Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—PREGNANCY—M.D. Tenn.: Pregnant worker fired after unpaid leave can proceed on PWFA, Title VII claims, (May 21, 2026)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

Although the employee was willing to sit down when she could, the HR team members told her that they needed an accommodation that “fits,” not just one that “fits sometimes.”

A pregnant third-shift utility operator for a personal care products manufacturer, who was placed on unpaid leave and then fired after the company determined it could not accommodate her need for “frequent” breaks on the conveyor line, can proceed to trial on her PWFA, Title VII, and state-law pregnancy discrimination claims, a federal court in Tennessee ruled. Fact issues as to whether the company could have accommodated her break and lifting/pushing restrictions, whether she would have been willing to transfer to another shift, and whether she could have been offered a housekeeping position that became available while she was on leave were sufficient to preclude summary judgment (Neal v. Vi-Jon LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00027 (M.D. Tenn. May 19, 2026)).

At the time she was hired as a full-time third shift utility operator, the employee did not disclose that she was two months pregnant. According to the employee, the most physically demanding part of her job was putting three eight-pound bags of salt into boxes and then sliding the boxes down a motorized conveyer to the next person on the line.

Doctor’s note. When her team lead saw the employee sitting down during a period when her line was slow, and overheard her telling a coworker she was pregnant, she instructed the employee to get a doctor’s note so the team lead could accommodate her and not write her up. In response, the employee provided her team lead with a letter from her doctor requesting accommodations for her pregnancy, including “[n]o lifting, pushing or pulling anything that is 20lbs or heavier.... Please allow for frequent seated breaks through each shift.”

Before taking the letter to HR, the team lead told the manufacturing manager about it. That same day, the employee met with two HR team members who expressed concern about her need for “multiple breaks” because the third shift ran on a skeleton crew. Although the employee explained that there were plenty of times that there was “nothing coming down the line” and she could take those opportunities to sit down as long as she was “not written up,” the HR members replied that these instances were not predictable and were not something they could “accommodate... on a regular basis.”

They then told the employee she was eligible for 90 days of unpaid leave. The employee again stressed that she would be fine with taking breaks only when production was slow but when she revealed that her pregnancy was high-risk, the HR members responded that they did not “want to take any chance of violating [her] restrictions.” When the employee stressed that she was comfortable with third-shift, which was perfect for her child-care schedule, she was told to come back on Monday.

Unpaid leave. When she returned the following Monday, she was told a weekend cleaning crew position might become available but at that point, they were putting her on unpaid leave. Although the position did become available while she was on leave, she was never notified and was instead terminated after the expiration of her leave.

PWFA and state-law claims. The employee subsequently sued under both the federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and the Tennessee Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (TPWPA), which, observed the court, expressly require accommodations for “known limitations for medical needs” relating to an employee’s pregnancy. While providing unpaid leave, said the court, may be a reasonable accommodation, under both laws, it is unlawful to require an employee to take leave under a law or employer policy if another reasonable accommodation can be provided.

In support of its motion for summary judgment on the employee’s failure-to-accommodate claims, the company argued that it offered unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation and then fired her after the leave expired, when she was unable to return to work due to her restrictions. According to the company, it engaged in the interactive process when the HR members met with the employee to discuss possible ways to accommodate her restrictions, including suggesting other roles and/or shifts because third shift, which ran on a skeleton crew, would not work with her restrictions. It was the employee, the company insisted, that requested unpaid leave and when it expired, she refused to consider any other shift.

Sabotaged? In stark contrast, however, the employee argued that the interactive process was “sabotaged” after one of the HR members told the production manager that she needed four breaks per hour. Based on that, she contended, before she even met with the HR members, the manager concluded that the company could not accommodate her need for “frequent” breaks. In other words, said the court, the manager communicated to the HR members before the meeting that the company could not accommodate the employee’s need for “frequent” breaks and his decision was based on the HR member telling him that she would need up to four breaks per hour.

