Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, TORT CLAIMS—W.D. VA.: Employee survives motion to dismiss defamation claims against employer allegedly based on false statements of sexual harassment, (Jan 31, 2025)
Law Firms Mentioned:Morgan, Lewis & Bockius | Virginia Employment Law
Organizations Mentioned:Employment Law | Gilead Sciences | Gilead Sciences, Inc. | Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP
By Ursula Furi-Perry, J.D., MBA
A reasonable person would understand the defamatory statement as an allegation of workplace sexual harassment, which would tend to harm the reputation of the mis-attributed speaker.
An employee of a biopharmaceutical company survived the employer’s motion to dismiss his claim of defamation that resulted in his termination based on false claims of sexual harassment, ruled a federal district court in Virginia. The employee brought a suit against the employer and a female coworker for defamation, after the female coworker allegedly falsely accused him of making a statement at a work conference that he “want[ed] to rip [her] panties off.” The court dismissed the claim against the coworker for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the defamation claim for failure to state a claim. The court accepted the employee’s allegations as true, and the facts sufficiently established that the coworker knew her allegation was false when she made it to the employer. A reasonable person would understand the defamatory statement as an allegation of workplace sexual harassment, which would tend to harm the reputation of the mis-attributed speaker (Auckland v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., No. 7:24-cv-00501 (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2025)).
Application for promotion. The employee, a Virginia resident, worked for the defendant, a biopharmaceutical company that operates nationwide and is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California. After seven years of employment, he applied for a preceptor role, which was associated with greater visibility and was often leveraged for career advancement within the employer. At the time he applied, the employee had consistently met or exceeded all managerial expectations on his performance reviews.
That same summer, the employee attended a work conference along with other employees, one of whom was a female mentor in the preceptor program. The employee received the promotion, but was later questioned by human resources, which informed him that he was under investigation for allegedly stating to the mentor at the conference that he “want[ed] to rip [her] panties off.” The employee denied making that statement adamantly, and later learned that the mentor favored other people for the position.
The employee sued the employer and the mentor for defamation. He alleged that the employer tried to cover up the mentor’s allegations, and that the mentor had sent a series of text messages to another employee, in which she discussed the corrupt arrangement that she had allegedly made with the employer. The mentor filed a motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction, and the employer filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The court addressed the procedural issues under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under 12(b)(2), the court reviewed whether there were sufficient contacts, ties, and relations for personal jurisdiction, and whether the exercise of jurisdiction was authorized under Virginia’s long-arm statute, also comporting with the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment. Under 12(b)(6), the court reviewed whether the employee failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Personal jurisdiction. Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court held that the mentor’s single act of exchanging a series of text messages did not confer jurisdiction of this court over her personally, as the text message exchange was not a business transaction within the meaning of the long-arm statute. The employee did not identify any other basis for jurisdiction, and therefore had not met his “burden of making a prima facie showing in support of” the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the court held, dismissing the claims against the mentor but granting leave to the plaintiff to amend his complaint to include additional or alternative facts.
Motion to dismiss. Regarding the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court held that the employee met his burden of pleading the elements of publication of an actionable statement with the requisite intent. The employee alleged that he never told the mentor that he “want[ed] to rip [her] panties off” and that she knew he had never made such a statement. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepted those allegations as true, and the facts sufficiently established that the mentor knew her allegation was false when she made it to the employer.
“An allegation of workplace sexual harassment is a serious matter that has the power to ‘lower [a plaintiff] in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him,’” the court admonished. “One would reasonably understand an allegation that someone said at a work conference that they ‘want[ed] to rip [a co-worker’s] panties off’ as an allegation of workplace sexual harassment, which would tend to harm the reputation of the mis-attributed speaker.” The court held that the alleged statement was defamatory and therefore actionable as a matter of law, denying the motion to dismiss brought by the employer.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the claim against the mentor for lack of personal jurisdiction, but denied the dismissal of the employee’s claim against the employer based on failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The case is No. 7:24-cv-00501.
Judge: Cullen, T.
Attorneys: Linda Leigh Rhoads (Virginia Employment Law) for Ian Lewis Auckland. Jocelyn Renee Cuttino (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius) for Gilead Sciences, Inc.
Companies: Gilead Sciences, Inc.
Cases: Discrimination SexualHarassment TortClaims VirginiaNews