Cybersecurity Policy Report, Trusted Overseas Labs Eyed to Strengthen FCC’s Equipment Testing Program, (May 1, 2026)

By Jeff Williams

Building on the “bad labs” report and order it adopted last year, the FCC yesterday unanimously adopted a second report and order, order on reconsideration, and second further notice of proposed rulemaking (FNPRM) in ET docket 24-136 intended to strengthen national security by boosting reliance on reciprocity in equipment testing and certification.

During a presentation at the FCC’s public meeting, Katherine Nevitt, senior attorney adviser in the agency’s Office of Engineering and Technology, said the report and order would establish a “fast-track priority review” for equipment authorization applications subject to the pre-approval guidance process when testing is conducted in “trusted test labs.” Such labs include facilities located in the United States or in countries with a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) or comparable reciprocal agreement, she said.

“This action would strengthen the integrity of the equipment authorization program by accelerating the expansion of testing capacity in the United States and in reciprocal economies that do not present national security concerns,” Ms. Nevitt said.

The order would also require telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs) and test labs to disclose the number and geographic location of all employees involved in FCC-recognized testing and certification, she said, calling that information “essential to assess impartiality and identify foreign jurisdictional influence.”

In addition, the order would update “post-market surveillance procedures to improve oversight and help ensure that devices in the marketplace are consistent with those tested in the lab,” as well as “strengthen enforcement mechanisms to deter violations, including false certifications and fraudulent test results, and reinforce the Commission’s ability to hold manufactures, TCBs, and test labs accountable for misconduct,” Ms. Nevitt said.

The item also establishes “confidential reporting channels to enable industry participants to raise compliance concerns or national security risks without fear of retaliation,” as well as direct OET to “develop a consolidated machine-readable list of prohibited entities,” which will “streamline the screening process for TCBs and reduce the administrative burden associated with reviewing multiple federal lists,” she said.

The FNPRM would, among other things, seek comment on whether the Commission should “prohibit recognition of test labs, TCBs, and accreditation bodies located in countries without an MRA or reciprocal agreement,” as well as on “modernizing data analytics in the equipment authorization system to strengthen oversight, detect evasion, and streamline processes,” she said.

FCC Chairman Brendan Carr said the item was the “next step to restore reciprocity to the FCC’s equipment authorization program” after the FCC took action in its “bad labs” report and order that prohibits TCBs, test labs, or laboratory accreditation bodies that are owned, controlled, or directed by an entity on the FCC’s “covered list” or other specified government lists of national security threats from participating in the FCC’s equipment authorization program (CPR, May 22, 2025).

“If a country wants the FCC to recognize its test labs, the country should sign an MRA or similar agreement with the U.S.,” Mr. Carr said. “This will not only ensure reciprocal international commercial relations, but also will ensure that the FCC has sufficient oversight, monitoring, and enforcement authority to guarantee the integrity of the equipment authorization process. It will also hopefully onshore testing capacity that has been offshored for decades.”

FCC Commissioner Anna Gomez said the FCC’s efforts regarding the testing process were “aimed at strengthening the integrity of our equipment authorization process and thus strengthening the trustworthiness of wireless devices that reach consumers.”

FCC Commissioner Olivia Trusty said during the meeting that the item “creates a clear pathway for equipment testing to occur in labs located in the United States or in countries with which we maintain trusted trade relationships that allow us to rely on their testing and certification regimes.”

News: FederalLegislation DataSecurity