But there was nothing in the record, said the court, suggesting the employee needed four breaks per hour. To the court, it also seemed clear that by the time the HR members met with the employee, they had already decided the company could not accommodate the requested restrictions in a way that would allow her to continue in her third-shift position.

Frequent. In addition, the court observed, the HR members seemed to agree that “frequent” breaks meant between three and five breaks per shift, or one-to-three breaks beyond the two already provided by the company. The employee, however, presented evidence that the lines frequently stopped for at least several minutes one-to-three times during every shift, which provided built-in opportunities for breaks. Nor did it appear that the HR members discussed with the manager or the employee’s shift supervisor whether it would be unduly burdensome for the employee to take an extra one-to-three breaks per shift or whether it was reasonable to allow her to sit down near the line rather than going to the break room as the manager assumed was necessary.

Based on this, the court found a fact issue as to whether the company engaged in good faith in the interactive process and whether it could have accommodated the employee’s “frequent breaks” restriction. At a minimum, said the court, “if there was some ambiguity as to what ‘frequent’ meant, [the company] should have requested clarification from the plaintiff’s provider.”

Lifting restrictions. As to the employee’s lifting restrictions, while she was never required to lift more than eight pounds, the manager claimed that pushing the box down the motorized conveyor involved pushing up to 24 pounds. There was no record evidence, however, showing how often an employee might have to push a box that stopped during the process or how much force was required when it did. Moreover, the employee claimed the manager told her that he “saw no reason” why the lifting restriction would be a problem. Accordingly, the court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the company could have accommodated her lifting/pushing restriction and in a way that would have permitted her to continue working her third-shift job.

Transfer. The court also found disputed facts regarding whether the employee would have been willing to transfer, at least temporarily, to first shift and whether she could have been offered the housekeeping job that came open six weeks after she was placed on leave. Although the company urged the court to disregard her declaration testimony that she was “certain” no one offered her a position on a different shift and that she would have accepted a first-shift position if one had been offered because she made it clear in the meeting that she would only accept a third-shift position, the court noted that her meeting with the HR members was videorecorded.

Having reviewed the recording and transcript, the court noted that while the employee confirmed that the third-shift was perfect for her, there was no indication they ever discussed whether she might be willing to transfer to a different shift. Thus, said the court, not only did her declaration testimony not contradict her earlier sworn testimony, but also it established a fact dispute as to whether she was ever offered a position on a different shift and whether she would have accepted one if it had been offered.

Housekeeping position. In addition, the court found a fact dispute as to whether the employee could have been offered the housekeeping position that came open after she was placed on leave. While the company again argued that it would not have worked because it was not a third-shift position, the employee testified that it would have been “perfect” for her childcare schedule and when she went on leave, she believed the company was going to call her if a weekend cleaning crew position became available.

Finally, the court observed, the employee testified that she did not request to go on leave and certainly did not request leave of only 90 days. Rather, she claimed she took leave because it was better than being fired. For its part, the company did not adequately address why allowing her to stay on unpaid leave through the end of her pregnancy, instead of terminating her after 90 days, would not have been a reasonable accommodation, particularly given that, as one of the HR members testified, the third shift was chronically short-staffed. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment against these claims.

Title VII claims. Turning to the employee’s Title VII claim, the court noted that while the standards that apply to those discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims differ somewhat from the standards that apply to her PWFA and TPWFA claims, the legal claims and the facts supporting them “overlap sufficiently that it would be a waste of judicial time and resources for the court to address them separately.” Thus, it denied summary judgment on these claims as well.

The case is No. 3:25-cv-00027.

Judge: Trauger, A.

Attorneys: Jon C. Goldfarb (Wiggins, Childs, Pantazis, Fisher & Goldfarb) for Kelse Neal. Darius Walker, Jr. (Ogletree Deakins) for Vi-Jon LLC.

Companies: Vi-Jon LLC

Cases: PregnancyDiscrimination Discrimination Discharge StateLawClaims TennesseeNews