Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, DEFENSES TO LIABILITY—MOTOR VEHICLES—M.D. Pa.: GM’s third-party complaint against driver for contribution in accident involving its allegedly defective vehicle survives dismissal, (Dec 9, 2025)

By Nicholas Kaster, J.D.

An estate’s complaint appeared to hold open the possibility that the decedent’s death was caused by joint tortfeasors, the court noted.

A third-party complaint filed by General Motors against a driver for contribution in a fatal accident involving its allegedly defective vehicle survived a motion to dismiss. As a result of the accident, the decedent’s estate filed a products liability action against GM for defective design. GM then filed a third-party complaint against the driver allegedly responsible for the accident, asserting claims for negligence and contribution. A federal district court in Pennsylvania dismissed the negligence claim but held that GM may be able to demonstrate that the driver’s conduct proximately caused the decedent’s injuries, including her death, and could therefore prevail on a contribution claim (Woodward v. General Motors, LLC, No. 4:25-CV-1025 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)).

Background. The case arose as the result of an accident on February 11, 2023, in Tioga County, Pennsylvania. The decedent was driving a 2013 GMC Acadia, and the driver of another vehicle hit the decedent head-on. The decedent survived the initial collision but was trapped inside the Acadia. When the Acadia caught fire, the decedent was unable to escape and died. The driver of the other vehicle stood criminal trial and was convicted by a jury of homicide by vehicle and a number of other traffic violations.

The administrator of the decedent’s estate filed two different lawsuits to recover for the decedent’s death. He sued the driver in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County, Pennsylvania, and in a federal suit, he sought to recover only from GM. In the Tioga County proceeding, the estate alleged that the driver was negligent, reckless, and negligent per se and sought damages for all of the decedent’s injuries including her death.

In the federal proceeding, the estate alleged that GM was responsible for the decedent’s death based on theories of strict liability for defective design (lack of crashworthiness), breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, and failure to warn/recall. Specifically, the estate alleged that the decedent “would have survived the collision had the vehicle been crashworthy.”

GM impleaded the driver in this matter, alleging counts for negligence and “indemnification and contribution.” GM’s theory was that the decedent’s injuries, including her death, were caused in whole or in part by the driver’s conduct. The driver moved to dismiss GM’s third-party complaint. In the briefing, GM agreed to withdraw its indemnification claim, leaving only the issues of negligence and contribution.

Negligence claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) provides that a defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it. This means that the third party’s liability is some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or the third party is secondarily liable to the defendant. Accordingly, “third-party claims must be brought under a theory of derivative liability such as indemnification or contribution.” Courts have stringently followed the rule that a third-party complaint may not set forth a claim of the third-party defendant’s liability to the plaintiff.

The court found that GM’s negligence count was based on just such an impermissible theory of direct liability between the driver and the administrator of the decedent’s estate. Specifically, GM alleged that any damages that the estate may be entitled to recover as a result of the accident, any liability on the part of GM being denied, are a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness and/or other liability-producing conduct of the driver. Nowhere in this count or elsewhere in the third-party complaint did GM allege that the driver was negligent with regard to GM. If the driver’s negligence was the sole cause of the decedent’s death, the court pointed out, GM was simply not liable (in other words, the estate’s claim against GM would fail for lack of causation). If the driver’s negligence was a partial cause, GM could recover from him on a theory of secondary liability. But this kind of direct impleader is improper, the court held, and the driver’s motion to dismiss GM’s negligence count was therefore granted.

Contribution claim. On the issue of contribution, the driver argued that he could not be liable on such a claim because the estate’s claims against GM did not permit a joint tortfeasor theory.

In Pennsylvania, contribution exists between joint tortfeasors. Where the defendant in an original action impleads a third-party defendant on a contribution theory, and the third-party defendant was not a defendant in the original case, the party seeking contribution must stand in the shoes of the original plaintiff and prove that the new defendant was a joint tortfeasor in that his tortious conduct also caused the harm at issue. This step is often unnecessary because most plaintiffs will bring a single suit against all potential causes of a given harm and therefore the third-party defendant’s liability for the plaintiff’s injury will be decided in a direct action. But contribution is available to allocate the loss fairly in any situation where two or more persons are jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.

The driver here contended that the estate’s complaint distinguished the decedent’s death from other injuries that she suffered in the crash and alleged that GM bore sole responsibility for that heightened injury. Accordingly, the driver asserted that he could not be a joint tortfeasor with GM as to the death. However, said the court, Pennsylvania law is to the contrary, and the primary complaint was not as clear cut as the driver would have it. Moreover, several additional factors counseled that dismissal of the contribution claim at this stage would be premature, said the court.

