Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, REMEDIES, DAMAGES—11th Cir.: Former security company employee revives Title VII claims, (Aug 6, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

Although she claimed to have never received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the district court presumed she had received it three days after it was mailed.

Affirming in part and reversing in part a district court’s rulings on the retaliation and race and pregnancy discrimination claims asserted by a former security company employee, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning with regard to the three-day presumption concerning right-to-sue letters sent by the EEOC. Here, the court found that because the employee had introduced enough evidence to rebut the three-day presumption and had created a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment on timeliness, the district court had erred by using the presumption to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer on her Title VII claims. The court also vacated a judgment of more than $800,000 in favor of the employee based on faulty jury instructions (Key v. Hyundai Engineering America, Inc., No. 24-11069 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2026)).

The employee in this case is a Black woman who wore her hair in dreadlocks. She had submitted a job application to work for Dynamic Security in the mailroom at the Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama (HMMA) plant in Montgomery.

Grooming policy. According to the security company’s grooming policy, certain hairstyles, including dreadlocks, are prohibited. When the employee interviewed for the position, she did so in front of a Dynamic employee and an employee of Hyundai Engineering America (HEA). During the interview, the Dynamic employee mentioned that the woman’s dreadlocks might be a problem. After she showed them a picture of her hair styled in an “updo,” the interviewers said “okay” and hired her for the position.

Handbook. During the employee’s training, she was provided with Dynamic’s Security Officer’s Handbook. The handbook included a section titled “Waiver of Trial By Jury Policy.” The employee stated she “skimmed” parts of the handbook and signed an “Acknowledgment and Receipt of Employee Handbook” form, confirming she was bound by the handbook’s policies.

Sent home. On her first day of work, the employee was sent home before the end of her shift because of her hair. The next day, she wore a hat to work. Later that day, she met with the Dynamic employee who had interviewed her along with another manager. During the meeting, the interviewer stated: “So I heard that you feel like you been discriminated against.” When the employee pointed out that she was wearing a hat, as instructed, the interviewer responded, “This is going to be a problem. You’re going to be a problem.”

Complaint. Sometime after this meeting, the employee told the manager who was present for the conversation that she would like to speak with someone in HR so that she could make a formal complaint of discrimination. There was some back and forth over who the employee should speak to. Ultimately, she made an official, written complaint of discrimination and handed it over to the manager. The complaint alleged that she “was being discriminated against because [she had her] hair in dreadlocks, and also because [she] was pregnant.” The employee testified that she viewed the complaint as alleging race discrimination.

Later, the employee asked if she could leave to speak with a person whom she thought worked in Dynamic’s HR department but who in fact was Dynamic’s district manager. During their conversation, the district manager asked the employee if she was going to sue Dynamic. After disclosing the events of her first day, the district manager told her she could not return to work.

EEOC charges. Subsequently, the employee filed charges with the EEOC. On August 3, 2017, the EEOC issued a charge of discrimination against Dynamic, which the employee signed. It issued a second charge against HMMA, which the employee also signed. Once Dynamic responded, the EEOC mailed the employee a copy of Dynamic’s statement. The EEOC also mailed the employee a conciliation letter on her HMMA charge.

On March 1, 2019, the EEOC issued the employee a right-to-sue letter for her charges against Dynamic, but she claimed to have never received this letter. On July 12, 2019, the EEOC also issued the employee a right-to-sue letter against HMMA, which she did receive.

Lawsuit. After receiving the second right-to-sue letter, the employee filed suit on October 10, 2019, against Dynamic, HEA, and HMMA, alleging claims of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, race discrimination under Title VII, race discrimination under Section 1981, retaliation under Title VII, and retaliation under Section 1981.

The district court granted summary judgment on all claims brought against HEA and HMMA, and against all but the Section 1981 retaliation claim against Dynamic, which proceeded to trial. At trial, the district court denied Dynamic’s motion to strike the employee’s demand for a jury trial.

During the trial, Dynamic proposed a jury instruction regarding the first element of the retaliation claim—protected activity. The district court declined to use the proposed instruction, instead proffering instructions of its own. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee with a damages award totaling $811,264.

Dynamic appealed the district court’s judgment against it while the employee appealed the district court’s orders on her other claims.

Timeliness. In granting summary judgment against the employee’s Title VII claims, the district court did so on timeliness grounds, finding that she had sued Dynamic more than 90 days after receiving the right-to-sue letter. The employee maintained that she never received the letter. Nevertheless, the district court found that the circumstances of this case raised a presumption that the EEOC properly mailed the employee’s notice of her right to sue Dynamic on March 1, 2019. In reaching this determination, the district court relied on evidence the employee received mail from the EEOC at the same address prior to the alleged failure to receive the right-to-sue letter and that she had failed to identify “any evidence demonstrating there may have been a flaw in the mailing procedure.”

