Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES—D. Md.: Teacher’s viewpoint discrimination claim based on ban on Palestinian symbols survives dismissal, (Jun 3, 2026)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

The Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed whether any messages associated with a teacher’s attire constitute curricular speech or private speech.

Declining to dismiss the First Amendment claims of a Maryland public school teacher who alleged she was banned from displaying and wearing symbols associated with Palestine, a federal district court in Maryland found it could not, at this early stage, conclude that the items posted on her door, including a flag and watermelon stickers, constituted curricular speech rather than private speech on a matter of public concern. The court also found that further factual development was needed before it could determine whether her attire, including a traditional Palestinian scarf and a Gaza shirt, constituted curricular speech. The teacher also plausibly alleged she had been subjected to a restriction on private speech occurring outside the classroom, off of school premises, and while she was off duty. Although the court found her claim for monetary damages against the individual defendants was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, it left intact her claim against the principal in his individual capacity as well as her claim for prospective injunctive relief (Sayed v. Taylor, No. 25-1951-TDC (D. Md. June 1, 2026)).

As the staff sponsor for the middle school’s minority scholars program, the middle school science teacher often posted small flag stickers from different countries on her classroom door and adjoining walls to honor the diversity of her students. She claimed the school also historically allowed teachers to display messages of support for particular communities, including Black Lives Matter flags and Pride pins and t-shirts, in their classrooms or on their clothing and displayed flags from across the world throughout the building as well as a BLM sign in the gymnasium.

Sticker and shirt. In August 2023, the employee included a Palestinian flag among the stickers she posted on her door. In late 2023, the teacher, who wore a keffiyeh—a traditional Palestinian scarf—also began wearing a shirt with the words “Gaza: The Soul of my Soul,” which commemorated a three-year old Palestinian girl who had recently been killed by Israeli forces.

Complaint. Not long after the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks, the teacher learned that the parent of a student who did not attend any of her classes had complained about the Palestinian flag sticker. Although the school told the parent the flag did not violate any school rules, the student continued to complain.

Banned. The school removed the sticker the following year and informed the teacher that she could not put it back on her door and she could no longer wear the keffiyeh because they could be construed as “antisemitic” or “supporting terrorism.” She could, however, continue to display other flags on her door. According to the teacher, the principal told her she would not be allowed to return to her classroom unless she complied with these restrictions.

Watermelon sticker. Two days later, she placed a watermelon sticker on her classroom door, and the principal directed her to remove it because it was a symbol of Palestinian solidarity. When she wore the Gaza shirt a week after that, the principal escorted her to the office and told her to change her shirt or go home. Although she explained that the shirt was meant to commemorate the young child, he allegedly responded that it was disruptive and could be perceived as antisemitic.

Work contract. That same day, the principal placed a Memorandum for the Record in the teacher’s work contract that directed her to “refrain from wearing, posting, sharing, or in any way displaying information relating to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.”

Lawsuit. The teacher subsequently sued the principal and superintendent, alleging that the restrictions on her display of symbols or messages related to Palestine constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. For their part, the defendants argued that her expressive activities constituted curricular speech by a public school that is not protected by the First Amendment.

Curricular speech. When a First Amendment free speech dispute involves a teacher who is speaking within the classroom, the court observed, the determination of whether the speech involves a matter of public concern depends on whether the speech is curricular. The Fourth Circuit has defined curricular speech as that which “constitute[s] school-sponsored expression bearing the imprimatur of the school” and is “supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge to the students.” In determining whether speech is school-sponsored and bears the imprimatur of the school, the court must examine whether it is “so closely connected to the school” that it appears the school is sponsoring it.

Classroom decorations. As to the prohibition on the teacher’s classroom decorations, the court pointed out that the complaint allegations did not demonstrate whether the school imposed any restrictions on the posting of materials on classroom doors or whether there was a policy allowing the principal to monitor those postings and remove items for any particular reason.

Instead, the court observed, not only did the teacher allege facts suggesting no policy or practice exists she alleged the school had a “history of allowing political messages by teachers in the classroom and other learning spaces,” including the posting of BLM signs and Pride flags. She also alleged that no teacher had ever been reprimanded for displaying any of these political messages or directed to stop displaying them. Here, the court found that at this early stage of the case, it could not definitely conclude that teachers, students, and parents understood her classroom decorations to be recognized restrictions such that they bore the imprimatur of the school.

The complaint allegations also provided an incomplete picture of whether the decorations were displayed in order to impart particular knowledge to students. The teacher acknowledged that the international flags were displayed to honor the diversity of her students in a manner similar to the way the school hangs flags on its walls to honor the diversity of its students. She also stated that the Palestinian flag led to student comments and discussion and gave students “a safe space to have thoughtful and curious conversations about the flags and the people they represent.”

Once again, the court found further factual development necessary to properly assess whether the flag sticker was presented to impart knowledge to students. Because it could not find the items posted on her classroom door constituted curricular speech, the court concluded that dismissal was not presently warranted on this claim.

Attire. Regarding the restrictions on the teacher’s attire, the court noted that she asserted the school historically permitted political messages by teachers in classrooms and learning spaces and that she had frequently worn the keffiyeh and Gaza shirt before the principal imposed the restrictions. These allegations, said the court, suggested the absence of any policy or practice of monitoring teacher attire that could potentially demonstrate attire was deemed to be school sponsored expression bearing the school’s imprimatur.

Her allegations also did not definitively show she wore the keffiyeh or Gaza shirt to impart particular knowledge to students. Rather, she alleged she wore the keffiyeh to express support for Palestinians and the Gaza shirt to “commemorate a young girl who was killed by gunfire.” Once again, the court found factual development required in order to determine whether her attire is properly deemed to be curricular speech rather than private speech. Under these circumstances, the court again declined to dismiss her claim related to her prohibited attire.

Work contract. In support of her allegation the restrictions on her expressive activity extended beyond the classroom, the teacher pointed to the Memorandum of Record, which directed that she “refrain from wearing, posting, sharing, or in any way displaying information relating to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.” While the defendants claimed the memorandum limited its reach to her activities on school grounds, this argument, said the court, “was contradicted by the plain language of the memorandum,” which did not specify any limits to the directive. Thus, the court denied the motion as it related to the memorandum’s broad restrictions.

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Turning finally to the defendants’ claim that to the extent the teacher sought monetary damages, the Eleventh Amendment provided immunity to them for claims against them in their official capacities, the court agreed. But because Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to Section 1983 claims against individual defendants in their personal capacities, the court declined to dismiss the claim for monetary damages against the principal in his individual capacity. It also decided to dismiss the teacher’s claim for prospective injunctive relief against the defendants, including in their official capacities.

The case is No. 15-1951-TDC.

Judge: Chuang, T.

Attorneys: Ahmad Jafar Kaki, I (CAIR Legal Defense Fund) for Hibah Sayed. Lauri Elizabeth Cleary (Lerch, Early & Brewer) for Thomas Taylor and Peter Crable.

Cases: PublicEmployees IndividualRights MarylandNews GCNNews