Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—SEX—2d Cir.: $484,000 jury verdict in favor of school principal on gender bias claims upheld, (Dec 4, 2025)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

“Like all trials, this one was not perfect; we can conclude with confidence, however, that it was fair to both parties” and the defendants “are not entitled to a do-over.”

A jury’s conclusion that a school district fired a high school principal and subjected her to a hostile work environment because of her gender in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL was supported by sufficient evidence, ruled the Second Circuit, finding further that the school district failed to show any error in the $484,456 in damages awarded to the principal or that any errors made by the district court were prejudicial or rendered the trial unfair. Judge Sullivan, dissenting, argued that the district court’s comment to the jury during trial concerning whether New York law allowed the principal to amend a student’s accommodation plan without consulting a school committee alone constituted reversible error (Krause v. Kelahan, Nos. 22-41 (L) and 22-288 (Con) (2d Cir Dec. 3, 2025)).

Alleged behavior. Shortly after the principal was hired, she claimed she witnessed the superintendent scream at a female employee. Shortly after that, she alleged, he began directing his ire at her, including by threatening to fire her; telling her shortly before the school’s graduation ceremony that “If you f*** this up, I will fire you, but good luck and have fun;” sending her a photograph of herself with the message, “See, you are always being watched; telling her he hated working with women because they were emotional; commenting on her clothing and the clothing of other female employees; and making condescending comments about her parenting skills.

Although she complained to the school board, his treatment of her worsened. After she was fired for incompetency, she sued, alleging the school district, board, and superintendent violated Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by subjecting her to a hostile work environment and discharging her because of her gender.

Lower court proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the principal’s equal protection claim but the other claims proceeded to trial. The jury found the defendants subjected the principal to a hostile work environment because of her gender and awarded her $484,456 in damages, including $334,456 for lost income and $150,000 for pain and suffering. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for JMOL, a new trial, and a reduction of damages.

Sufficiency of evidence on discriminatory discharge claim. The defendants first argued on appeal that the trial evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict for the principal on her discriminatory discharge claim. Disagreeing, the Second Circuit found the jury could have reasonably concluded that the principal’s sex was a motivating factor in her discharge. Not only did she provide a detailed narrative of the superintendent’s disrespectful and demeaning behavior towards his female coworkers, her accounts of specific incidents were partially corroborated by others who either witnessed the superintendent’s behavior or heard about it contemporaneously from the principal.

A reasonable jury, said the court, could also have found the principal performed adequately well in her role. Witnesses testified that she had the skills and motivation to be a good principal and she was described as an “asset” to the district and was “engaged with students” and easy to work with. Although some witnesses claimed she was incompetent, there was testimony the superintendent was responsible for many of the problems these witnesses observed, including that the principal was often seen crying and was usually sad and down.

Pretext. There was also evidence sufficient for the jury to find the district’s stated reasons for firing the principal were pretextual. While the district pointed to her low performance evaluation scores, the superintendent was her only evaluator and her scores improved during her final year. Moreover, the superintendent never placed her on a Principal Improvement Plan even though he told the board that he did and even though it was required by New York law. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that the superintendent did not provide the principal with an adequate opportunity to improve before urging the board to fire her.

And while the superintendent cited the principal’s questionable decision-making, including her decision to eliminate bells in the high school without consulting him, teachers, or the board, the bells were not functioning due to a mechanical issue and the principal testified that she informed the superintendent of her decision and he did not object.

The superintendent also pointed to the principal’s decision to amend a student’s Section 504 peanut allergy accommodation plan without first consulting the 504 Committee. But there was evidence the parents had contacted the school about amending the plan, that the principal met with them several times, and that she proposed a temporary revision to the plan for the first two weeks of school to assess if it would work. The principal also claimed there was an unwritten policy of allowing temporary changes to 504 plans without committee approval. A jury, said the court, could have believed that even if the principal violated the Section 504 Policy by making the temporary change, the error was not one that justified firing her as the parents were happy with the changes and when they learned she had supposedly been placed on administrative leave in part because of the changes, they immediately emailed the board to express concern.

Thus, for all these reasons, the appeals court found the district court properly rejected the defendants’ sufficiency challenge to the jury’s verdict.

