Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, LABOR—UNIONS, UNION MEMBERS—D. Conn.: Union for prison workers can continue to challenge termination of CBA, (Apr 30, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons terminated the CBA “effective immediately” in the wake of Executive Order 14,251, which exempted agencies from the collective bargaining agreements of the FSLMRS.

Denying a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay, a lawsuit filed by the National Council of Prison Locals challenging the sudden termination of a collective bargaining agreement by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a federal district court in Connecticut determined, among other things, that the plaintiffs’ claims were expressly outside the scope of the FSLMRS because the challenged executive order removed the BOP from the statute’s coverage. The court also rejected the BOP’s assertion that the present case should be dismissed under the doctrine of claim splitting, finding that another case filed in California preceded the claims asserted in the present action. In addition, the court found the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the CBA termination violated their First Amendment rights (National Council of Prison Locals v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:25-CV-1907 (VDO) (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2026)).

CPL-33 is a labor organization affiliated with the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). Local 1661 is the local chapter of CPL-33 for employees at the Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury. Its members are covered by the CBA between CPL-33 and the BOP.

CBA extension. On November 1, 2024, CPL-33 came to an agreement with the BOP to extend their CBA through May 28, 2029.

Executive order. After taking office, President Trump signed Executive Order 14,251 on March 27, 2025, exempting federal agencies from the requirements of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), including the BOP. However, the executive order did not state that agencies were compelled to terminate existing CBAs and did not mandate that the existing CPL-33 CBA be terminated before its May 2029 expiration date.

Termination. Although the executive order was issued on March 27, 2025, the BOP did not terminate its CBA with CPL-33 until approximately six months later. In the interim, the executive order was enjoined on First Amendment grounds by a federal district court in California. The Ninth Circuit subsequently stayed that injunction and the BOP abruptly terminated the CBA on September 25, 2025.

Lawsuit. On November 13, 2025, CPL-33 and Local 1661 filed this complaint alleging that the BOP’s termination of the CBA was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, and that the termination was impermissible retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The BOP filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay, along with a motion to transfer the case to the district court for the District of Columbia. The BOP’s motion was presently before the court.

Claim channeling. First, the BOP argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Congress had channeled the plaintiffs’ claims to the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The court disagreed.

In this instance, the court explained that the plaintiffs’ claims were expressly outside the scope of the FSLMRS because the executive order removed the BOP from the statute’s coverage. As a result, the plaintiffs could not bring their claims through the review scheme established by Congress under the FSLMRS, said the court.

The government attempted to distinguish this case from other litigation challenging the executive order itself because the plaintiffs here were challenging the termination of the CBA. The court was unmoved, reiterating that the plaintiffs’ claims challenging the termination of the CBA could not proceed through the review scheme established by the FSLMRS because the executive order removed the BOP from the statute’s coverage.

Claim splitting. After the executive order was issued, numerous unions filed suit challenging its validity. In one such suit filed in a federal district court in California, AFGE II, the lead plaintiff is the AFGE, the parent organization of the plaintiffs in this case. The defendants in AFGE II include the Department of Justice, of which the BOP is a sub-agency. AFGE II was commenced on April 3, 2025, approximately six months before the termination of the CBA at the center of this case. The BOP invoked the doctrine of claim splitting, arguing the court should dismiss the instant case because it was impermissibly split from AFGE II. The court was not persuaded.

Because the plaintiffs’ claims were unavailable when AFGE II was filed, the court explained that it could not dismiss them as duplicative. The CBA was terminated six months after the national AFGE initiated AFGE II, observed the court, and the plaintiffs alleged the termination was in response to speech by CPL-33 from the period between March and June 2025. Thus, the facts giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claims occurred well after the filing of AFGE II, said the court.

First Amendment claims. Next, the BOP moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court rejected the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the termination of the CBA violated the First Amendment, both as retaliation for protected speech and as viewpoint discrimination.

Retaliation. As to the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court found that CPL-33 engaged in constitutionally protected activism on behalf of its members, advocating on Capitol Hill for matters such as improved working conditions, and arguing against the passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. CPL-33 further made a sufficient showing that its activism was a substantial or motivating factor in the BOP’s decision to terminate the CBA, pointing to a message sent by the BOP’s director in which he stated, among other things, that CPL-33 was not the “kind of union” he supports and that it had become “an obstacle to progress.” Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss this claim.

Viewpoint discrimination. With regard to the plaintiffs’ claim for viewpoint discrimination, the court found that the BOP did not express that unionization itself impeded national security or prevented the BOP from accomplishing its mission. Rather, it took issue with CPL-33’s specific advocacy and viewpoints, namely its repeated challenges to the Trump administration’s policies. The message sent by the BOP’s director referred to such advocacy specifically.

The court noted that while the BOP was certainly within its rights to terminate the CBA in accordance with the executive order for national security concerns, it could not do so in an effort to punish or suppress disfavored speech. As such, the motion to dismiss this claim was also denied.

APA claim. Turning to the plaintiffs’ claim that the termination of the CBA was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, the court explained that a motion to dismiss was not the appropriate mechanism for reviewing the merits of such a claim in the first instance. Thus, the court declined to consider the BOP’s arguments in the absence of a certified administrative record or the additional evidence permitted on a motion for a preliminary injunction.

Motion to stay. Addressing the BOP’s alternative motion to stay pending the final outcome of AFGE II, the court found no reason to do so. As previously noted, the court found the present case and AFGE II were “distinct cases concerning discrete issues.”

Motion to transfer. Finally, the court considered the BOP’s motion to transfer. The BOP argued that the operative facts occurred in Washington, D.C., because that it is where the executive order and the termination letter were issued. The court was unmoved, noting the significant ties the case had to Connecticut, including the involvement of a Connecticut-based union representing workers at a Connecticut-based BOP facility.

“The balance of convenience factors favors keeping the matter in the District of Connecticut, and the Government has not met its burden of demonstrating otherwise by clear and convincing evidence,” concluded the court, denying the motion to transfer.

The case is No. 3:25-CV-1907 (VDO).

Judge: Oliver, V.

Attorneys: Brian C. Rosen-Shaud (Jacobson Lawyers Group) for National Council of Prison Locals, American Federation of Government Employees and CPL-33, AFGE Local 1661, AFL-CIO. J. Brian Meskill, U.S. Department of Justice, for Federal Bureau of Prisons and William K. Marshall, III.

Companies: National Council of Prison Locals, American Federation of Government Employees; CPL-33, AFGE Local 1661, AFL-CIO

MainStory: TopStory Labor UnionsMembers Procedure PublicEmployees Retaliation ConnecticutNews GCNNews