Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, STATE-LAW CLAIMS—D.D.C.: Suit against Nestle alleging misrepresentations regarding child labor remanded to state court, (Feb 13, 2026)

By Donielle Tigay Stutland, J.D.

The non-aggregation principle applied under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act.

The federal district court for the District of Columbia granted a motion brought by a human rights organization to remand its lawsuit against Nestle to state court. The suit alleged that the chocolate manufacturer misrepresented labor practices in its cocoa supply chain in violation of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA). The court remanded the suit to state court after concluding that the non-aggregation principle applies under the CPPA and thus, diversity jurisdiction is not satisfied (International Rights Advocates, Inc. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-02603-BAH (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2026)).

Background. A human rights organization filed the case under the CPPA in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia on May 30, 2025. The complaint alleged that Nestlé made false and deceptive marketing representations to consumers, including that Nestlé has zero tolerance for child labor, forced labor, and modern-day slavery, and was committed to preventing and eliminating child labor in its supply chain. The complaint further alleged that Nestlé deceived consumers into believing that Nestlé took meaningful action to address and prevent child labor in its supply chain, while no such thing was occurring.

The cocoa manufacturer filed a notice of removal, which asserted diversity subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiff “is a nonprofit organized under the laws of the District of Columbia and with its principal place of business in the District of Columbia,” defendant “is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Virginia,” so “there is complete diversity of citizenship,” and “the costs of complying with the injunctive relief that [plaintiff] seeks and the attorneys’ fees that [plaintiff] has requested are reasonably anticipated to exceed $75,000.” The human rights organization argues that the cocoa manufacturer cannot satisfy the second requirement for diversity jurisdiction because application of the non-aggregation principle precludes the damages sought in the complaint from meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Non-aggregation principle. The CPPA non-aggregation principle has been applied by the courts to require that “when a plaintiff brings a CPPA claim on behalf of the general public, the attorney’s fees must be apportioned such that only the fees properly attributable to the plaintiff herself are considered as part of the amount in controversy” and, likewise, “the cost of complying with an injunction is appropriately included in the amount in controversy for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) but may not be aggregated across multiple plaintiffs and must instead by allocated to each plaintiff on a pro rata basis.” The district courts have adopted the “either-viewpoint” approach to calculating amounts in controversy—which allows for consideration of either the value of the plaintiff’s requested relief or the defendant’s potential costs—in cases where only equitable relief is sought.

Here, the consumer neither sought class certification nor damages but rathe injunctive relief to bar Nestle from continuing to engage in the unlawful trade practices as well as “declaratory relief in the form of an order holding Nestles’ conduct to be unlawful in violation of the CPPA and requests its attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this action.”

Amount in controversy. Having determined that the non-aggregation principle applies, the court next concluded that neither the manufacturer’s compliance costs nor the non-profit’s attorney fees individually or combined satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.

With respect to the cost of compliance, the court rejected an argument by the manufacturer claimed that its cost of compliance would satisfy this standard because plaintiff’s challenge applies to “statements made on the Nestlé USA’s product labels, websites, corporate policies, and/or other materials alleged to be accessible to consumers” would require defendant “to formulate new material to replace the challenged statements, identify each place that the challenged statements appear, adapt the new material to replace the challenged statements, and manufacture new labels for untold numbers of products” necessitating the “involvement of policy personnel, lawyers, communications and graphics vendors and specialists to create the new material, and information technology personnel and lawyers to identify the material covered by the litigation.” The court compared precedent has permitted federal district courts “in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances” to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act when certain criteria are satisfied including “whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other State” but not considering the amount in controversy.

The court also detailed that here, the nonprofit brings this case on behalf of “the interests of District of Columbia consumers” under D.C. Code § 28—3905(k)(1)(D). The court noted that this subsection does not allow the organization to recover for its own injuries. The fees generated to bring this claim are necessary to provide relief for the District of Columbia consumers, so the non-aggregation principle applies to plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. Under Smithfield Foods, when an organization is acting on behalf of the general public under (k)(1)(C), the non-aggregation principle applies to attorney fees even when there is a unity of identity between the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel, regardless of the fact that (k)(1)(C) permits an organization to recover on its own behalf. Here, the non-profit brings this case on behalf of “the interests of District of Columbia consumers” under D.C. Code § 28—3905(k)(1)(D), which does not allow the organization to recover for its own injuries. Thus, the non-aggregation principle would apply to the nonprofit’s fees, as they were incurred to benefit D.C. consumers under § 28-3905(k)(1)(D), not solely the organization.

The court denied a request from the non-profit to recover its attorneys' fees and costs for the removal to federal court, finding the cocoa manufacturer’s removal objectively reasonable despite being unsuccessful.

The Case is No. 1:25-cv-02603-BAH.

Judge: Howell, B.

Attorneys: Kim E. Richman (Richman Law & Policy) for International Rights Advocates, Inc. Jacob T. Spencer (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher) for Nestle USA, Inc.

Companies: International Rights Advocates, Inc.; Nestle USA, Inc.

Cases: StateLawClaims Procedure AttorneysFees DistrictofColumbiaNews