Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PROCEDURE—10th Cir.: Intervening change in law not enough to reopen voluntarily dismissed case, (Aug 4, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

“a change in law alone is not an extraordinary circumstance” that would justify vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6).

In a case on remand from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in reopening the case under FRCP 60(b). Initially, the appellate court had reversed the district court, which had concluded that it could reopen a dismissed case under Rule 60(b) when the dismissal was voluntary. The Supreme Court disagreed with this determination, finding that a voluntary dismissal had all the hallmarks of a final proceeding and was thus eligible for reopening. On remand for further proceeding on any remaining issues, the appellate court concluded that an intervening change in law was not the type of extraordinary circumstance that would justify reopening a case under Rule 60(b) (Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., No. 22-1252 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025)).

This case stemmed from an age discrimination claim brought by a former employee of Halliburton. The employee was contractually obligated to arbitrate the dispute, and thus voluntarily dismissed his case to proceed with arbitration. He later returned to court to reopen his case objecting to the arbitrator’s proceedings and award. The district court found that reopening was warranted and jurisdiction was proper. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that a voluntary dismissal was not a “final proceeding” and reopening was impossible under Rule 60(b).

Supreme Court decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Tenth Circuit was reversed, with the Court finding that voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a final proceeding under Rule 60(b). The Court went no further, rejecting Halliburton’s request that it conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate, and that even if Halliburton lost on the voluntary dismissal issue, it should prevail on the jurisdictional issue.

According to the Supreme Court, it “granted certiorari to decide whether Rule 60(b) permits a court to reopen a case that was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.” This question, continued the Court, was separate from, and antecedent to, the question of whether the district court could exercise jurisdiction over the employee’s motion to vacate. The Court declined to express any view on whether that relief was proper and left it to the lower courts to address any subsequent jurisdictional questions on remand.

Analytical steps. The Supreme Court’s analysis suggested four analytical steps in addressing Rule 60(b) issues: (1) is a Rule 41(a) dismissal without prejudice a final judgment that qualifies for Rule 60(b) relief? If yes, as held by the Supreme Court in this instance; (2) did the district court err in reopening the case under Rule 60(b)? If no; (3) did the district court have jurisdiction to vacate the arbitration award? If yes; (4) did the district err in vacating the arbitration award?

Here, the Tenth Circuit answered “no” to whether Rule 60(b) relief was proper, stopped there, and reversed the decision of the district court on that ground alone.

Timeliness. On remand, Halliburton argued that the district court erroneously reopened the case because the motion was untimely under Rule 60(b)(1). The employee had filed his notice of dismissal on April 13, 2020, and his motion to reopen the case on September 13, 2021—seventeen months later. The employee conceded that his motion was untimely because it was outside of the one-year statute of limitations period. Accordingly, the court found that his inadvertent mistake of voluntarily dismissing his case did not support reopening under Rule 60(b)(1).

Extraordinary circumstances. As to whether Rule 60(b)(6) could be triggered, the court explained that in order to obtain relief under the Rule a movant must show “extraordinary circumstances.”

Initially, the district court found that the employee deserved relief primarily because an intervening change in the law—Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022)—doomed any refiling of the case due to dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or barred by the statute of limitations. As such, the employee concluded that any new lawsuit he filed to challenge the arbitral award would lack a jurisdictional hook under Badgerow.

“But a change in law alone is not an extraordinary circumstance,” said the court, noting that it has held since 1958 that a change in case law does not justify vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6). A strong interest in finality, continued the court, has led to a widespread consensus supporting such a conclusion.

Further, although the district court and the employee referred to Badgerow as changing the law, “it really didn’t,” said the appellate court. Badgerow resolved a circuit split on an issue that the Tenth Circuit had never taken a position. Thus, no binding Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court law was at issue at all.

Ultimately, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in basing its ruling on the erroneous view that Rule 60(b)(1) was not time-barred, and that Rule 60(b)(6) could be satisfied by an intervening change in the law.

The case is No. 22-1252.

Judge: Per curiam.

Attorneys: Kevin D. Benish (Holwell Shuster & Goldberg) for Gary Waetzig. Jonathan C. Bond (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher) for Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

Companies: Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

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