Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, COVERAGE, LIABILITY—E.D. Mo.: Outreach worker, terminated after mayor’s alleged threat, largely fails to advance claims, (Apr 9, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

The worker had engaged in protected speech during the decommissioning of a homeless encampment, after which the mayor allegedly threatened to withhold funding from his employer.

A street outreach worker brought this action against the Mayor of St. Louis and the city’s former director of human services in their official and individual capacities asserting Section 1983 claims of First Amendment retaliation, civil conspiracy, and violation of due process, as well as a state-law claim for tortious interference. A federal district court in Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants to the extent that the claims were brought against them in their official capacities. However, summary judgment was denied on the retaliation and due process claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacities, and on the claim of tortious interference (Simon v. Jones, No. 4:23 CV 955 CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 7, 2025)).

The plaintiff in this case was formerly employed at St. Patrick’s Center (SPC) as a coordinated street outreach worker.

Threats. According to the worker, SPC terminated his employment in response to threats made by the Mayor of St. Louis who purportedly threatened to withhold government funding from SPC because of the worker’s protected speech made at and during the city’s decommissioning of a homeless encampment. He asserted that the city’s then-director of human services provided the information to the mayor regarding his speech and purported actions that formed the basis for the mayor’s threats. Subsequently, the worker filed this lawsuit against the mayor and the director of human services in both their official and individual capacities.

Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. First, the court addressed the worker’s Section 1983 claims alleging civil conspiracy. To the extent that the claim was brought against the defendants in their official capacities, the court noted that a claim against a public official in their official capacity is just another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the official is an agent.

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine recognizes that a legal entity and its agents, when acting in their official capacities, are a single “person” that cannot conspire with itself. Although the Eighth Circuit has not yet applied the doctrine to conspiracy claims under Section 1983, it has done so in the context of Section 1985 claims, holding that a local government entity cannot conspire with itself through its agents acting in their official capacities.

Here, the court found that this reasoning applied equally to the worker’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against the defendants in their official capacities. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted against this claim.

Further, the court determined that the defendants were also entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that the conspiracy claim was brought against them in their individual capacities. Given the uncertain applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to Section 1983 claims, the court could not say that the defendants would have known with any certainty that their alleged agreement to retaliate against the worker by threatening his employer’s funding was clearly forbidden by the law such that they would be exposed to liability.

Official capacity. Turning to the retaliation and due process claims, the court noted that the worker did not present any argument or evidence disputing the defendants’ showing that the director of human services was neither a lawmaker nor possessed final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to distributing funds to non-profits. As such, the director of human services was entitled to summary judgment to the extent that these claims were asserted against him in his official capacity.

Likewise, the worker failed to present any argument or evidence disputing the defendants’ showing that the mayor did not possess unilateral, final decision-making authority regarding the receipt or withholding of public funds to non-profit organizations, including SPC. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted to the mayor to the extent that these claims were asserted against her in her official capacity.

Individual capacity. Next, the court considered whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claims of retaliation and due process. At all times relevant to the worker’s allegations, the law was clearly established that a government official may not retaliate against an individual for his exercise of his First Amendment right to free speech by inducing another to take adverse against him on account of that speech, explained the court. This prohibition, continued the court, extends to government actions directed to private entities who depend on government sources for income.

In addition, the law was clearly established that because an at-will employee has a right enforceable in law against third parties who unlawfully interfere with his employment relationship, that employee’s right to continue in employment is sufficient to give him a constitutional cause of action challenging state action that compelled his employer to fire him.

Here, the court concluded that there remained genuine issues of dispute concerning predicate facts material to the issue of qualified immunity on the retaliation and due process claims, including the details of the worker’s conduct and nature of the statements made during the decommissioning, and the truthfulness of the human services director’s representations to the mayor and other city officials regarding the worker’s conduct and statements. Accordingly, granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was inappropriate, said the court.

Tortious interference. Finally, the court similarly found genuine issues of material fact existed on the question of whether the director of human services acted in bad faith or with malice in his representations of the worker’s behavior, and whether the mayor acted in bad faith or with malice in her alleged threats to SPC concerning funding. As such, the court denied the defendants summary judgment on their assertion that they were entitled to official immunity on the worker’s state-law claim of tortious interference.

The case is No. 4:23 CV 955 CDP.

Judge: Perry, C.

Attorneys: Brandy B. Barth (Newton Barth) for Yitzchak Simon. Abby J. Duncan, St. Louis City Counselor's Office, for Tishaura Oneda Jones.

Cases: CoverageLiability Discharge IndividualRights PublicEmployees Retaliation StateLawClaims MissouriNews