Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—N.D. Ill.: Dismissal granted in challenge to Illinois Worker Freedom of Speech Act, (Oct 8, 2025)

By Cathleen Calhoun, J.D.

The Illinois law bars adverse action against employees who decline to participate in employer-sponsored meetings or communications about the employer’s opinion on religious or political matters.

Determining that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, a federal district court in Illinois denied a request for a preliminary injunction and granted a motion to dismiss in a case brought by a nonprofit challenging the Illinois Worker Freedom of Speech Act (Act). The Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) and Technology & Manufacturing Association (TMA) claimed the Act violates their First Amendment rights to free speech and sued the Director of the Illinois Department of Labor (Director), seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the invalidity of the Act. The court found that the Director was not a proper defendant under the Ex parte Young doctrine, since her role was “ministerial or administrative,” and that the Director had sovereign immunity (Illinois Policy Institute and the Technology & Manufacturing Association v. Flanagan, No. 24-cv-06976 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2025)).

Illinois Worker Freedom of Speech Act. The Illinois General Assembly found it to be “in the public policy interests of the State for all working Illinoisans to have protections from mandatory participation in employer-sponsored meetings if the meeting is designed to communicate an employer’s position on religious or political matters.” The Act, effective January 1, 2025, bans any sort of adverse action against employees who “decline[] to attend or participate in an employer-sponsored meeting or decline[] to receive or listen to communications from the employer if the meeting or communication is to communicate the opinion of the employer about religious matters or political matters.” The Act creates two enforcement mechanisms: a private right of action for an “aggrieved employee,” and a provision whereby an “interested party” may bring an alleged violation to the attention of the Director. The complaint focused on the latter mechanism, which authorizes the Department of Labor to “inquire into any alleged violations” that are “brought to its attention by an interested party, to institute the actions for the penalties provided in this Section and to enforce the provisions of this Act.”

Subject matter jurisdiction. The Ex parte Young doctrine allows exceptions to sovereign immunity for state officials if certain conditions are met. The Director argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because: (1) plaintiffs could not establish the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity because they did not sue an “officer[] of the state... who threaten[s] and [is] about to commence proceedings” against them and (2) plaintiffs did not show Article III standing because their injuries depend on the speculative possibility of private suits against them and no relief granted against the Director could prevent such suits.

Authority to enforce. The court began first with an analysis of the Director’s authority to enforce the Act. Regarding language that the Director has the power to “enforce the provisions of the Act,” the court agreed with the Director that such vague language, by itself, did not provide the Director with meaningful enforcement power. The court also found that regardless of any action taken during the 180-day period following service of the notice of complaint to the parties, any interested party had the ability to file a civil lawsuit. In summarizing, the court noted, “all roads lead to the interested party being able to file a lawsuit.” As a result, the court found that the Director was not a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, as her role in the Act was “ministerial or administrative.”

Threatened enforcement. The Director also argued, in the alternative, that even if she had enforcement authority under the Act, she was still protected by sovereign immunity because the plaintiffs have not proven an “ongoing violation of federal law.” The court agreed, finding that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the Act had any impact on their operations. The court noted that "a vague allegation, unsupported by evidence, that plaintiffs worry about the Act chilling their speech, is insufficient to satisfy the second element of Ex Parte Young in the face of a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction." As a result, the court found that the suit was barred against the Director by sovereign immunity.

The case is No. 24-cv-06976.

Judge: Valderrama, F.

Attorneys: Jeffrey M. Schwab (Liberty Justice Center) for Illinois Policy Institute. James Joseph McQuaid (Liberty Justice Center) for Technology & Manufacturing Association. Alex Hemmer, Illinois Attorney General's Office, for Jane R. Flanagan.

Companies: Illinois Policy Institute; Technology & Manufacturing Association

Cases: IndividualRights Procedure StateLawClaims IllinoisNews