Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, JURISDICTION—AIRCRAFT AND WATERCRAFT—E.D. Ky.: Medic’s widow denied relief from final dismissal of pilot’s estate in helicopter crash case, (Jun 16, 2026)

By Pankhuri Bhatnagar, B.A. LL.B.

The widow failed to identify extraordinary circumstances justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief and could not use the rule as a substitute for an untimely Rule 59(e) motion.

In an action brought against several helicopter part suppliers and a pilot’s estate by the widow of a flight medic who died in a crash, a federal district court in Kentucky denied the widow’s motion to amend a prior order dismissing claims against the estate with prejudice. The court observed that the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (KWCA) barred any viable claims against the estate since the decedents were co-employees, that the dismissal was not based on a jurisdictional defect, that the estate’s dismissal did not constitute a determination regarding the pilot’s estate, and that the suppliers could seek fault apportionment against it at trial (Welsh v. Bell Textron, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00064 (E.D. Ky. June 11, 2026)).

Background. In October 2024, a flight nurse, flight medic, and pilot were in a Bell 206L-3 helicopter as part of an Air Evac Lifeteam medical team. The helicopter crashed in Kentucky and erupted in flames, causing the death of all onboard personnel. The medic’s widow (claimant) brought suit against the pilot’s estate and multiple corporate entities (suppliers) involved in the design, manufacture, and supply of helicopter components, including Bell Textron, Inc. The claims against the estate were for pilot error, wrongful death, loss of consortium, and loss of parental consortium, while those against the companies pertained to negligence and product liability. The suppliers removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds without obtaining consent from the estate, asserting that the latter was fraudulently joined. The court agreed and denied the widow’s motion to remand, finding that the KWCA, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.690(1), barred recovery because the decedents were co-employees acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the crash. The widow moved to modify the dismissal from one with prejudice to one without prejudice. Bell Textron requested clarification that the estate’s dismissal did not resolve questions of fault and would not prevent apportionment against the estate at trial.

Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The rule permits relief from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but applies only in extraordinary circumstances not covered by Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989). The claimant argued that the dismissal should have been entered without prejudice because the court lacked jurisdiction over the estate after finding fraudulent joinder. The court disagreed, explaining that the dismissal was not based solely on a jurisdictional defect but on the substantive conclusion that the KWCA's exclusive-remedy provision barred any viable claim against the estate. The court had previously determined, based on the claimant’s own pleadings, that no facts supported an intentional-injury exception and that there was no colorable basis for recovery against the estate even under the highly deferential “glimmer of hope” standard applicable to fraudulent joinder challenges. The dismissal therefore reflected the absence of a viable cause of action rather than the impropriety of the forum. The claimant widow identified no newly discovered evidence, intervening change in law, manifest injustice, or other extraordinary circumstance warranting relief. Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(6) relief was unavailable.

Rule 59(e). The estate rightly pointed out that the widow could have sought the requested modification through a timely Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment within 28 days of judgment, but failed to do so. She allowed that deadline to expire before filing her Rule 60(b)(6) motion for the same relief. Permitting the relief would render the 28-day deadline optional and irrelevant, and a party who possessed an available procedural remedy and chose not to pursue it cannot later obtain equivalent relief through Rule 60(b)(6)'s extraordinary-circumstances gateway. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950). The motion hence failed for this independent reason.

Apportionment. Next, the court explained that its prior ruling addressed only the estate’s immunity from direct tort liability under the KWCA and made no findings regarding negligence, fault, or causation. Under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182 and Kentucky precedent, parties protected by workers’ compensation immunity may still qualify as settling tortfeasors for purposes of fault apportionment. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Ky. 1986). The estate occupied the same position as a settling nonparty because workers’ compensation benefits function as a settlement of tort claims under Kentucky law. Kentucky courts have consistently held that nonparties, dismissed parties, and settling tortfeasors may be subject to fault apportionment even when no direct claim may proceed against them. Beverly v. MEVA Formwork Systems, Inc., No. 3:08-29-DCR, 2010 WL 2305746 (E.D. Ky. June 7, 2010). Accordingly, the remaining parties could seek apportionment of fault against the estate at trial if they establish the statutory prerequisites and present sufficient evidence of fault. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467, 479-81 (Ky. 2001). The court reserved any final ruling on an apportionment instruction until a later stage of the proceedings.

The case is No. 3:25-cv-00064.

Judge: Van Tatenhove, G.

Attorneys: Margo L. Grubbs (Grubbs & Landry, PLLC) for Haley Welsh. Andrew Riley Grant (FBT Gibbons LLP) for Bell Textron, Inc.

Companies: Bell Textron, Inc.

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