Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PROCEDURE—6th Cir.: Correctional officer, fired after allegedly harassing comments, brought suit too late, (Oct 20, 2025)

By Jason Albright, J.D.

A coworker had reported him for allegedly lewd and obscene comments made during their carpool drives.

A Michigan correctional officer, discharged after a coworker reported him for allegedly lewd and obscene comments he made during their carpool drives, brought his procedural due process claim against two Michigan Department of Corrections officials too late, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The parties did not dispute that Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations applied to his Section 1983 action, that the former officer’s December 17, 2020, post-termination hearing was the latest possible date when he was allegedly denied due process, that his June 2024 complaint did not fall within the limitations period, and even a complaint in his prior unsuccessful suit—which could conceivably have enabled tolling—was filed one day after the limitations period expired on December 17, 2023 (Bozzo v. Nanasy, No. 25-1199 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025, amended Nov. 26, 2025)).

Correctional officer. Beginning in 2013, the plaintiff worked on-and-off as a correctional officer at the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC).

Carpool and comments. The employment relationship ended, however, due to “bad blood” between the officer and a coworker. At one point, the two had carpooled together to work. In 2017, however, the coworker reported the officer for lewd and obscene comments made during their drives. She later reported him for other instances of misconduct.

Obscenities. Upon learning of her complaints, the officer seemingly directed some “obscenities” at her when discussing her actions with fellow correctional officers. Once these words made their way back to her, she reported him for that conduct as well.

Discharge. The situation came to a head on June 19, 2019, when MDOC served him with a misconduct charge regarding his carpool comments and his later remarks about the coworker in the workplace. The charge summarized the allegations against him as well as the MDOC rules his purported misconduct implicated.

Five days later, MDOC held a disciplinary conference with him and his union representative. According to the officer, the conference was brief, amounting to little more than his representative making a short statement about his employment and the charges. MDOC informed him of his termination on July 31, 2019.

Arbitration. He challenged that decision by invoking his collectively bargained right to arbitration, and a three-day arbitration hearing was held ending on December 17, 2020. At the hearing, MDOC’s discipline coordinator testified that MDOC applied its recently updated employee policies, which took a more stringent approach to harassment allegations, to the officer. A few months later, on March 1, 2021, the arbitrator issued a ruling in favor of MDOC.

First lawsuit and dismissal. On December 18, 2023, the officer filed a complaint in federal court. Named as defendants were the discipline coordinator and MDOC’s director. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations spanning the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In large part, he took issue with his arbitration hearing, where he alleged that he was “set up” using “surprise” testimony and “subjective” new policies, and with the arbitrator, who he alleged relied on “falsehood[s]” and derived “significant income” from MDOC.

After he failed to respond to defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of prosecution.

Second lawsuit, again dismissed. He re-filed largely the same complaint on June 14, 2024, the defendants again moved to dismiss, and the district court again granted their motion, this time on two grounds: (1) his claim was untimely under the statute of limitations; and (2) he had forfeited his constitutional arguments save for his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, which failed to state a claim in any event.

Appeal. He appealed to the Sixth Circuit, and as in district court, he advanced only his procedural due process claim. He asserted that the district court erred in dismissing the action as time-barred and that he stated a plausible claim for relief under Section 1983.

Accrual. The Sixth Circuit initially observed that Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which they arose, and the parties here did not dispute that Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations applied.

Deprivation. Beginning with the required “deprivation,” the former officer alleged a loss of property occurring when his public employment was terminated, specifically when MDOC formally terminated him, “in a short correspondence,” on July 31, 2019.

Inadequate process. As for the alleged inadequate state process, the former officer alleged a series of procedural violations at different points in time, including MDOC’s handling of the coworker’s complaints, which dated back to the June 24, 2019, pre-termination conference. And he alleged that those due process violations continued up to his post-termination arbitration hearing, which ended on December 17, 2020.

That latter date, concluded the court, was thus the latest possible date when he allegedly was denied due process. And because that date occurred after his termination in 2019, it was the point at which both elements of his due process claim had “come to fruition,” when he had a “complete and present cause of action.”

Too late. Measured from December 17, 2020, his June 14, 2024, complaint did not fall within the three-year statute of limitations. And though under Michigan law, his first lawsuit would have tolled the limitations period during the six months before it was dismissed without prejudice, he filed his first complaint on December 18, 2023—one day after the three-year limitations period expired on December 17, 2023. The first lawsuit thus did nothing to alter the limitations period, and his claim was indeed time-barred.

The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

The case is No. 25-1199.

Judge: Readler, C.

Attorneys: Frank Gregory Becker (Becker Law Office) for Charles Bozzo. Lindsey Erin Andrzejewski, Office of the Attorney General, for Jennifer Nanasy and Heidi E. Washington.

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