Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—8th Cir.: School employees revive First Amendment claims involving district’s mandatory equity training, (Jan 2, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

An en banc court found that potentially adverse consequences, including being removed from the training and not getting paid, gave teachers an objectively reasonable basis for self-censorship.

Reversing a district court’s dismissal of two school employees’ free speech claims for lack of standing, a divided Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that the employees wanted to speak out against the views expressed during an equity training program but had engaged in self-censorship based on the district’s warning that failure to complete the training or to act in a “professional” manner would result in docked pay. Chief Judge Colloton, joined by four others, dissented, arguing that “Public employee training will now be fraught with uncertainty,” and that an employer that trains on any subject from any point of view could now face the threat of litigation (Henderson v. Springfield R-12 School District, No. 23-1374 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025)).

Mandatory training. The equity training giving rise to this lawsuit was offered in-person and online during the Fall of 2020. One of the employees attended the in-person training while the other opted for the online course.

When the training was announced, the district communicated to the employees that they would not receive credit if they failed to attend the training, which they understood to mean that they would not receive their full pay if they did not attend the training. A Power Point slide presented at the training also contained the message of: “Be Professional—Or be Asked to Leave with No Credit.”

Online training modules. An additional component of the training program that was not required of those who attended the program in person consisted of online training modules. Completion of these modules was required to receive credit, and participants could only complete each module by selecting a pre-programmed, “correct” answer.

Opposing viewpoints. During the training, each employee expressed viewpoints that were disfavored by other participants. The employee who attended the online session expressed her view that Kyle Rittenhouse was defending himself against rioters and she believed that he had been hired to protect a business. In response, a trainer told her she was wrong and confused because Rittenhouse “murdered an innocent person” who “was an ally of the Black community.” Subsequently, the employee did not publicly express her disagreement with statements made by the trainers because, she alleged, she knew that the school district did not accept such allegedly alternative viewpoints.

As to the employee who attended the in-person training, she expressed her opinion in a small group setting that the murder of George Floyd was not a commentary on all law enforcement and that, in her view, not all cops were bad. Another individual disagreed and appeared upset by the employee’s comment. During a subsequent exercise, the employee did not express her view that was at odds with the other participant or the school district’s teachings, allegedly out of concern about how her comments would be received by the district.

When the employee eventually decided to voice her views again in response to how the school district was allegedly assigning characteristics based on race, her views were not accepted. She described the next breakout session as “very hostile,” and she allegedly “shut down” out of fear of speaking up because “it became very clear that everyone’s opinion was not welcome.”

Lawsuit. Subsequently, the employees filed this lawsuit asserting free speech claims. The district court concluded that they lacked standing because they had not shown an injury in fact, and it awarded attorney fees to the district. On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but reversed the award of attorney fees. Sitting en banc, the court here considered whether the employees had satisfied the standing requirement.

Chilled speech. In considering whether the employees had suffered an injury, the court noted that it had previously recognized that chilled speech can give rise to a constitutional injury. The record in this case, the en banc court concluded, contained evidence that the employees stopped voicing their opinions and self-censored when it became apparent that their opposing views were considered unacceptable by the school district and were not only being rejected by the trainers but were met with hostility by the trainers, who were employed by the school district.

Further, the en banc court found, the employees self-censored to avoid negative consequences that the district had said it would impose—namely that they would be asked to leave the training and would not receive credit, resulting in docked pay.

“The specific consequences identified by the school district for not agreeing with the school district’s views on being an anti-racist educator caused an objectively reasonable chilling effect on the plaintiffs’ speech,” said the court.

Because there was sufficient evidence in the record demonstrating an objectively reasonable chilling effect on speech that would cause a person to self-censor, and the employees did in fact censor themselves, this was enough to show an injury in fact, explained the court, and the district court had erred when it determined otherwise.

Compelled speech. The employees also alleged injury when they were purportedly deprived of their First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech. The en banc court agreed with the employees, noting that a person in their position had an objective basis to conclude that continued disagreement with the district’s views could lead the district to conclude that they were acting “unprofessionally,” with all of the attendant consequences.

In addition, the employee who participated in the online training proffered additional evidence supporting her compelled speech claim based on the modules she was required to complete. It was undisputed that it was impossible for the employee to complete the module without accepting the district’s point of view, said the court.

Official duties? As an alternate basis for its grant of summary judgment, the district court assumed the employees sufficiently alleged a compelled speech injury and then held that the district may require this speech as part of the employees’ official duties, and thus the employees were not speaking as citizen for First Amendment purposes. The district court did not consider whether there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the speech was pursuant to the employees’ official duties, and the court here remanded that issue for the district court to decide in the first place, finding the grant of summary judgment on this basis to be inappropriate.

Attorney fees. After dismissing the action for lack of standing, the district court found the employees’ claims to be frivolous, ultimately awarding the district more than $310,000 in attorney fees. The court’s decision to hear this matter en banc, the court said, undermined the rationale of the district court, and it reversed and vacated the lower court’s grant of attorney fees.

Dissents. Judge Colloton, joined by Judges Loken, Smith, Shepherd, and Kelly, dissented, arguing that the majority’s theory of chilled speech foundered in part because the record did not support that the school district’s directive to “be professional” ever deterred the employees from speaking. Although they may have been subjectively “chilled” from expressing their viewpoints in further conversations during the session, their decision to self-censor based on the supposed threat of sanctions was not objectively reasonable, and a directive to “be professional” was insufficient to cause a constitutional injury.

“The majority’s conclusion portends a host of litigation over public employee training,” warned the dissent, noting that, “Public employee training will now be fraught with uncertainty.” An employer that trains on any subject from any point of view, while mandating that employees act professionally, is now subject to a federal lawsuit by an employee who disagrees with the training and opts to keep quiet, concluded the dissent.

Writing separately, Judge Shepard, joined by Judges Loken and Kelly, observed that while the district did caution that failure to complete the training would result in the loss of credit, there was no evidence that dissenting views might be punished. Further, if a contentious environment and disagreement with one’s peers is enough to show an injury in fact for standing purposes, then even those attendees who agreed with the training would have standing, as they too were subjected to views by the employees with which they vehemently disagreed. “That the majority’s reasoning permits this anomalous result is further proof that the theory should be rejected.”

The case is No. 23-1374.

Judge: Erickson, R.

Attorneys: Derek H. MacKay (Knight Nicastro MacKay) for Brooke Henderson and Jennifer Lumley. Ransom A. Ellis, III (Ellis & Ellis) for Springfield R-12 School District, Board of Education of the Springfield R-12 School District, Grenita Lathan, Martha Doenning, Yvania Garcia-Pusateri, and Lawrence Anderson.

Companies: Springfield R-12 School District; Board of Education of the Springfield R-12 School District

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