On this count, the parties primarily disputed the current state of the crashworthiness doctrine under Pennsylvania law. The crashworthiness doctrine renders a vehicle manufacturer civilly liable to an injured plaintiff for increased or enhanced injuries over and above those which would have been sustained as a result of an initial impact, where the vehicle defect can be shown to have increased the severity of the injury. A crashworthiness claim requires proof of three elements. First, the plaintiff must prove that the design of the vehicle was defective, and that at the time of design an alternative, safer, and practicable design existed that could have been incorporated instead. Second, the plaintiff must identify those injuries he or she would have received if the alternative design had instead been used. Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate what injuries were attributable to the defective design.

In the driver’s view, the crashworthiness doctrine envisions “mutually exclusive” injuries in an accident that satisfies the elements of the cause of action, and therefore the initial tortfeasor who caused the accident would only be liable “for those injuries he caused, presuming a reasonably safe car.” In contrast, the manufacturer would only (and exclusively) be liable for the enhanced injuries that resulted from the lack of crashworthiness. On this reading, “when claims against separate defendants are premised on negligence and crashworthiness … the manufacturer and the negligent driver can never be joint tortfeasors.” However, said the court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court fundamentally rejected this view of the division of injuries on a crashworthiness claim in Harsh v. Petroll (887 A.2d 209 (2005)). In Harsh, the state high court reasoned that Pennsylvania law’s adherence to the principles of risk allocation and concurrent causation counseled in favor of extending the principle of concurrent causation to cases involving enhanced injuries. It explained that “in fashioning a just and coherent crashworthiness jurisprudence … the concept of enhancement” was developed as a means of “delineat[ing] the basis for and extent of a manufacturer’s responsibility to answer in damages for an injury.” But, “the interests of justice do not require that the same line of demarcation operate automatically to relieve from liability a negligent tortfeasor whose concurrent conduct also served as a substantial factor in producing the additional harm.” In other words, the point at which a lack of crashworthiness becomes a cause of enhanced injuries is only relevant for determining where the manufacturer’s liability begins, and not where the initial tortfeasor’s liability ends. The latter question should be answered under a standard concurrent causation inquiry. Under Harsh, the injuries in a crashworthiness case are exclusive as a matter of law only insofar as the manufacturer cannot be liable for divisible injuries caused by the crash that are not related to a lack of crashworthiness.

For purposes of this case, the Harsh decision meant that the estate’s specification of when the decedent’s injuries occurred was not particularly relevant to the driver’s potential liability. The estate’s allegations contained no other details from which the court could conclusively determine the driver’s liability at this stage of the litigation. Indeed, the complaint appeared to hold open the possibility that the decedent’s death was caused by joint tortfeasors, repeatedly noting that GM’s actions “were a factual cause” of the decedent’s injuries and death. GM, on the other hand, clearly alleged that all the decedent’s injuries were caused, at least in part, by the driver. Taking those allegations as true, said the court, GM may be able to demonstrate that the driver’s conduct proximately caused the decedent’s injuries, including her death, and could therefore prevail on a contribution claim.

The court said it was mindful of the risk of inconsistent verdicts given the proliferation of cases involving this accident. But contrary to the driver’s vague suggestions, the greatest potential for inconsistent verdicts lies in cutting off GM’s contribution claim at this early stage, said the court. The estate explicitly seeks recovery from the driver for all of the decedent’s injuries, including death, in the Tioga County proceeding. Thus, the issue of whether the driver’s conduct proximately caused all of her injuries—both immediate and enhanced—will be adjudicated in that suit. If that question is decided affirmatively, said the court, contribution would undoubtedly be appropriate in this matter. In contrast, the court said, prohibiting the contribution claim risks two independent verdicts finding that two different parties caused the decedent’s death, creating the conditions for an impermissible double recovery. Finally, the court was particularly concerned about creating an inconsistency with the criminal verdict against the driver.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the contribution claim was denied. But discovery on that claim was stayed pending the outcome of the state proceeding between the estate and the driver.

The case is No. 4:25-CV-1025.

Judge: Brann, M.

Attorneys: Sasha Beth Coffiner (Rieders Travis Firm) for Mason Woodward. Janet L. Conigliaro (Dykema Gossett PLLC) for General Motors LLC.

Companies: General Motors LLC

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