Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, TORT CLAIMS—N.D. Ohio: Trucker’s claims against freight platforms fail for lack of specificity, (May 29, 2026)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

The use of common platforms certainly implied parallel conduct, but without more, it was indistinguishable from any other industry in which multiple parties use the same systems to conduct business.

A trucking owner-operator’s pro se complaint claiming violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and the Sherman Act did not comply with the requisite “short and plain” pleading standards, held the federal district court in Cleveland, Ohio. The complaint was also deficient with respect to the particularity requirement of R. 9(b). The plaintiff consistently pleaded in conclusory fashion and failed to show the existence of a RICO enterprise. The plaintiff did not plead specific predicate acts or how the alleged participants were involved. An industry is not a RICO enterprise merely because its participants use technology, data, or platforms. The Sherman Act claims were similarly deficient of required pleading elements like market definition, monopoly power, or attempts to acquire monopoly power. The tortious interference claim likewise failed for lack of specificity. The court accordingly dismissed all of the owner-operator’s claims, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim pursuant to R. 12(b)(6). The dismissal was with prejudice because the court now had reason to believe, after many failed attempts to amend, that further amendment would be futile (Alves v. Internet Truckstop Payments, LLC, No. 1:26-cv-00150-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 27, 2026)).

Background. The owner-operator of a purported federally authorized motor carrier accused multiple telematics, trucking fleet management, and freight brokerage companies of operating and participating in a deficiently-specified freight brokering data technology racket. The plaintiff alleged the defendants operated broker-facing platforms within a broader freight-technology ecosystem that integrates tracking, surveillance, and compliance verification tools used by brokers to monitor and evaluate motor carriers in real time. In that context, the plaintiff said freight onboarding failures and approval delays made it impossible to obtain consistent trucking work despite maintaining paid access to multiple load boards and actively seeking dispatch. The plaintiff said she remained idle at truck stops for extended periods waiting for payment and load approval despite being ready, willing, and able to transport freight. She said this forced her to borrow money from family and friends to meet operating expenses, effectively subsidizing the freight brokers. The plaintiff alleged that “cascading” denials of load access, approval holds, payment delays, and carrier-status conflicts are commonly understood as forms of blacklisting.

The TAC alleged four claims against all defendants, collectively: (1) civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act violations; (2) Sherman Act violations; and (3) tortious interference with business relationships under Ohio law. The court described the third amended complaint (TAC) as containing nearly 200 paragraphs across its thirty-five substantive pages, yet it lacked any specific allegations of illegal conduct.

RICO claims. The plaintiff failed to allege the plausible existence of a RICO enterprise, let alone any predicate acts supporting a pattern of racketeering. The court observed that the Sixth Circuit has made it clear that a pleading is deficient if it merely lists entities that allegedly comprise a RICO enterprise and then lists a string of supposed racketeering activities purportedly attributable to it. Shotgun pleading is also improper.

The TAC never identified which defendants participated in which predicate acts or how or where any of the allegedly illicit enterprise activity took place. The court quipped that an industry is not a RICO enterprise merely because its participants use technology, data, or platforms.

The court continued that even if the plaintiff had managed to adequately plead a relationship between the defendants, the TAC still failed to show that alleged actions pertinent to the RICO claim were sufficiently related and continuous. The plaintiff admitted to having obtained federal motor carrier operating authority less than a year ago. That was less than the amount of time the Sixth Circuit recognizes for the continuity required for a viable RICO claim.

The pleading of predicate wire fraud and Hobbs Act extortion violations was insufficient and lacked R. 9(b) particularity. Plaintiffs must identify the speaker of fraudulent statements, the statements involved, time and place circumstances, and explain why the statements were fraudulent. The instant plaintiff provided only threadbare accusations that the defendants engaged in “interstate transmission” or “interstate maintenance.” Turning to the Hobbs Act, plaintiffs must show how a defendant obstructed commerce by extortion or threatened violence, but the instant plaintiff only provided “barebones” accusations of “economic leverage,” albeit the plaintiff may have identified one act sufficiently specific to mount a defense. The plaintiff’s suggestion that one of the defendants might have threatened to blacklist the plaintiff did not implicate movement of property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, and the plaintiff’s own understanding of a “verbal commitment,” without more, could not constitute a real threat. The court dismissed the RICO claim as to all defendants in light of the pleading deficiencies.

Antitrust violations. The court found the Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 claims also failed for multiple pleading deficiencies. First, the court found that general references to “freight brokers” and “broker facing [data or online] platforms” were insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirement of a defined, relevant market under the Sherman Act. Those terms could have been understood to refer to different markets. Allegations about “market access” in “all interstate commerce” were not a properly defined product and geographical market. Failure to define a relevant market was a ground for R. 12(b)(6) dismissal.

The court also found the plaintiff failed to plead the existence of participation in some agreement that unreasonably restrained trade in any relevant market. One might infer an agreement from parallel behavior in combination with more than what this plaintiff pleaded, but the instant allegations were sufficiently ambiguous to be indistinguishable from lawful and rational competitive conduct.

The use of common platforms certainly implied parallel conduct, but the court found this indistinguishable from any other industry in which multiple parties use the same systems to conduct business. Even the more specific allegation that the defendants agreed to use Carrier 411, said to control carrier reputational information, was insufficient to establish “any sort of specific agreement amongst the defendants, let alone that such agreement is unlawful.”

The Sherman Act Section 2 claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization failed because the plaintiff never alleged how the defendants intentionally worked in concert, let alone that they did so for purposes of monopolization, in an undefined market. Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 claims both require proof of concerted action, but the plaintiff failed to plead it.

The plaintiff also failed to plead monopoly power, any attempt to acquire monopoly power, or engagement in exclusionary conduct. Nor did the plaintiff plead causation involving any sort of connection between alleged monopolization and her alleged injury.

Tortious interference. Turning to the tortious interference claims, the court found the TAC failed to articulate any specific business relationship or contract that the defendants might have disrupted; how any defendant would have known about such relationship; or how any interference took place. Simply stating that the defendants knew about relationships was not enough. Here, too, the pleading was conclusory, so the court dismissed the tortious interference claim as to all defendants.

No amendment. The court said it would have denied any motion to file a fourth amended complaint to cure pleading deficiencies because amendment appeared to be futile. The court noted the plaintiff had four conforming opportunities to plead under procedural rules, but demonstrated an inability to cure even taking into account multiple irregular attempts to cure.

The Case is No. 1:26-cv-00150-DAP.

Judge: Polster, D.

Attorneys: Sandra Worthing Alves, pro se. Andrew J. Dorman (Reminger Co., L.P.A.) for Internet Truckstop Payments, LLC.

Companies: Internet Truckstop Payments, LLC

Cases: TortClaims Procedure OhioNews