Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, LITIGATION NEWS, TRENDS—Supervisor sanctioned for falsely claiming employee’s Kirk-related post resulted in disruptions, ‘hundreds’ of complaints, (May 21, 2026)

By Brandi O. Brown, J.D.

“There is a label for what [the supervisor] did—making false statements. And there is a label for what defense counsel has done—vexatious litigation.”

Recently, a federal district court in Florida came down hard on a Florida wildlife official and her counsel for falsely claiming that a former employee’s social media post about Charlie Kirk had significantly disrupted agency operations, resulted in “hundreds” of complaints, and required urgent action, i.e., her termination. Discovery revealed those claims were false and that the employer knew it. Nevertheless, the affiant and defense counsel continued to defend it, leading the court to conclude that both the affiant and defense counsel should be responsible in equal parts for the biologist’s fees for pursuing the sanctions.

A biologist who worked for the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) for more than seven years sued the agency in September 2025 for unfairly firing her for posting a meme on her private Instagram story following the death of Charlie Kirk.

Whale of a tale. Specifically, while she was on vacation and out of state, she reposted on her private Instagram account, wherein she did not identify herself as an employee of the FWC, a post made by a parody/satirical social media account, in which the account holder posts memes and statements purporting to speak on behalf of a whale. After news of Charlie Kirk’s death, that account had posted this statement on Instagram: “the whales are deeply saddened to learn of the shooting of charlie kirk, haha just kidding, they care exactly as much as charlie kirk cared about children being shot in their classrooms, which is to say, not at all.” That was the post shared by the biologist and it was intended by her, she alleged, “to convey a particularized political message which is apparent from the text itself.”

“Libs of TikTok.” Her post was shared a few days later by a group or individual known as “Libs of TikTok” with identifying information found elsewhere online and the suggestion that she should be fired. That group, the biologist alleged, is closely followed by senior officials in the DeSantis administration and in the state legislature and the same day, an official with the FWC posted on X a statement about it.

Law enforcement and regional director hand-deliver termination. Less than 24 hours after the “Libs of TikTok” post, she was told by her employer to choose between resignation and termination. She alleges that, approximately 40 minutes later, after she responded that she wished to consult with an attorney, the Regional Director of the FWC came onto her property, accompanied by law enforcement, and delivered her a termination letter. That letter was executed by the supervisor who is the subject of the court’s sanctions.

Anti-libs group announced it first. Ten minutes after the letter was delivered, the “Libs of TikTok” posted a statement on X confirming that the FWC had fired the biologist and just over an hour after that, the FWC issued a press release announcing her termination. That press release, also released on X, indicated that FWC terminated the biologist because her commentary “made light of the assassination of Charlie Kirk” which was “not in line with the FWC[’s] values.” The FWC post confirmed that this official agency action was taken by “FWC leadership.”

Represented by the ACLU of Florida and the law firm of Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, she filed suit, arguing that her termination was punishment for expressing a political view disfavored by certain state officials and violated her First Amendment right to free speech.

Preliminary injunction denied. She moved for a preliminary injunction in October 2025, asking the court to reinstate her employment and restore her to her associated position and responsibilities and that the court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction forever enjoining the defendant and the various agents and employees of FWC from disciplining her in the future for posting the specific political statement at the center of the lawsuit in the exercise of her First Amendment rights.

The employer filed a response and attached a single declaration from a supervisor, which was signed under the penalty of perjury. Relying on that declaration, the judge denied the employee’s motion for a preliminary injunction, relying largely on the “unrebutted” affidavit by the supervisor.

Magistrate hears sanctions motion. Subsequently, the biologist moved for sanctions, asserting that the supervisor’s affidavit contained false statements, was submitted and relied upon by the defendants in bad faith, and resulted in the wrongful denial of her motion for a preliminary injunction.

A U.S. Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing and issued a rather scathing report and recommendation. In it, the judge noted that the defendants did not argue that the affidavit was 100 percent accurate, admitting that the supervisor’s use of “personal knowledge” and “hundreds of contacts” had been shown to be “imprecise,” although they argued that “[i]mprecision is not fraud.” They also acknowledged that the information suffered from “evidentiary” and “foundation” issues.

No question about it. “While they may not go as far as to say it explicitly,” the magistrate judge wrote, “there is no question that the information provided to Judge Walker was not verifiably true at the time it was submitted.”

“When a witness testifies, whether by declaration, affidavit, or live in front of the Court from the witness stand, they are required to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

Here, the magistrate noted, the supervisor’s affidavit “does not live up to that standard. And the words she used in her affidavit are important.”

The affiant’s statements. The supervisor stated in her affidavit that her representations were “based on [her] personal knowledge and review of official Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) records” and that she had “personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the termination of [Plaintiff’s] employment and of the events leading up to and following that decision” and that her statements “are based on firsthand involvement, direct observation, and contemporaneous agency records maintained in the ordinary course of business.”

She asserted that “within hours” of FWC becoming aware of the biologist’s post, “the agency’s communications office began receiving a large volume of calls, emails, and online messages from citizens, volunteers, and partner organizations” and that “[m]any expressed concern or outrage, questioning whether the post reflected FWC’s values or political neutrality.” She also stated that “[o]ver the next two days, hundreds of citizen contacts, and multiple media inquiries were received across FWC’s public channels” and that “[t]he volume and tone of these communications disrupted agency operations, required diversion of staff resources to manage responses, and raised legitimate concerns about the agency’s credibility and public trust.”

