Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, IMMIGRATION—C.D. Cal.: Narrow injunction issued against DHS rule ending automatic extensions for H4 visa holders, (Sep 15, 2026)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

Rather than issue a nationwide injunction, the court set aside the rule as to the seven plaintiffs who are all H4 visa holders eligible to work in the United States.

Granting a preliminary injunction in favor of seven H4 visa holders—spouses of H1B visa holders—a federal district court in California immediately set aside, as to them, the government’s interim final rule that ended the “auto-extension” of employment authorizations for H4 visa holders. Stressing that this case “does not call for adjudicating the merits of the Executive Branch’s immigration policy,” the court explained that the issue before it “is only that the government did not follow the proper procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act. That is why this regulation fails and why the Court sets it aside as to the seven named Plaintiffs” (Doe v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, No. 8:26-cv-00060-DOC-MAA (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2026)).

H4 visa holders. Spouses of H1B visa holders are admitted pursuant to an H4 visa. H4 visa holders, observed the court, are not automatically eligible for employment in the United States and must obtain employment authorization documents (EADs). An H4 visa holder’s employment authorization is tied to their spouse’s immigration status. The plaintiffs here are each H4 visa holders who are eligible to work in the United States. They claim that recent changes with respect to the issuance of EADs has rendered it impossible for them to legally work in the United States and has forced some of them out of jobs they were holding under prior authorizations.

Interim final rule. Specifically, in October 2025, the government issued an interim final rule (IFR) ending a prior rule that granted EAD holders who had filed a renewal application up to 540 days of EAD auto extension, which was successful in preventing H4 visa holders from experiencing a gap in employment eligibility. In support of this new rule, the government cited one incident in which “an alien firebombed and assaulted demonstrators at a peaceful Jewish event to support hostages in Gaza,” by throwing Molotov cocktails that injured multiple victims. According to the government, the perpetrator was an alien who had “obtained an EAD based on a pending asylum application which was then automatically extended for a period of up to 540 days.”

Notice-and-comment period. The government bypassed the notice-and-comment period for the IFR and made it effective immediately, reasoning that “[t]he attack by an alien against peaceful demonstrators in Boulder, Colorado, highlights the critical and urgent need to act to mitigate the immediate risk posed to innocent Americans.” It also claimed that such emergency measures were necessary to prevent aliens from rushing to file EAD applications during the notice-and-comment period.

Contending that the government’s justifications behind the IFR were pretextual and false, the plaintiffs pointed to ATLAS and CIV, two systems that allow the government to screen and vet immigrants on H4 visas continuously. Thus, they argued, screening and vetting through the EAD process is superfluous.

Lawsuit. The plaintiffs sued the government, asserting one claim for violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and requested a temporary restraining order, which the court converted into an application for a motion for a preliminary injunction.

Likelihood of success on the merits. Turning to whether the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits, the court first addressed the government’s contention that exigent circumstances existed for bypassing the notice-and-comment period under a “midnight rush” theory. Specifically, it argued, “[i]f DHS were to announce the rulemaking, it is self-evident that aliens would rush to file renewal EAD applications to obtain automatic extensions before the rule takes effect” and that “[m]ore aliens would thus obtain up to 540-day automatic extension without the proper vetting and determination by USCIS that the alien continues to be eligible.”

But this “midnight rush” theory, said the court, was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in a series of cases related to immigration policies from the first Trump administration and it could not provide justification for the government’s good-cause exception argument.

The government, citing the single incident where an asylum applicant threw a Molotov cocktail while on an EAD auto-extension, next argued that bad actors could use their earnings from gainful employment to support criminal or terrorist actors. In support of its reliance on the good-cause exception, it cited “a Washington Post article indicating that when the United States stopped its policy of separating migrant parents from their children, smugglers told asylum-seekers that ‘the Americans do not jail parents who bring children—and to hurry up before they might start doing so again.’”

One-off event. Here, said the court, a “one-off event does not justify the use of the good-cause without further reasoning or justification. The government’s example also ignores a basic premise. The issue in the Molotov cocktail incident is not that the individual had authorization to work in the United States, it is that the person was in the United States and had access to a dangerous weapon. There is no logical connection between the person’s work authorization and their Molotov-throwing behavior.”

And while the government argued that the IFR extends beyond this single incident and suggested that EAD holders may use the income from their work in this country to support nefarious activities, it failed to identify any other example supporting an urgent security need for the IFR. As to the government’s assertion that significant security vulnerabilities exist in the United States and the 540-day auto-extension of an EAD “allows, for example, aliens to access secure facilities, such as airports—without determining continued eligibility, without resolving potential hits of derogatory information, and without determining that the employment authorization should be granted in the exercise of discretion, when applicable,” the court explained that “If an EAD applicant is a national security threat, the issue is that they are able to live in the United States, not that they are able to work in the United States.” The IFR, said the court, does not eliminate the former concern.

Foreign affairs function. The government next argued that DHS permissibly invoked the foreign affairs exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking, which applies “to the extent that there is involved... [a] foreign affairs function of the United States. This exception, the government asserted, applies because “the grant of employment authorization and/or EADs is inherent to the control of an alien’s status, and affects the transfer of goods, including money, across the U.S. border.”

Agreeing with the plaintiffs that “[t]his claim ignores the fact that a nonimmigrant’s status is entirely separate and distinct from their employment eligibility,” the court explained that “this case only concerns the plaintiff’s employment eligibility within the United States.”

Vetting capabilities. As to the government’s contention that its emergency rule is necessary to prevent bad actors from working in the United States without vetting, the court found this ignored the government’s continuous vetting capabilities through programs like ATLAS and CIV and the government failed to explain why these systems are insufficient for vetting EAD applicants. While the court noted that there are vetting alternatives to the IFR and that the IFR might have benefits over those alternatives that would justify its issuance, the government, it stressed, “is required to go through this step to demonstrate the propriety of its rulemaking process.”

Irreparable harm. Finding next that the plaintiffs sufficiently established a risk of irreparable harm, the court noted that they face an extended lapse in employment and the harm from this extends beyond the loss of wages. This lapse, said the court, “will prevent Plaintiffs from progressing in their careers and constrain their future earning potential. It may also signal to other employers that EAD holders present a risk of losing eligibility and inhibit Plaintiffs’ future employability.”

Balance of hardships and public interest. Finally, the court found the balance of equities and public interest factors favored the plaintiffs as public interest is served by compliance with the APA and the government failed to comply with the statue in enacting the IFR. The court also noted that H4 visa holders are generally highly educated and it is reasonable to conclude that they will contribute positively to society if allowed to work. Moreover, the court observed, they have already been vetted at least once, and the government can continuously vet them through programs like ATLAS and CIV. “Forcing such individuals to endure lapses in employment is not in the public interest.”

Narrow injunction. In granting the preliminary injunction, the court noted that it elected not to issue a nationwide injunction as this case raises mostly legal issues regarding the implementation of government regulations which are ripe for appeal. “The Court hopes that an appellate court will be given the opportunity to assess this issue without the need for a prior nationwide injunction. The Court anticipates that Plaintiffs may reinvigorate their request for a nationwide injunction if the government ultimately elects not to appeal this Order. If this comes to pass, the Court can entertain the request understanding that the government has declined an earlier opportunity to appeal.”

The case is No. 8:26-cv-00060-DOC-MAA.

Judge: Carter, D.

Attorneys: Justin Tseng (Law Offices of Justin Tseng) for Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4. Alarice M. Medrano, Office of U.S. Attorney, for U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Cases: RemediesDamages Immigration FederalRegulations Procedure CaliforniaNews