Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, JURISDICTION—MEDICAL DEVICES—W.D. Pa.: CPAP manufacturers can’t sever patient’s claims against physician, (Jan 5, 2026)

By Susan L. Smith, JD, MA

There will be common questions of fact and law about the damages caused by an alleged failure to warn by the doctor and by the manufacturers, and if forced to litigate in separate forums, the woman could face “empty chair” defenses by both the physician and the companies.

A federal district court in Pennsylvania remanded a woman’s case against a physician and the manufacturers of recalled CPAP equipment after denying the manufacturers’ request to sever the woman’s claims against the nondiverse doctor. The woman brought her complaint in state court alleging that she suffered harm due to (1) the doctor’s failure to warn her of potential dangers of using a Philips DreamStation CPAP device despite the manufacturers’ recall notice, and (2) the manufacturers’ failure to warn her about the dangers associated with the use of the device. The manufacturers, Philips RS North America LLC and Philips North America, LLC (collectively, Philips), subsequently removed the complaint to federal district court. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the district court for pretrial proceedings as part of the Philips Multidistrict Litigation (MDL). The court found that the physician was not fraudulently misjoined and that severance was not warranted. The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and granted the woman’s motion to remand the case to the state court. In addition, the court concluded that Philips did not meet its burden to show that severance at this time was appropriate; therefore, the court declined to sever the claims against the doctor from the claims against Philips (Ruiz v. Philips, No. 25-314 (Dec. 18, 2025)).

Fraudulent misjoinder. Philips invoked the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine and contended that the doctor’s citizenship could be ignored because he was improperly joined as a defendant in the same case as Philips to defeat removal. Philips further argued that the doctor was fraudulently misjoined because the medical negligence claims against the doctor did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the product liability claims against Philips or present common questions of law or fact. The court noted that it was Philips’ burden to show: (1) the nondiverse defendant had no real connection to the action against the diverse defendants; and (2) the violation was so egregious as to constitute fraudulent misjoinder.

The court stated that the question was whether permissive joinder of the claims against the doctor and Philips in a single action in state court was wholly frivolous. The court determined that fraudulent misjoinder could not be found in this case. In the state court complaint, the woman alleged that she was prescribed the CPAP device before the recall; that Philips and the doctor both failed to properly warn her about the alleged defects in the Philips CPAP device; and that her injuries arose, in part, due to those failures to warn. In addition, both the negligent failure to warn and products liability claims required proof that the DreamStation device was defective and caused injury. The court found that the decision to pursue the claims against the doctor and Philips in a single action appeared to be well within the California and federal permissive joinder rules. Further, no basis was presented that would support a finding that the joinder was fraudulently made to avoid removal jurisdiction.

The court determined that it would likely be more efficient and tactically favorable to the woman to pursue those claims in the same case. If the claims were severed and proceeded in separate forums and the woman prevailed in one suit and established that the Philips device was defective, she would likely have to relitigate that issue in a separate lawsuit against the doctor, which would create additional costs and the potential of inconsistent pretrial rulings and outcomes for the woman. Further, if separate lawsuits were required, the woman could face empty chair defenses by both the doctor and Philips. The court determined that the woman’s negligent failure to warn claim against the doctor shared a real connection and common questions of fact and law with the failure to warn claim against the manufacturers. Thus, the court concluded that Philips failed to meet its heavy burden to demonstrate that the doctor was fraudulently misjoined.

Severance. Alternatively, Philips asked the court to sever and retain the woman’s claims against Philips as part of the Philips MDL. The case involved removal jurisdiction of a case originally filed in state court, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 is routinely employed in cases that began in federal court. The analysis for severing a party pursuant to Rule 21 to preserve diversity jurisdiction provides that: (1) the party to be severed must be dispensable, and if so, (2) the court must assess whether severing would prejudice any of the parties in the litigation. The court assumed for purposes of the analysis that the doctor was a dispensable party. In terms of prejudice, the court considered the tactical advantages of severance. The court noted that there will be common questions of fact and law about the damages caused by the alleged failure to warn by the doctor and by Philips, and, if forced to litigate in separate forums, the woman could likely face “empty chair” defenses by both the doctor and Philips.

MDL. The court noted that the current status of the MDL weighed in favor of remand. The court stated that keeping the MDL-related aspect of the case could minimize duplicative discovery and the potential for inconsistent pre-trial rulings. Further, the MDL was now largely resolved. The court approved class action settlements of the Economic Loss and Medical Monitoring claims and Philips offered private settlements to plaintiffs who had certain qualifying injuries, as defined in the settlement. On March 14, 2025, Philips placed $1.05 billion in a fund to settle those kinds of personal injury claims. The record did not reflect that the woman participated in a private settlement in the Philips MDL; thus, she would be deemed a litigating plaintiff and, unless the case was remanded, would have to comply with the requirements of the Docket Management Order.

Remand. The court stated that remand at this time did not foreclose Philips’ ability to access a federal forum because Philips may seek severance after the case is remanded to state court, or the doctor may successfully challenge the claims against him. In terms of the MDL at this stage, the court concluded that considerations of efficiency, fairness, and judicial economy weighed in favor of remand. The court stated that the woman chose to file her case in state court, timely opposed removal, and sought remand. Although she did not participate in extensive proceedings in the MDL in this court, she may have the benefits of the extensive discovery already conducted in this MDL. If severance were granted, she would be forced to litigate the claims against the doctor and Philips in separate forums. Further, there could be empty chair defenses in each forum, with the doctor and Philips blaming each other for failure to warn the woman and the resulting injuries.

The case is No. 25-314.

Judge: Flowers, J.

Attorneys: Brian J. Kim (SHK Law Corp.) for Adriana Ruiz. Jordan Lambert Gary (Sullivan and Cromwell LLP) for Philips North America LLC. John P. Lavelle, Jr. (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP) for Philips RS North America LLC

Companies: Philips North America LLC; Philips RS North America LLC

Cases: CourtDecisions JurisdictionNews MedicalDevicesNews WarningsNews PennsylvaniaNews