Source issues. The magistrate judge found that two issues were at play—the purported versus actual source of the affiant’s knowledge and the actual accuracy of those statements, regardless of their source. “In reality,” the magistrate judge explained, and as admitted by the affiant during the hearing, the affidavit statements at issue “were not based on her ‘personal’ knowledge, ‘firsthand involvement,’ or ‘direct observation,’ but were based on conversations she had with two other FWC employees,” and possibly a conversation with the FWC director sometime after the termination.

Also, the only records she reviewed prior to the biologist’s termination was FWC policy relating to OPS employment, confirming that the biologist was subject to termination without any sort of pre-termination hearing process. While the affiant claimed that she had a different understanding of what is “personal knowledge,” “firsthand involvement,” and “direct observation,” the magistrate judge explained: “secondhand information is not firsthand involvement” but rather it is hearsay. In this regard, the magistrate judge explained, ignorance of the law is no excuse, particularly where she was represented by counsel.

She could have made an accurate statement about her knowledge, the magistrate noted. Proper characterization would have impacted the weight to be assigned to the affidavit and the statements within. Instead, she “explicitly paints the facts from personal knowledge, not hearsay” while truthfully, “most of her affidavit was based on information and belief.”

Accuracy issues. Beyond the questions regarding the source of the supervisor’s information, the magistrate explained, “a more troubling question is whether several of the statements in the affidavit are true and accurate.” This concern was focused on two particular paragraphs (paras. 4 and 5) in the affidavit. In one, the supervisor claimed that “within hours” of the biologist’s social media post, “the agency’s communications office began receiving a large volume of calls, emails and online messages from citizens, volunteers, and partner organizations.”

However, the affiant, as demonstrated by her response to questions posed during the hearing, “had no knowledge to support most of this statement.” She also admitted in deposition that it was not the “agency’s communications office” receiving those contacts, but members of the executive team. There was also no evidence to support that the affiant knew who was making the calls or messages.

In a following paragraph, she states that “over the next two days, hundreds of citizen contacts, and multiple media inquiries were received across FWC’s public channels.” However, the magistrate notes, she “had no basis for this assertion. Even at a hearsay level, no one told her hundreds of contacts were coming in.” She also admitted that prior to the biologist’s firing, she made no effort to quantify the number of calls or contacts to FWC regarding the biologist’s post, the magistrate noted.

Motivated not to give true information. The “troubling fact” for the magistrate judge was that the affiant had access to specific information about numbers of complaints, but “chose not to review it.”

Ultimately, the magistrate judge concluded that the affiant supervisor’s “knowing and material omissions, mischaracterizations, embellishments, falsehoods, and willful refusal to read the OIG report all lead to one conclusion: the motivation behind her affidavit was not to provide true information to the Court, but to blindly support the agency’s legal theory with enough testimonial evidence to defeat a preliminary injunction.”

Recommendation. “The narrowest sanction this Court can discern which will punish Defendants’ bad behavior, discourage such behavior in the future, and remedy the harm to Plaintiff without rewarding her for her own lack of diligence in challenging the affidavit during the injunction stage, would be to strike the offending paragraphs and language from [the supervisor’s] affidavit and allow the district court to proceed with whatever course it chooses with respect to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.”

Court’s decision. While the court accepted the recommended findings of fact offered by the magistrate judge, noting that “[i]f anything,” the magistrate judge was “generous” in evaluating the matter, it explained that the problem for it centered heavily on the fact that the supervisor and defense counsel continued to defend “her false statements once the absence of personal knowledge as a basis for certain assertions and the falsity of paragraphs 4 and 5 in her declaration became clear through discovery.” The supervisor’s “continued quibbling with the content of her affidavit and what constituted personal knowledge when she made the sworn statements within that affidavit undermines the system of justice,” the court explained, and her defense counsel’s continued defense of her false statements “flouts the responsibilities that counsel must abide by.”

Though it was a close call, the court concluded that had paragraphs 4 and 5 been omitted, it would not have changed the outcome of the preliminary injunction hearing. The court also did not find that defense counsel knowingly submitted a false declaration.

Continued defense was the problem. “However, all counsel has an affirmative obligation to ensure that they are not submitting false evidence and if they later learn of the falsity of material evidence, they must take reasonable remedial measures to correct the error.” The problem here is that defense counsel, rather than admit that the declaration was poorly drafted and included false statements and then correct the record, continued to defend it and to “play with language” to defend it.

“There is a label for what [the affiant] did—making false statements. And there is a label for what defense counsel has done—vexatious litigation.”

Supervisor to pay half. The court explained that it would have “readily shown grace” had they done the reasonable and professionally required thing and corrected the false statements. Instead, both the affiant and defense counsel “doggedly defended the indefensible” and as a result, the court decided to award fees for the time spent litigating the sanctions motion. Responsibility for those fees is to be split between the affiant supervisor and defense counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel responds. “We are appreciative of the court’s order and the important message it sends: no one is above the law,” said Carrie McNamara, staff attorney of the ACLU of Florida. “This ruling is a timely and significant rebuke of a troubling trend that has become emblematic of Florida governance. It marks the second time in less than a year that a court has had to sanction a state official for conduct that undermined the integrity of judicial proceedings or disregarded court orders.”

“Sanctions in federal cases are rare because the rules are clear, and parties and their attorneys are expected to follow them,” said Gary S. Edinger of Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A., co-counsel for the biologist. “When those rules are violated, there are real consequences. That is exactly what happened here. The defendants submitted a false affidavit, and the court saw through it.”

The case is No. 4:25-cv-00419-MW-MJF.

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