IP Law Daily, PATENT—Fed. Cir.: Jury’s verdict of nonobviousness as to a portable setting apparatus reversed on appeal, (Jan 26, 2026)

By Carolin Dennis, B.Sc., LL.B., LL.M.

Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s conclusions on obviousness regarding a patent for a portable setting apparatus used in tire pressure monitoring systems.

In a non-precedential disposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) as to obviousness and ruled that a patent covering tire pressure monitoring was invalid for obviousness. The Federal Circuit did not reach either the issue of patent ineligible subject matter under section 101 or the issue of infringement (Orange Electronic Co. Ltd. v. Autel Intelligent Technology Corp., Ltd., No. 24-1876 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 23, 2026)).

Background. The appellant Orange Electronic Co. Ltd. (Orange) owned U.S. Patent No. 8,031,064 (’064 patent) directed to “an identification re-writable tire pressure detecting apparatus.” Autel Intelligent Technology Corp., Ltd. (Autel) manufactures tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) setting mechanisms. Orange sued Autel in the Eastern District of Texas alleging infringement of claims 26 and 27 of the ’064 patent. Autel brought a counter-claim of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. The jury found that Autel infringed the asserted claims (claims 26 and 27) and that neither of those claims was invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 or 103. The jury awarded Orange $6,616,397 in damages.

In a post-trial JMOL motion, Autel argued that JMOL must be granted because claims 26 and 27 are invalid as obvious under section 103 based on the combination of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2007/0055411 (Nihei) in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2006/0208864 (Nantz). It also argued that the JMOL must be granted because the asserted claims are directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court denied Autel’s motion as to obviousness, concluding that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Autel has not shown the asserted claims to be obvious by clear and convincing evidence. The district court concluded that the asserted claims were directed to an abstract idea, but denied JMOL as to section 101. However, the district court granted Autel’s motion for JMOL of noninfringement, finding no evidence of sales, offers for sale, or importation in the United States. Orange appealed the district court’s grant of JMOL of noninfringement, and Autel cross-appealed the district court’s denial of JMOL as to invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 or 103.

Obviousness. The invention of the ’064 patent is “an identification rewritable tire pressure detector” that can replace a broken tire pressure detector. To do this, the claims describe a “portable setting apparatus” that rewrites the old tire pressure detector’s identification onto the new tire pressure detector. Autel argued that the combination of two pieces of prior art, Nihei and Nantz, rendered the asserted claims obvious. However, the district court denied Autel’s motion for JMOL as to obviousness because it found substantial evidence that “Nihei and Nantz fail to teach or suggest the asserted claims’ ‘portable setting apparatus’ limitations” and accordingly did not reach the other obviousness-related issues raised by the parties. On appeal, the parties did not dispute that Autel’s proposed combination meets most of the claim limitations. However, Orange argued that the district court was correct as to the “portable setting apparatus” limitation and that the combination in other respects did not render the claims obvious.

Autel argued that Nihei’s setting device and PC together disclose the claimed “portable setting apparatus.” Orange argued that there is substantial evidence to support a finding that the setting device alone in Nihei is the claimed setting apparatus. However, the only testimony as to what constitutes the setting apparatus came from Autel’s expert, Dr. Souri, who testified that the setting device and PC “form the setting apparatus” because the PC is the brain. The Federal Circuit agreed with Autel that the record can only support the conclusion that the setting apparatus in the Nihei/Nantz combination constituted both the setting device and the PC. Given that the setting device and the PC together form the claimed setting apparatus in the Nihei/Nantz combination, Autel argued that the “portable setting apparatus” limitation is satisfied. Orange’s expert witness, Mr. McAlexander, testified that the setting device in Nihei “is not a portable device” because it is “tethered to a personal computer.” However, the Federal Circuit noted that the claims only require that the setting apparatus be portable “relative to the vehicle,” not that it be handheld. Without contradiction, Dr. Souri testified Nihei’s setting device and PC are “portable to the vehicle so that you’re able to move around and program the sensors in the wheels.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit did not find substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict of nonobviousness as to a portable setting apparatus.

Further, the Federal Circuit found that given that the only configuration of the setting apparatus supported by substantial evidence included the PC, no reasonable jury could conclude that the prior art did not disclose the manual input limitation.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Orange’s argument that the Nihei/Nantz combination does not teach a tire pressure detection sensor that transmits RF signals to the setting apparatus as required by the claims, because this is exactly what Nihei teaches. As Dr. Souri explained, “Nihei discloses the setting device that can receive the RF signal,” which means the tire pressure detection sensor transmits an RF signal to the setting apparatus. Orange’s theory appeared to be that Nantz teaches away from a sensor that transmits RF signals because it discloses a sensor with a two-way LF channel. But teaching an LF embodiment does not suggest that an RF embodiment is not desirable.

Lastly, Orange argued that Nantz teaches storing “a bank of TPM sensor IDs,” which are used to assign a new ID to the replacement tire pressure detection sensor, and the asserted claims require using the old identification. However, the undisputed evidence showed that the Nihei/Nantz combination discloses using the old sensor ID.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that no reasonable jury could have found the claims nonobvious in view of Nihei and Nantz and that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of nonobviousness.

The Case is No. 24-1876.

Judge: Dyk, T.

Attorneys: John F. Rabena (Sughrue Mion, PLLC) for Orange Electronic Co Ltd. Nicole A. Saharsky (Mayer Brown, LLP) for Autel Intelligent Technology Corp., Ltd.

Companies: Orange Electronic Co Ltd.; Autel Intelligent Technology Corp., Ltd.

Cases: Patent FedCirNews