Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, LABOR—PICKETING—S.D. Ind.: Teamsters denied preliminary injunction to engage in picketing on casino’s private property, (Jan 9, 2026)

By Ronald Miller, J.D.

Given that it’s undisputed that the picketing site is on the casino’s private property, “[t]he question is, [u]nder what circumstances can private property be treated as though it were public.?”

A Teamsters local union was denied a preliminary injunction by a federal district court in Indiana that would prevent a city from interfering with its picketing activity in designated areas in front of a casino. The union had argued that since a street was “a public thoroughfare, that meant the land next to it fell within the category of private property” that is dedicated to public use under the First Amendment. However, the court rejected the union’s contention that proximity to a public street alone was sufficient to justify treating private property as a traditional public forum. To be treated as a public forum, the private property must be open to the public and closely “historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Accordingly, the union failed to show a likelihood of success justifying a preliminary injunction (Teamsters Local Union No. 135 v. City of Shelbyville, Indiana, No. 1:25-cv-02278-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2026)).

Union organizing. The Teamsters union was attempting to organize employees of a casino located in Shelbyville, Indiana. A union election through the NLRB was scheduled for October 17, 2025, but it was postponed because of the government shutdown and the casino refused to let a third party conduct the election. Thereafter, the union organized a strike and began picketing in front of the casino outside its entrances.

Picketing activity. On October 17, 2025, the union president spoke with Shelbyville Police Department officers about the lawful parameters of the protest. The Teamsters then picketed peacefully, and strikers did not violate the officers’ instructions, or impede the ingress or egress of traffic through any of the casino’s entrances, or on the public street. However, on November 5, 2025, Shelbyville Police Department officers told the Teamsters “to immediately disperse, and told them that they could not picket along the public road.” Thereafter, the picket line was dispersed.

A union election has now been held and “the Teamsters won their recognition vote,” but the NLRB has not certified the results and the Teamsters’ need to picket “remain[s] acute in the foreseeable future.”

Picketing site. The Teamsters filed this case against the City of Shelbyville and its police chief alleging violations of the First Amendment, the NLRA, and Indiana state law. The court denied the Teamsters’ motion for a temporary restraining order because the union had not shown that the picketing site was public property or private property historically dedicated to public expression. Thereafter, the union filed a renewed motion for a preliminary injunction that would prevent defendants from interfering with the picketing activity at the picketing site.

First Amendment. The union sought a preliminary injunction under the First Amendment and the NLRA. Public ways and sidewalks “occupy a special position in terms of First Amendment protection because of their historic role as sites for discussion and debate.” These traditional public fora are typically “public property that has immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.” However, privately owned streets and sidewalks are not “the equivalent, for First Amendment purposes of municipally owned streets and sidewalks.”

Here, the Teamsters do not plan to picket in the public street on which the casino is located. Instead, they intend to picket “along” the road, at a picketing site that is on the casino’s private property. The union argued that “since North Michigan Road is a public thoroughfare, that means the land next to it falls within the category of private property” that is dedicated to public use under the First Amendment.

Traditional public forum. Given that it’s undisputed that the picketing site is on the casino’s private property, “[t]he question is, [u]nder what circumstances can private property be treated as though it were public.?”

“[T]o hold that [Horseshoe is] compelled by law to supply picketing areas for pickets to drive [its] customers away is to create a court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private ownership of property rests in this country.” Thus, the court rejected the union’s contention that proximity to a public street alone is sufficient to justify treating private property as a traditional public forum.

Seventh Circuit precedent demonstrates that treating private property as a traditional public forum is the exception to the rule. To be treated as a public forum, the private property must be open to the public and closely “historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights.”

Here, the Teamsters failed to provide evidence of any historical exercise of expressive activity at the picketing site. Instead, the defendants’ uncontested evidence is that the sidewalks in and near the picketing site “run only along and in the property of [Horseshoe] and do not connect to any other public sidewalk, and their sole purpose is to access” the casino. The Teamsters do not dispute that the picketing site is on casino’s private property and that the sidewalks in the picketing site serve only as means to access the casino’s facilities. Without “historical association... with a public forum,” or “dedication of the property to public use,” the casino’s private property is not a traditional public forum.

Preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the union had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on its First Amendment free speech claim that can support a preliminary injunction.

NLRA preemption. The Teamsters also argued that the NLRA prevented the defendants from removing them from the picketing areas. The NLRA comprehensively regulates labor relations, so it preempts some “state and local regulation of activities that the NLRA protects or prohibits or arguably protects or prohibits.” However, NLRA preemption “is not absolute,” and the Teamsters have not identified authority showing that the NLRA preempts a local government’s ability to enforce trespass law on private property. So, the Teamsters are unlikely to succeed on their claim that the NLRA preempts enforcement of state trespass law.

Accordingly, Teamsters was denied its motion for preliminary injunction.

The case is No. 1:25-cv-02278-JPH-TAB.

Judge: Hanlon, J.

Attorneys: Pamela Marie Newport (Herzfeld Suetholz Gastel Leniski and Wall) for Teamsters Local Union No. 135. Jason Donald Clark (McNeely Law) for City of Shelbyville, Indiana.

Companies: Teamsters Local Union No. 135; City of Shelbyville, Indiana

Cases: Labor OrganizingElections StateLawClaims IndividualRights IndianaNews