Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISABILITY—DISCRIMINATION—D.D.C.: WMATA employee proceeds with Rehab Act wrongful termination claim, summary judgment derails others, (Feb 13, 2026)

By Molly Platnick

She was terminated three years after being “medically disqualified” from working as an operator.

In a case brought by a former employee who was terminated following a back injury, a federal district court for the District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s motion for summary judgment. She had alleged she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodation and reporting sex discrimination. The court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment on her wrongful termination claim under the Rehabilitation Act, finding she could perform the essential functions of the administrative job she took on after her back injury. It granted summary judgment against her other claims, determining that WMATA had provided reasonable accommodation. Her Title VII claims failed to survive judgment as well—her HWE claim was time-barred and she could not show WMATA’s stated reason for dismissing her was a pretext for disparate treatment.

The court declined to untangle the employee’s “murky” retaliation claims (Reddish v. WMATA, No. 22-2658 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2026)).

Shortly after starting at WMATA as an equipment operator in February 2013, the operator began filing complaints against her coworkers and supervisors for discriminating against her based on her sex. The complaints included allegations other employees refused to ride in company vehicles with her, called her “Jezebel,” and told her she could not work in one of the yards because there were no “female lockers.” A colleague told her this harassment was “her fault because she chose to work in a male dominant environment.”

Then, the operator injured her shoulder on the job in August 2013 but returned to work “full duty” after surgery. In February 2015, WMATA transferred the employee from the yards to work in an office as an administrative assistant, however, her job title did not change, and she sometimes returned to the yards. WMATA stated it transferred the operator because the superintendent was looking for someone able to sort “day-to-day” paperwork. The former employee rejected this as a pretext for transferring her because she complained about being sexually harassed.

In August 2017, the employee took medical leave for back surgery. In June 2017, on her physician’s recommendation, she requested an ergonomic chair at work. WMATA’s EEO office granted her request while she was on leave.

A doctor who worked for WMATA determined, as of September 1, 2017, the employee was “medically disqualified” from working as an operator and WMATA’s ADA panel would review internal job postings for 60 days to identify potential positions for her assignment. She could remain in the ADA program for three years from when she was disqualified, and could return to the operator position if she “became physically qualified to do so during that three-year period.”

WMATA notified the employee in May 2018 it had not found an appropriate position for her within the 60-day period. In July 2020, WMATA alerted the employee she would be terminated on September 1, 2020, unless she could prove she was able to return to the operator position. Because the employee did not show she was physically qualified, the Transit Authority terminated her.

Procedural history. In February 2021 the employee filed an “initial inquiry questionnaire” with the EEOC, claiming discrimination and retaliation based on her transfer to an administrative position and ultimate termination. She brought this case against WMATA in September 2022, asserting sex discrimination, retaliation, and disability discrimination in violation of the ADA.

She claims that WMATA: (1) failed to provide her reasonable accommodation and ultimately terminated her because of her disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) discriminated against her on the basis of her sex because male employees were granted reasonable accommodations and assistance in finding other positions; and (3) terminated her in retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodations and filing complaints of sex discrimination.

Reasonable accommodations. The employee alleged WMATA failed to accommodate her by denying her an ergonomic chair. The Transit Authority responded that an ergonomic chair was not a reasonable accommodation but that in any event it did not deny her request for the chair. The court rejected the first argument because, as discussed in detail below, the employee was de facto working an administrative job and was not required to perform the essential functions of an operator. An employee can demonstrate she was denied reasonable accommodation if she can show her employer ended the “interactive process” or participated in the process in bad faith. Here, the employee conceded that the employer evaluated her for a chair shortly after she made her request and notified her, while she was on leave, that it would purchase one.

Alternative position. Additionally, the employee claimed the employer failed to make “genuine efforts to identify a position to which she could be reassigned” before terminating her. Reasonable accommodation requires employers to give disabled employees “more assistance” but does not make them “place a disabled employee in a position for which she is not qualified, or to create a vacant position when none is available.” Here, WMATA reviewed internal job postings for 60 days and the HR specialist continued to work with the employee until September 2020. The court was persuaded these actions were enough to meet the bar for “more assistance,” and the burden shifted to the employee to proffer evidence she was improperly denied or not considered for a job for which she was qualified. She did not present that evidence and the court concluded WMATA’s failing to find a replacement position was not a failure to accommodate.

