Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, PLEADINGS—HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS—E.D. Pa.: Injured consumer’s claims against stool seller dismissed, stool maker denied dismissal, (Jul 23, 2024)
Law Firms Mentioned:Law Offices of Mitchell Lee Goldfield | McDonnell & Associates PC | Ulmer & Berne LLP
Organizations Mentioned:UBesGoo, Ltd. | Walmart Inc.
By Pankhuri Bhatnagar, B.A. LL.B.
A consumer’s strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation claims against Walmart were dismissed for being conclusory and insufficiently pleaded.
In an action brought against the manufacturer and seller of a cabinet-and-stool set by a man who was injured when the stool on which he was sitting collapsed, a federal district court in Pennsylvania denied the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because despite the consumer’s failure to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, his claims were not “frivolous” and jurisdictional discovery could help determine the manufacturer’s forum contacts. The man was allowed to amend and rectify the deficiencies of his claims against the seller (Blanding v. Walmart Inc., No. 23-5142 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2024)).
Background. An individual purchased a “double drawer rolling kitchen cabinet storage cart with two stools.” Another man sat on one of these stools, but the stool collapsed and injured him. The man brought suit against UBesGoo Ltd. and Walmart Inc. in New Jersey state court under several product liability theories, alleging that the companies manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold the cabinet-and-stool set. Walmart removed the case to New Jersey’s federal district court, which then transferred the matter to this court due to want of jurisdiction and application of Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules. UBesGoo moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) and the consumer requested leave to engage in jurisdictional discovery. Walmart sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
General jurisdiction. A “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants,” Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2004). For a corporate defendant, the main bases for general personal jurisdiction are (1) the place of incorporation; (2) the principal place of business; and (3) in exceptional cases, where “a corporation's operations in a forum…[are] so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State,” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014). The consumer’s only allegation here was that UBesGoo was licensed to do business in Philadelphia, with an office for process service in New Jersey. In contrast, UBesGoo presented a declaration from one of its managers that it was a limited liability company under the laws of California, with a principal place of business in Fujian, China. The declaration added that UBesGoo was never registered to do business in Pennsylvania or New Jersey. The man did not counter this evidence and relied on his bare pleadings, thus failing to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction.
Specific jurisdiction. In Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), the court explained that the likelihood of exercising personal jurisdiction is based on a sliding scale approach: jurisdiction exists where a defendant “clearly does business over the Internet” in the forum state, the claim arises out of the use of that site, and the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum market; but jurisdiction does not exist where the defendant simply posts information on a website accessible to users. This court inferred from the complaint that UBesGoo manufactured and sold the subject products through Walmart’s online store. While UBesGoo would benefit from the nationwide market reach of Walmart, its use of a third-party website to facilitate sales did not alone satisfy the “purposeful availment” standard. Moreover, it was not enough that the manufacturer might have predicted that its stool sets would reach Pennsylvania because “it is the defendant’s actions, not [its] expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment,” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877-85 (2011). Although the man failed to establish jurisdiction over the manufacturer, his claims were not “frivolous.” The court accordingly permitted jurisdictional discovery, and UBesGoo’s motion was denied without prejudice.
Strict liability and negligence. The consumer did not plead any facts about the product’s inherent dangerousness, the nature of the product warnings, whether and how those warnings were unsafe or inadequate, or how he would have avoided the risk had he been warned. These defects were fatal to his failure-to-warn claims under both strict liability and negligence theories. His manufacturing and design defect claims similarly failed because he provided nothing more than conclusory statements that the cabinet-and-stool set was “in a defective condition and was unreasonably dangerous to users” without stating what constituted the manufacturing defect, how the defects proximately caused the injury, what feature of the product was unsafe or which feature could have made it safe, and whether a safer alternative design existed. His claim for “negligent failure to test” was dismissed because Pennsylvania law does not recognize it as an independent tort, Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F. 3d 136, 143–144 (3d Cir. 2000).
Warranties. The man baldly alleged that the cabinet-and-stool set “failed to meet the warranty and guarantees” provided to the set’s owner, a third party to the suit, without specifying what those guarantees were or how he relied upon them. Since he did not identify any express warranties, his claim for breach of an express warranty claim could not survive. Next, he did not allege any facts to give rise to an inference of breach of an implied warranty of merchantability or an implied warranty of particular purpose, by failing to explain the “particular purpose” of the stool set and how either Walmart or UBesGoo provided any expertise or judgment when representing its purpose. His conclusory statements about a “breach of warranty” were insufficient for the claims to proceed.
Misrepresentation. A valid negligent misrepresentation count requires allegations that the defendant misrepresented a material fact with knowledge of its falsity, with an intent to induce another to act on it, resulting in injury to a party who justifiably relied on that representation. The consumer broadly alleged that the “defendants”—not specifying which—"misrepresented the risks” of the set in their advertising and “concealed” information about those risks. He did not specify what information was misrepresented or how he was induced to act on that information, leading to the failure of this claim as well.
Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) requires a court to grant a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.” Although the instant complaint was the third amended complaint in this action, the court considered only the most recent amendment made after the case was transferred from New Jersey. The man was permitted to amend and rectify the shortcomings of all his claims against Walmart except the “failure to test” count, which was not an independent cause of action.
The case is No. 23-5142.
Judge: Pappert, G.
Attorneys: Mitchell Lee Goldfield (Law Offices of Mitchell Lee Goldfield) for Eric D. Blanding. Gwyneth Schrager (McDonnell & Associates PC) for Walmart Inc. David A Landman (Ulmer & Berne LLP) for UBesGoo, Ltd.
Companies: Walmart Inc.; UBesGoo, Ltd.
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