Monetary damages. The defendants next argued that the district court’s dismissal of the principal’s equal protection claims precluded her from recovering lost-income damages on her Title VII claims because it found that she had not established that gender discrimination was a but-for cause of her termination. They contended that they had a partial defense to a Title VII motivating factor claim if they could show that they “would have [made the same termination decision] in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”

Finding the district court’s ruling did not have the preclusive effect they asserted, the appeals court explained that it was the principal’s burden on her equal protection claim to establish that discrimination was the but-for cause of her termination. Under Title VII, however, the defendants bore the burden of establishing they would have terminated the principal even absent a discriminatory motive. On summary judgment, the district court never considered whether, with the burden of proof resting on the defendants, they had established that they would have inevitably terminated her for nondiscriminatory reasons as they never raised a same-decision defense in their summary judgment briefing and they could not claim on appeal that the district court failed to reach an issue they did not present.

Errors in evidentiary rulings. Nor were the defendants entitled to a new trial because of errors in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, said the court, finding that any evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion and any error was harmless.

District court’s comment about state education law. Finally, the defendants argued that the district court’s remark to the jury about Education Law Section 4402 warranted a new trial. While the defense counsel was cross-examining a witness, the court stated: “Now, before we go any further, you have heard the law concerning the 504. Whether or not the [district] complied with that law, followed it or made changes or made informal parts is an issue that you may have to consider in determining this case. Next question.”

According to the defendants by seeming to refer to Education Law § 4402 as “the law concerning the 504,” the court mistakenly suggested that it applied to Section 504 Plans but Education Law § 4402 applies to individualized education plans (IEPs) and does not say anything about Section 504 Plans. They also argued that the district court compounded the error by raising the possibility that they might not have “complied with” Education Law § 4402. The court, they contended, effectively told the jury that the district violated state law if it prevented principals from amending Section 504 Plans as the principal did here, which undermined one of the nondiscriminatory justifications they offered for her termination.

Disagreeing, the appeals court found the defendants “overstate the nature and force of the District Court’s comment.” First, said the court, the comment was somewhat garbled as the lower court’s statement it had “heard the law concerning the 504,” was by no means a clear instruction that Education Law § 4402 applies to Section 504 Plans. Presumably, said the appeals court, the district court intended to refer to “the 504 issue,” as it had done before the text of Education Law § 4402 was read.

Further, the appeals court observed, the judge’s next comment—that the jury “m[ight] have to consider” whether the district “complied with that law, followed it[,] or made changes[,] or made informal parts,” was equally hard to understand. Though the jury may have been confused, the appeals court was “hardly convinced that, as Defendants urge, the District Court ‘directly told the jury... that the School District was required by law to allow [the principal] to agree to changes to the student’s [Section 504 Plan] without involvement of a [Section] 504 [C]ommittee.”

In addition, the court observed, the defendants appeared to have played a significant role in causing the district court’s purported error as over the course of the litigation, they took inconsistent positions about whether Education Law § 4402 applied to Section 504 plans. “It is no surprise, then, that the trial judge may have believed that Education Law § 4402 applied to Section 504 plans: Defendants had told him as much.” Accordingly, the court denied their motion for a new trial.

Dissent. Judge Sullivan, dissenting, argued that “the district court’s erroneous instruction regarding New York Education Law § 4402 alone constitutes reversible error.” Reversal, he continued, “is especially appropriate here, where the district court compounded its error by allowing the jury to consider speculative hearsay statements concerning the motives of [the superintendent], and by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of unrelated complaints made over a year after [the principal] had been terminated.” Accordingly, Judge Sullivan would vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial.

The case is Nos. 22-41 (L) and 22-288 (Con).

Judge: Carney, S.

Attorneys: A.J. Bosman (Bosman Law Firm) and Stephen Bergstein (Bergstein & Ulrich) for Lisa Krause. Charles C. Spagnoli (Ferrara Fiorenza) for Greg Kelahan, Oriskany Central School District, Oriskany Central School District Board of Education, Carl Grazadei, Michelle Anderson, and Robin Appler.

Companies: Oriskany Central School District; Oriskany Central School District Board of Education

Cases: SexDiscrimination Discrimination StateLawClaims Procedure RemediesDamages EvidenceDiscovery ConnecticutNews NewYorkNews VermontNews GCNNews