Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—7th Cir.: Town supervisors entitled to qualified immunity against administrator’s First Amendment retaliation claim, (Aug 10, 2026)

By Ronald Miller, J.D.

This case also raised a thorny question of how “partisan” or “political” must the employee’s speech be to trigger the policymaker corollary, which covers an employee fired for his political speech.

A town administrator’s First Amendment retaliation claim alleging that he was fired by a new slate of town supervisors after they took control of the local government failed, ruled the Seventh Circuit. As the town’s highest unelected official, the administrator qualified as a “policymaker” within the ambit of the Elrod—Branti line of political patronage cases, which permit public officials to fire policymaking employees for political reasons without offending the First Amendment. Concluding that a reasonable official, looking at governing precedent, could think firing the administrator in this situation would not offend the Constitution, the appeals court agreed with the district court that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity (March v. Town of Grand Chute, Nos. 25-1755 and 25-1808 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2026)).

Termination. The employee served as the town administrator for the Town of Grand Chute. He was the highest-ranking unelected official in the town. A new faction was elected to the town’s Board of Supervisors. The new faction fired the town administrator. He sued the supervisors who voted in favor of his termination for retaliating against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. In his view, he was fired for participating in a state investigation into corruption allegations against one of the new supervisors. The supervisors insisted they fired the administrator for political disloyalty and poor job performance.

Residency dispute. Controversy arose as soon as the new supervisors took office. The most important feud involved the residency of one of the new supervisors. The lone holdover supervisor became convinced that the supervisor was not living in Grand Chute. He owned a home in the town, but he spent substantial time at his house in another town with his wife.

The holdover supervisor filed a formal complaint about the new supervisor’s standing as a supervisor. This challenge proved unsuccessful. The town clerk ruled the evidence was insufficient to say that the new supervisor did not reside at his Grand Chute home.

Investigation. In September 2021, the holdover supervisor reached out to the district attorney about the new supervisor’s residency. The matter was referred to the Wisconsin Department of Criminal Investigations, which opened an investigation. For six months, the new supervisor was investigated in secret until March 2022, when state authorities executed surprise search warrants at both of the new supervisor’s homes and his business. The new board members spent several weeks trying to figure out what, or who, was motivating the investigation, but received no answers.

Discharge. Nearly two months after the search of the new supervisor’s properties, the supervisors learned that the town administrator had been involved in the investigation. Thereafter, relations between the administrator and the new faction soured. At a town meeting in April 2023, the board of supervisors publicly broached terminating the administrator’s contract. Less than a month later, four members of the board voted to terminate his employment. Within a few weeks of being fired, the town administrator sued several of the board members and the town under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Criminal complaint. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a criminal complaint against the new supervisor, charging him with taking a private interest in a public contract while in office, a Class I felony. The charge related to a public works contract awarded to a company owned by the new supervisor. But after a jury trial the new supervisor was acquitted of the corruption charge. He filed a counterclaim against the town administrator, arguing that he deliberately withheld damaging information to set him up for prosecution.

Involvement in investigation. As a result of the criminal investigation, it was revealed that the town administrator was far more involved in the investigation than he had admitted to the board. Moreover, discovery in the civil case added to the evidence of the administrator’s involvement. In light of all this, the defendants argued that the administrator’s firing did not violate the First Amendment because he was a “policymaker” who was aligned with their political enemies and spoke “in a manner that is critical of superiors or their stated policies.”

The new supervisor brought a counterclaim, alleging that the administrator retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment by scheming to trick him into committing a crime.

The defendants moved for summary judgment in the administrator’s lawsuit, as did the administrator on the counterclaim. The district court granted these motions. The district court held that the administrator could not succeed on the merits and that qualified immunity shielded these defendants from liability. Both parties timely appealed.

According to the town administrator, the new board faction fired him because he spoke to law enforcement as part of the state’s criminal investigation against the new supervisor, retaliating against him because he exercised his First Amendment rights.

Policymaker. As the town’s highest unelected official, the administrator qualified as a “policymaker.” That brought his case within the ambit of the Elrod—Branti line of political patronage cases, which permit public officials to fire policymaking employees for political reasons without offending the First Amendment, observed the Seventh Circuit.

To establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) the Constitution protects his speech or conduct; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter him from exercising his First Amendment rights; and (3) his speech “was a motivating factor in [his] employer’s adverse action against” him. However, employers can fire “policymaking” employees for political reasons without offending the First Amendment.

Retaliation. The administrator insisted he was terminated because he spoke to state authorities during the state’s criminal investigation. The defendants invoked both the standard Elrod—Branti policymaker exception and its corollary.

This case also raised a thorny question of how “partisan” or “political” must the employee’s speech be to trigger the policymaker corollary, which covers an employee fired for his political speech.

The speech in this case, involving the administrator’s comments to an investigator focused on the alleged misconduct of his superiors, was not overtly partisan. But the administrator was intensely critical of the new board faction, attacking them personally and questioning whether they had the judgment or ability to run the town effectively. Nor was there doubt that his speech was related “to the performance of [his] duties.”

However, a critical difficulty was that the defendants did not know what the administrator said when they fired him. They learned the administrator spoke to investigators after state law enforcement searched the new supervisor’s properties.

Qualified immunity. Based on uncertainties in the caselaw, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. A reasonable official in their position would believe that in these circumstances governing law allowed them to fire the administrator.

The operative question for all the Elrod—Branti policymaker cases is whether the administrator was a policymaker. The “test for whether a position involves policymaking is whether the position authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation.” The administrator’s core duty was to direct the town’s departments to implement the board’s policy decisions.

Based on governing precedent, a reasonable officer could think he need not wait for smoking-gun evidence of disloyalty before firing a policymaker. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for them to think that the administrator’s interviews with investigators involved speech critical of them and their policies.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

The cases are Nos. 25-1755 and 25-1808.

Judge: Brennan, M.

Attorneys: Michael R. Fox (Fox & Fox) for James March. Lori M. Lubinsky (Axley LLP) for Town of Grand Chute, Ronald G. Wolff, Jr., Jason Van Eperen and Jeffrey Ings.

Companies: Town of Grand Chute

Cases: IndividualRights PublicEmployees Discharge Retaliation IllinoisNews IndianaNews WisconsinNews