However, the court noted the failure to accommodate claim might have succeeded under an alternative theory: WMATA failed to accommodate her because it did not formally transfer her from the operator to administrative role. The employee, however, did not “develop, support, or even invoke” argument and the court dismissed it as immaterial.

Termination. As for the employee’s claim that WMATA terminated her on the basis of her disability, the court considered whether she met the necessary elements of a Rehab Act claims, i.e., showing that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) she was otherwise qualified; (3) she was excluded from, denied the benefit of, or subject to discrimination under a program or activity…carried out by a federal [an] agency…with federal funds.”

Otherwise qualified? The second element was at issue here. WMATA claimed that “lifting heavy weights [and] operating equipment” were essential functions of the operator position, which the former employee could not perform after she injured her back. However, the record shows that while the employee’s title may not have changed, she transitioned to a new position performing administrative tasks in WMATA’s office over two years before her termination.

The court concluded no reasonable jury could find the office position was temporary and both sides agreed the role was “not created to accommodate [the employee’s] disability.” After an extended period of “only occasionally” having to operate machinery and lift heavy loads, a jury could determine these were not essential functions of her position. “Although a close question,” according to the court, it was persuaded that the employee had proffered sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment.

HWE claim. Regarding the employee’s claim under Title VII that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, the employer argued that it was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge within 180 days. While the employee attempted to rely on the continuing violation theory, referencing unanswered emails and non-accommodation, the court noted that none of the incidents she described in her complaint occurred within the 180-day window. The court determined the Morgan exception did not apply, noting that her allegations were “conclusory” in this regard and that it had already concluded that the employer was entitled to summary judgment on her failure to accommodate claims. The employee could not use “unspecified and unsupported” claims of past harassment to suggest continuing harassment and implicate Morgan.

Termination. Additionally, the employee alleged disparate treatment under Title VII because the employer had provided similarly-situated male employees with reasonable accommodations. Here, the court was persuaded the employee’s medical disqualification from the operator position and unsuitability for another position was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The issue for disparate treatment was not whether WMATA should have fired her but whether a “reasonable jury could find that the proffered rationale was pretextual and that the actual reason…was because of her sex.” The employee argued her medical disqualification was a pretext because nine similarly situated male employees received more favorable treatment. However, the court was not satisfied her evidence would let a reasonable jury find she was similarly situated to the nine employees.

The court acknowledged the former employee had evidence indicating she may have experienced sex-based prejudice while working as an operator. While she could not raise this as a separate claim because she did not timely exhaust her administrative remedies, the court suggested she could use this evidence as “relevant background” that her termination was “attributable to invidious motives.”

Even with this evidence, the court decided the former employee’s disparate treatment claim would fail. The offensive conduct occurred too long before the events that that gave rise to her failure-to-accommodate claim and she did not connect the discrimination to any of the decisionmakers in her Title VII claim.

Retaliation. Finally, the employee claimed she was terminated for requesting reasonable accommodation and filing complaints against her coworkers for sex discrimination. WMATA disputed any causal connection between her complaints and disqualification because they occurred almost four years apart. (The employee filed her last complaint in 2014 and was medically disqualified in 2018.) The court agreed, relying on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hamilton v. Geithner, that four months between the protected activity and adverse action might not “suffice even to make out a prima facie case of retaliation.” The employee’s alternative theories were not persuasive and the court concluded that the employee presented no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer had retaliated against her.

The case is No. 1:22-cv-02658-RDM.

Judge: Moss, R.

Attorneys: Megan Brenna Betts for Trina E. Reddish. Alexis J. Echols, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, for Washington Metro Area Transit Authority.

Companies: Washington Metro Area Transit Authority

Cases: DisabilityDiscrimination Discrimination SexDiscrimination SexualHarassment Discharge Retaliation Procedure DistrictofColumbiaNews