois Company, No. 25-1562 (7th Cir. Apr. 28, 2026)).

The employee worked as an energy efficiency advisor, and during a work-related conference fell and injured her wrist, for which she underwent multiple surgeries. She requested work accommodations and alleges multiple acts of discrimination and retaliation before her termination on February 26, 2018.

Formal charge 556 days after termination. On August 23, 2018, 178 days after her termination, she submitted a CIS to the IDHR. The form required her to name the company believed to have discriminated against her in Illinois, and describe the issues and grounds on which she was requesting the IDHR to investigate. In the subsequent months, the employee and IDHR exchanged several emails, in which inter alia, IDHR confirmed it had received the CIS and was working on the matter. The IDHR finalized her formal charge of discrimination on September 5, 2019, which was 556 days after her termination.

The IDHR ultimately dismissed her case for lack of substantial evidence, and the EEOC sent her a right to sue letter in November 2020, after which she filed her initial suit, pro se. Two years later, she voluntarily dismissed that suit, and refiled in May 2024, represented by counsel.

Ameren moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely, which the district granted, finding that the employee failed to meet the ADA’s requirement that she file a charge of employment discrimination with the IDHR within 300 days of her termination. After her motion to reconsider was denied, she appealed.

Not a charge. The enforcement provision of the ADA incorporates Title VII’s requirement that aggrieved persons file a “charge of discrimination” with a state or local agency within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). While the employee filed her CIS with IDHR within 300 days of her termination, IDHR did not transform that CIS into a finalized charge cross-filed with the EEOC until more than 300 days had passed. The question before the court, therefore, was whether the CIS can be considered a “charge” for purposes of meeting the 300-day requirement. Relying on Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, the appellate court held that a CIS is not a charge.

In Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008), the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of “charge” in a parallel statutory scheme. It noted the term has no statutory definition and therefore it considered relevant EEOC regulations, policy statements, and litigation positions. It concluded that to be deemed a charge, a filing “must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and employee.” That conclusion remains binding under stare decisis, the appellate court reasoned.

Asked court to overturn precedent. In Carlson v. Christian Bros. Servs., 840 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit applied Holowecki to an IDHR CIS like the one in this case, and held it does not constitute a charge that could satisfy the ADA’s 300-day requirement, because it “did not request remedial action.” The court determined that the CIS is a “pre-charge screening form,” which is “merely a prelude to a charge, and not the charge itself.”

While the employee recognized that Carlson is directly on point and dispositive, she urged the court to overturn it because it did not properly follow Holowecki. But again citing stare decisis, the court declined to do so.

The employee contended the CIS has language authorizing EEOC to “look into the discrimination alleged above” and giving her “Consent for IDHR to disclose [her] identity and personal information as necessary to process and investigate [her] charge.” But the court pointed out this language was conditioned on IDHR ultimately accepting the employee’s claim and converting it into a formal charge. Indeed, the “instructions” section of the CIS states “THIS IS NOT A CHARGE.” While “the IDHR’s charge process can be confusing, especially to pro se litigants,” according to the court, and the fact a CIS qualifies as a charge for purposes of a comparable deadline for Illinois Human Rights Act claims further engenders confusion, the court remained bound by Holowecki and Carlson, noting Holowecki does not instruct as to how to weigh those considerations.

Equitable tolling. The 300-day filing deadline is akin to a statute of limitations subject to “equitable tolling under appropriate circumstances.” Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Scis./The Chi. Med. Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1174 (7th Cir. 1999). The court found evidence in the record that would support equitable tolling, sufficient to remand to the district court for consideration of this argument.

Confusing IDHR statements. At various times in its correspondence with the employee, the IDHR referred to her CIS filing as a “charge,” while at other times it differentiated between a CIS and a charge. But even when it was differentiating, IDHR was simultaneously reassuring the employee that she had already done her part, telling her “no further action is required of you at this point.” IDHR further repeatedly confirmed that the employee’s “charge” was deemed filed as of the date it received her CIS. Those statements, while accurate as to Illinois law claims, were confusing as to the employee’s federal claims. Equitable tolling may apply when an agency misleads a complainant, and there was enough evidence to pursue that argument, the court held.

Of course, equitable tolling only protects an employee to the extent she can show she filed the real charge as soon as realistically possible after learning she may not have filed a charge. Because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss the pleadings, the factual record was incomplete as to this question and the other issues relevant to equitable tolling and thus the court remanded to the district court so the factual record could be developed.

The case is No. 25-1562.

Judge: Taibleson, R.

Attorneys: Randall D. Schmidt (Mandel Legal Aid Clinic) for Kimberly Ballard. Merry C. Rhoades (Tueth Keeney Cooper Mohan Jackstadt) for Ameren Illinois Co.

Companies: Ameren Illinois Co.

Cases: Discrimination DisabilityDiscrimination Procedure IllinoisNews IndianaNews WisconsinNews