Based on the above, the district court presumed that the employee received the letter on March 4, 2019—three days after the EEOC had mailed it—and that the employee was at that point on notice of her right to sue Dynamic. With that presumption, the deadline for the employee to sue was June 2, 2019. Because she filed suit on October 10, 2019—more than three months after the presumed deadline—the district court granted summary judgment based on lack of timeliness.

Arguing that the district court should have credited her testimony at the summary judgment stage and sent the timeliness question to the jury, the employee contended that because there was no indication that she should be held at fault for failure to receive the notice, the district court should not have presumed that she received it within three days of its mailing. The court here agreed.

Burden met. In her deposition, the employee testified to the following: (1) she had never seen the Dynamic right-to-sue letter before; (2) no one except for her and her husband retrieved their household mail; (3) she received three other letters from the EEOC within a few months; and (4) she believed her charges against Dynamic and HMMA were combined and that the right-to-sue letter she received regarding HMMA was also her right-to-sue letter regarding Dynamic. Further, she testified that she engaged in email communications with an investigator at the EEOC, but the EEOC had never notified her that it had dismissed the charge against Dynamic.

Absent any evidence of negligence on the employee’s part, the court found that she had met her burden to establish that the failure to receive the right-to-sue letter was in no way her fault and that she had taken minimum responsibility for an orderly and expeditious resolution of her claims.

Hayes. The Third Circuit had addressed a similar situation in Hayes v. N.J. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 108 F.4th 219 (3d Cir. 2024). There, the EEOC had mailed the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter on March 11, 2020. The plaintiff claimed she did not receive the letter in the mail or otherwise see the letter until August 27, 2020. She filed suit on November 24, 2020, more than eight months after the mailing date listed on the letter.

To determine the date that the 90-day filing period began, the Third Circuit applied a three-day presumption of receipt by mail. The court then looked to whether the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to rebut the three-day presumption of receipt, concluding that the plaintiff had met her burden.

Here, the court adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Hayes. Because the employee “introduced enough evidence to rebut the three-day presumption” and “create[d] a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment on timeliness,” the district court erred by using the presumption to grant summary judgment in favor of Dynamic on the Title VII claims. Therefore, at trial, the jury must determine the date by which the employee was on notice of her right to sue Dynamic, said the court.

Jury trial waiver. Next, the court considered Dynamic’s motion to strike the employee’s jury demand. Dynamic argued that the district court erred because the employee had waived her right to a jury trial. The appellate court disagreed.

The district court had declined to strike the employee’s jury demand because it could not find that she had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to a jury trial. She had not signed the portion of the handbook where the waiver language was located or any other part of the handbook. Instead, she signed a separate form agreeing to be bound by the rules and policies contained within the handbook. However, a waiver is not a rule, regulation, or policy, and the signed form did not specifically mention the right to trial by jury. Thus, a signature expressing agreement to be bound by the terms of a handbook did not evince the employee’s intent specifically to waive her fundamental right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the district court’s decision on this issue was affirmed.

Jury instruction. Turning to Dynamic’s challenge to the district court’s jury instructions, the appellate court agreed with Dynamic that the district court had abused its discretion. The district court had failed to instruct the jury to determine whether the employee explicitly or implicitly communicated her belief that she had been discriminated against because of her race. Instead, the court’s instructions erroneously presumed that the employee had met her burden on this issue.

Because the jury was not properly instructed on protected activity, the appellate court reversed the district court, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a new trial.

Remaining claims. Finally, the employee asked the appellate court to reverse the district court’s dismissal of her Title VII and Section 1981 claims against HMMA and HEA and her Section 1981 race discrimination claim against Dynamic. The court could find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusions and thus affirmed as to these issues.

The case is No. 24-11069.

Judge: Kidd, E.

Attorneys: Heather Newsom Leonard (Law Offices of Heather Leonard) for Davita M. Key. Wesley C. Redmond (FordHarrison) for Dynamic Security, Inc. Scott Burnett Smith (Bradley Arant Boult Cummings) for Hyundai Engineering America, Inc.

Companies: Dynamic Security, Inc.; Hyundai Engineering America, Inc.

Cases: RemediesDamages Discrimination PregnancyDiscrimination RaceDiscrimination Procedure Retaliation AlabamaNews FloridaNews GeorgiaNews GCNNews