IP Law Daily, PATENT—Fed. Cir.: Dismissal of patent on methods for treating patients using remote devices on patent ineligibility grounds affirmed, (Oct 20, 2026)

By Carolin Dennis, B.Sc., LL.B., LL.M.

The district court did not err in finding the asserted claims of a patent on methods for treating patients using remote devices ineligible for patent protection.

In a non-precedential disposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting the motion to dismiss the patent owner’s complaint for failure to state a claim based on patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit determined that the asserted claims of the patent were directed to an abstract idea and lacked an inventive concept (Linden v. Resmed, Inc., No. 26-1517 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 2026)).

Background. Craig L. Linden (Linden) is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 9,639,150 (the ’150 patent) titled “Powered Physical Displays on Mobile Devices” which broadly discloses “various forms and applications of interactive powered display apparatuses and methods for direct and indirect interaction with living beings.” According to the specification, interactive physical displays may facilitate a doctor testing the vital signs, strength and/or muscle/nerve reactions of a remote patient while preferably video conferencing with a helper or the patient. Alternatively, home-based patients may be provided with remotely released medicine vaults under the control and supervision of a qualified remotely located person.

In 2024, Mr. Linden sued ResMed, Inc., ResMed Corp., and ResMed Holdings Pty Ltd. (ResMed) in the district court alleging that ResMed infringed certain claims of the ’150 patent. ResMed moved to dismiss Linden’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the asserted claims are patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion, but gave Linden leave to amend (First Order). Linden then filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), the operative complaint in the underlying proceeding, adding allegations that certain features of the claimed invention were not well known or routine. ResMed moved to dismiss the FAC on the same grounds. The district court granted ResMed’s motion to dismiss with prejudice (Second Order). The district court also found that the “physical display output” of Claim 1, which Linden argued is a specific non-generic technological component, is insufficient to render the claim non-abstract. Linden timely appealed the district court’s grant of ResMed’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. Linden argued that the district court erred by determining that the asserted claims of the ’150 patent are directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and by dismissing his FAC on that basis. He also contended that the district court erred both in its identification of a representative claim and at each step of the § 101 analysis.

Representative claim. Linden argued that the district court committed prejudicial error by treating Claim 1 of the ’150 patent as representative of the asserted claims. However, the Federal Circuit noted that Linden did not raise this issue in the proceedings before the district court. To the contrary, his counsel unequivocally represented to the district court that Claim 1 is representative. Further, as the district court discussed, the parties’ briefing on ResMed’s motions to dismiss focused exclusively on Claim 1, and Linden’s original complaint and FAC referred to Claim 1 as “exemplary.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the representative claim argument was waived and treated Claim 1 as representative.

Patent eligibility. The Federal Circuit used the two-step inquiry under Alice to determine whether the patent claim is an abstract idea.

Alicestep one. Linden argued that the asserted claims are non-abstract because they are directed to a “specific technological system” that requires a “concrete technological architecture.” The Federal Circuit noted that Claim 1 recites only that the first “electronic device” must be “internet and networking capable” and must include at least one “physical output display” and “input transducer.” Further, the claim does not address the structure of the second “electronic device” at all. In addition, the specification discloses that the claimed invention adds “communications or remote control capabilities to known devices” like “medical devices, therapy devices, rehabilitation devices,” etc. Citing, Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) the Federal Circuit explained that using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology. Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that Claim 1 recites generic hardware that does not render the claim non-abstract.

Linden also asserted that the claimed method “improves the technological operation of network-connected medical devices by enabling real-time, bidirectional control and execution of patient-specific therapy.” However, the Federal Circuit was not persuaded that Claim 1 constituted an improvement to computer technology because Linden did not describe what, if any, advancements to computing devices are encompassed by Claim 1. Thus, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Claim 1 simply describes “a remote version” of an in-person doctor visit, a type of conventional organized human activity. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims of the ’150 patent were directed to an abstract idea ineligible for patenting.

Alice step two.Alice step two asks whether the claims, despite being directed to an abstract idea, nonetheless contain an inventive concept that transforms the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea.

The Federal Circuit noted that Claim 1 recites only generic hardware components used to facilitate a remote doctor visit. Neither the claims nor the specification provides any specific implementation details as to how these components supply treatment. Further, the Federal Circuit found that Linden’s allegations in Paragraphs 29–38 of his FAC directed to the inventiveness of the ordered combination do not raise a material factual issue. Paragraphs 29, 32, and 35–37 alleged that the ordered combination is not conventional or routine. The remaining paragraphs alleged an advance of the ordered combination over the prior art that is insufficient to transform the claims into a patent eligible idea. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that these paragraphs lacked technical details on how to achieve the alleged improvements, which was wholly consistent with the lack of technical details provided in the ’150 patent itself.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Linden argument that “this is not a case where claims merely recite generic components performing their ordinary functions,” but instead, “the claimed elements are arranged in a specific configuration that enables device level control and therapeutic execution.” Linden provided no citations to his FAC or to the ’150 patent supporting this argument, and neither “device-level control” nor “therapeutic execution” are recited in the claims or discussed in the specification. Therefore, the asserted claims lacked an inventive concept.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment to dismiss was affirmed.

The Case is No. 26-1517.

Judge: Per Curiam.

Attorneys: Craig Leigh Linden, pro se. Lisa K. Nguyen (Paul Hastings LLP) for ResMed, Inc.

Companies: ResMed, Inc.

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